Summary
declining to find pendent venue over a Title VII claim pursuant to either the "specific provision" approach or the "primary claim" approach
Summary of this case from COOK v. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.Opinion
Civil No. CCB-04-1807 (ECF-EXEMPT).
November 9, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Now pending before the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss upon the grounds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and is an improper venue for this action. In the alternative, defendant moves the court to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss will be denied, but the case will be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charlretta T. McNeill ("McNeill") is employed as a Legal Administrative Specialist by the United States Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") in Washington, D.C. (Def.'s Mem, Beach Decl.at ¶ 4.) Defendant Kay Cole James ("James") is the director of OPM. The claims in the complaint stem from an incident that allegedly occurred on April 6, 2001. On that date, McNeill was asked to be the union representative in a conference. At that conference, McNeill alleges that Dennis Matteotti, the Division Chief of Disability Reconsideration Appeals Division, was acting inappropriately. Due to her disdain for his misconduct, McNeill ended the conference and attempted to leave. McNeill claims that Matteoti blocked the door and "violently stated `you are not going anywhere; you are going to listen to me.'" (Pl.'s Complaint ¶ 6, at 2.) McNeill alleges that Matteotti moved from the door as she tried to telephone security.
McNeill claims that this event adversely affected her medical and emotional health. She alleges that she was required to receive emergency care at George Washington Hospital and to use five weeks of sick and annual leave for treatment and therapy. (Id.) She returned to work but does not have any contact with Matteotti. She maintains that she was alienated by co-workers and subjected to disparate treatment by supervisors after her brush with Matteotti.
McNeill asserts that Matteotti has a pattern of subjecting black women over the age of forty to undue harassment or violence. She filed charges alleging discrimination on November 19, 2001 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and instituted this action on June 9, 2004 on the basis of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
ANALYSIS
James correctly argues that this district is not the proper venue for McNeill's case. Title VII limits the choice of forums to: (1) any judicial district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred; (2) the judicial district in which the relevant employment records are kept and administered; or (3) the judicial district in which the injured person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The alleged discrimination occurred in OPM's offices in Washington, D.C. and OPM's employment records are maintained there. (See Def.'s Mem., Beach Decl., ¶ 5.) McNeill is still employed by OPM and does not and cannot claim that she would have been working in a different judicial district but for the alleged discrimination. Thus, the District of Columbia is an appropriate venue for McNeill's Title VII claim but Maryland is not.There is no specific venue provision for the ADEA so venue is determined by the general venue provision of § 1391 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Under the general venue provision, actions against an officer, employee, or agency of the United States may be brought where (1) the defendant resides; (2) the cause of action arose; or (3) the plaintiff resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e). Because McNeill resides in Maryland, she has established proper venue for her ADEA claim. Venue for the ADEA claim would also be proper in the District of Columbia since James resides there and the alleged incident occurred there.
Whereas venue in this court is proper only for the ADEA claim, venue would be proper for both the ADEA and Title VII claims in the District of Columbia. McNeill urged the court to employ the doctrine of "pendent venue." This doctrine is an exception to the general rule that venue must be established for each claim in a complaint. Pendent venue allows proper venue as to one claim to support both claims if there are two or more claims that amount to a single cause of action with two grounds for relief. See Lengacher v. Reno, 75 F.Supp.2d 515, 518 (E.D.Va. 1999). The decision to apply pendent venue is left to the discretion of the court. Id. (citing Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed pendent venue. The courts that have discussed pendent venue have generally taken one of two approaches. Some have held that the more specific venue provision controls. See Lengacher, 75 F.Supp.2d at 519 (citing Trujillo v. Total Bus. Sys., Inc., 704 F.Supp. 1031, 1032 (D. Colo. 1989). Other courts decide based on the venue of the "primary" claim. See id. (citing Hayes v. RCA Serv. Co., 546 F. Supp. 661, 664 (D.D.C. 1982). Here, pendent venue is inappropriate under the first approach because the more specific venue provision is Title VII, which only permits venue in the District of Columbia. Similarly, the second approach does not favor Maryland as a venue because neither the Title VII or the ADEA claim is given primary importance in the complaint.
Generally, in cases involving Title VII and ADEA claims where venue is proper for one claim, but not the other, courts have transferred both claims to the district where venue is proper for both. See id. at 519. Venue is proper in the District of Columbia for both the Title VII and ADEA claims. "[T]he most efficient and sensible result is not a non-prejudicial dismissal of one claim, but rather transfer of the entire case to the District of Columbia." Benton v. England, 222 F.Supp.2d 728, 731 (D.Md. 2002) (quoting Lengacher, 75 F. Supp.2d at 519).
In the interest of justice and judicial economy, this case will be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
A separate order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby Ordered that:
1. defendant Kay Cole James's motion to dismiss or to transfer (docket no. 7) is GRANTED;
2. this case is TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia;
3. the clerk shall CLOSE this case; and
4. copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum shall be sent to counsel of record and to the plaintiff.