Opinion
No. CV-03-0822774 S
April 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS (#104)
This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, John A. Mastropietro, Chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission. The court held a hearing in connection with the motion on March 25, 2003, at which it received evidence and at which oral argument was presented. For the reasons stated below, the court denies the motion.
I BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The plaintiff, Delores McNair, filed a complaint, dated January 27, 2003. She alleges that she has a claim pending before the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), for injuries she sustained in the course of her employment. She acknowledges that, as a claimant before the Commission, she is subject to its rules, regulations, guidelines, and mandates. See Complaint, ¶ 2. She states that the defendant issued, by Memorandum No. 2002-07, a document entitled "Professional Guide for Attorneys, Physicians and Other Health Care Providers: Guidelines for Cooperation" (the "Guidelines"). See Complaint, ¶ 3. At the hearing the parties stipulated to the accuracy of the above-stated allegations.
The plaintiff claims that the Guidelines are unconstitutional, in violation of statutes, and otherwise illegal and invalid, in various ways. In paragraph 4A, she asserts that Section IV of the Guidelines establishes a procedure for a meeting between a claimant's physician, her attorney, and the respondent's lawyer, which violates General Statute § 52-146o. She also contends that the Guidelines unconstitutionally deny her the right to due process of law by violating her right, under the same statute, to decide who should have access to information from her treating physician about her work-related medical condition. See Complaint, ¶ 4B.
Section 52-146o provides,
(a) Except as provided in sections 52-146c to 52-146j, inclusive, and subsection (b) of this section, in any civil action or any proceeding preliminary thereto or in any probate, legislative or administrative proceeding, a physician or surgeon, as defined in subsection (b) of section 20-7b, shall not disclose (1) any communication made to him by, or any information obtained by him from, a patient or the conservator or guardian of a patient with respect to any actual or supposed physical or mental disease or disorder or (2) any information obtained by personal examination of a patient, unless the patient or his authorized representative explicitly consents to such disclosure.
(b) Consent of the patient or his authorized representative shall not be required for the disclosure of such communication or information (1) pursuant to any statute or regulation of any state agency or the rules of court, (2) by a physician, surgeon or other licensed health care provider against whom a claim has been made, or there is a reasonable belief will be made, in such action or proceeding, to his attorney or professional liability insurer or such insurer's agent for use in the defense of such action or proceeding, (3) to the Commissioner of Public Health for records of a patient of a physician, surgeon or health care provider in connection with an investigation of a complaint, if such records are related to the complaint, or (4) if child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual, abuse of an individual who is physically disabled or incompetent or abuse of an individual with mental retardation is known or in good faith suspected.
In paragraph 4C, the plaintiff challenges, as unconstitutionally vague, a provision of the guidelines which addresses the circumstances in which the claimant's counsel is forbidden to meet with her doctor. According to paragraph 4D, the Guidelines violate Connecticut law by recommending a reimbursement charge of 65 cents per page, instead of 45 cents per page, for copies of medical records.
At the hearing, the defendant's counsel noted that in a revision the Guidelines now recommend 45 cents, not 65 cents per page.
The plaintiff asserts, in paragraph 4E, that the Guidelines are unlawful in that they prescribe that a physician should refrain from characterizing a patient as "unemployable." Under paragraph 4F, she claims that the Guidelines unlawfully encourage treating physicians to enlist the assistance of counsel for either party to facilitate decisions on medical recommendations.
Another claim of unconstitutionality is described in paragraph 4G, wherein the plaintiff claims that the Guidelines arbitrarily and capriciously establish an inequality of pay rates for testifying physicians, depending on whether the physician has treated the claimant or examined her at the respondent's request. Finally, in paragraph 4H, the plaintiff asserts that the Guidelines were not enacted in accordance with due process and the rule-making procedures established by General Statutes §§ 4-166 et seq.
In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff claims a declaratory judgment that the Guidelines are unconstitutional and unlawful. She also seeks an order temporarily and permanently enjoining the implementation of the Guidelines. In addition, she requests any other equitable relief which the court deems fair and equitable.
At the hearing, Memorandum No. 2002-07, dated September 27, 2002, containing the Guidelines, was presented as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 is the revised and issued Guidelines, effective January 1, 2003.
II STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). "The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert . . . lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Practice Book § 10-31(1). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick, 244 Conn. 781, 787, 712 A.2d 396, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S.Ct. 542, 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 552, 698 A.2d 245 (1997).
"The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded . . ." Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 62, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
"Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and all facts provable thereunder, in deciding whether a declaratory judgment action in a given case is appropriate, we allow the trial court wide discretion to render a declaratory judgment unless another form of action clearly affords a speedy remedy as effective, convenient, appropriate and complete . . . Furthermore, [if] the plaintiffs' prayer for relief seeks not only a declaratory judgment but also general equitable relief, the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke the long arm of equity to receive whatever relief the court may from the nature of the case deem proper. Any relief can be granted under the general prayer which is consistent with the case stated in the complaint and is supported by the proof provided the defendant will not be surprised or prejudiced thereby . . . In sum, at least when there is a prayer for general equitable relief it is the law in our courts, as it is in the federal courts, that [a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted.) Id., 308-09.
III DISCUSSION
A. Sovereign Immunity
The defendant contends that this action, which is brought against him in his official capacity, is actually brought against the State of Connecticut, and is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, since the State has neither waived its immunity from suit nor consented to be sued. See defendant's memorandum in support of motion to dismiss, pp. 3-5 (#104.10) ("Deft.'s Memo."). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996).
Our Supreme Court has stated, "[w]e have long recognized the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent . . . We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Citations omitted.) Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 342, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981). Here, since the defendant is sued in his official capacity as chairman of the Commission, the State is being sued.
"The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized only three instances in which legal proceedings against the sovereign may be maintained: (1) an action for declaratory judgment or for an injunction that involves factual allegations of a constitutional infringement or violation; Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 550-53, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984); (2) an action for declaratory judgment or for an injunction that involves factual allegations that the State through its officers or agents has acted in excess of statutory authority; Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. [134,] 169, [ 749 A.2d 1147 (2000)]; and (3) the state has consented to suit by legislative enactment. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., [ supra, 239 Conn. 99]." St. George v. Gordon, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV-01-0379943-S (November 21, 2001, Skolnick, J.). Here, the plaintiff's allegations in her complaint fall under the first and second categories of exceptions to sovereign immunity, in that she alleges constitutional infringements or violations and actions in excess of statutory authority.
"[I]n a constitutional democracy sovereign immunity must relax its bar when suits against the government complain of unconstitutional acts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 283, 610 A.2d 590 (1992). However, "[t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." Barde v. Board of Trustees, supra, 207 Conn. 64. Here, the defendant has not, as yet, placed the allegations and their factual underpinnings in issue. For example, the motion was not accompanied by supporting affidavits. Accordingly, for the purposes of the motion, the court must "conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." Id., 62.
The court notes that, in a letter to the plaintiff's counsel, dated January 6, 2003, the defendant stated that the Guidelines "are a restatement of existing policy, procedure and law. With the exception of the dollar amounts, there are no substantive changes to present policy . . . Furthermore, these are guidelines." (Emphasis in original.) See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The parties have not briefed, except in conclusory fashion, the legal effect of the Guidelines.
Under this test, the court must review the complaint to ascertain if the plaintiff alleges sufficient facts, with respect to sovereign immunity, to support a claim of incursion on the plaintiff's constitutional rights. In so doing the court does not, at this juncture, "pass on whether the complaint [is] legally sufficient to state a cause of action." Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 489, 642 A.2d 699 (1994).
As noted above, in paragraphs 4B, 4C, 4G, and 4H, the complaint contains allegations of due process violations. Also as noted, the complaint seeks a declaratory judgment as to these alleged violations, as well as any other equitable relief which the court deems fair and equitable.
"The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits any state from depriving any person of `life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' Article one, section eight of our state constitution contains the same prohibition and is given the same effect as the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barde v. Board of Trustees, supra, 207 Conn. 64.
As a workers' compensation claimant, the plaintiff has a protected property interest which is sufficient to raise due process claims. As such a claimant, she would be entitled to benefits if she could establish that she met the statutory criteria. See Giaimo v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 509, 778 A.2d 33 (2001). It is in connection with that status that she claims that the defendant has violated her rights.
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due. . . . [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action . . . To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citation omitted.) Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
Our Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he United States Supreme Court [has] set forth three factors to consider when analyzing whether an individual is constitutionally entitled to a particular judicial or administrative procedure: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 226 n. 20, 764 A.2d 739 (2001).
The determination of what process is due should be made "after full consideration of the statutory scheme." Connecticut Associated Builders Contractors v. Anson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-98-579841 S (July 30, 1998, Langenbach, J.) ( 22 CLR 616), citing State v. Annonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 166-67, 425 A.2d 939 (1979).
Since the plaintiff has a protected property interest and since due process violations have been alleged, the defendant has not shown that he is entitled to dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. See Barde v. Board of Trustees, supra, 207 Conn. 65.
Under these circumstances, the court need not determine whether the plaintiff's allegations of actions by the defendant in excess of statutory authority are sufficient to pass muster for the purposes of the second exception to sovereign immunity. See Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 497.
B. Justiciability
The defendant also contends that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction since the plaintiff's claim is not justiciable, citing the four-pronged test of justiciability set forth in Mayer v. Biafore, Florek and O'Neill, 45 Conn. App. 554, 556, 696 A.2d 1282 (1997), reversed on other grounds, 245 Conn. 88, 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). See Deft.'s Memo., pp. 5-7.
"A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Mayer v. Biafore, Florek and O'Neill, supra, CT Page 5760 245 Conn. 91. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that "in deciding whether the complaint presents a justiciable claim, we make no determination regarding its merits. We do not consider, for example, whether it would survive a motion to strike on the ground that it does not state a valid cause of action for deprivation of the constitutional rights asserted, or whether it would survive a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the undisputed facts show that no such constitutional deprivations have occurred." Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 261 Conn. 475, 481, 803 A.2d 318 (2002).
"The principles that underlie justiciability are well established. Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." Id.
The defendant argues that the complaint fails each of the prongs of this test. The defendant contends that there is no actual controversy here, citing his purpose in publishing the Guidelines ("to reduce confusion . . ."), and his intent ("to assist both workers' compensation claimants and respondents in the orderly litigation of a claim . . ."). See Deft.'s Memo., p. 6. These statements about purpose and intent do not negate the fact that the plaintiff, as a compensation claimant, asserts that certain parts of the Guidelines infringe on her rights. See Downey v. Retirement Board, 22 Conn. App. 172, 181, 576 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811, 580 A.2d 56 (1990). The defendant has not shown the absence of a controversy.
Relying on the same rationale, the defendant claims that the interests of the parties are not adverse, since "[b]oth seek the smooth, orderly administration and adjudication of claims." See Deft.'s Memo., p. 7. The defendant's goals are not dispositive of the matter. By alleging that the defendant's Guidelines violate her rights, the plaintiff has set forth a sufficient pleading of adverseness.
In addition, the defendant contends that the complaint does not satisfy the third prong, that the matter is "capable of being adjudicated by judicial power." The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has made no allegations "other than conclusory statements concerning constitutionality and unlawful actions" to show how this matter is capable of being adjudicated by the court. See Deft.'s Memo., p. 7. The defendant erroneously raises consent to suit, which the court addressed above in the context of its discussion of sovereign immunity. The defendant also mentions "ripeness," Deft.'s Memo., p. 7, without explaining how it applies in this context. Where an issue is merely mentioned the court is not obligated to review it. See State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 281 n. 30, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001); CHRO v. Truelove and MacLean, Inc., 238 Conn. 337, 344 n. 11, 680 A.2d 1261 (1996).
The defendant does not contend that the matter at issue presents "a political question which could not be adjudicated by judicial authority without violating the principle of separation of powers." Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 674, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S.Ct. 236, 83 L.Ed.2d 176 (1984). The defendant also does not contend that the resolution of this type of dispute has been committed to the legislature. "Rather, the present case seeks to compel . . . steps to remedy the constitutional and statutory violations . . . We have expressly held that [i]n the absence of . . . a textual reservation . . . it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the [defendants have] fulfilled [their] affirmative obligations within constitutional principles." Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 316-17.
Finally, as to justiciability, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has not shown how the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to her. The defendant asserts that the Guidelines do not impact the plaintiff directly at all. See Deft.'s Memo., p. 7.
In response, the plaintiff notes ways in which she will be afforded relief if the court finds in her favor. See Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss, p. 3 (#105). For example, if the court determines that under certain circumstances the plaintiff's treating physician may not be required to meet with the insurance company's attorney, her rights would be meaningfully effected. See Complaint, ¶ 4 A. Also, if the court declares that the Guidelines illegally require a claimant's treating physician to refrain from characterizing her as "unemployable," the plaintiff may be able to present such evidence to support her claim. See Complaint, ¶ 4E. Thus, adjudication by the court which was favorable to the plaintiff would result in practical relief. In summary, since it is justiciable, the defendant has not shown that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter on that ground.
C. Standing
The defendant also contends that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter since the plaintiff lacks standing. See Deft.'s Memo., pp. 7-9.
"Standing is . . . a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury [that the complainant] has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy . . . If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted.) Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 219, 789 A.2d 431 (2002).
"Standing concerns the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Med-Trans, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, 242 Conn. 152, 160, 699 A.2d 142 (1997). Whether the plaintiff has standing depends on whether a duty was owed to her, that is whether she was within the zone of interests protected by the applicable law, here the Workers' Compensation Act. "This inquiry, in turn, requires an examination of the function and purpose of [the Act.]" Lewis v. Swan, 49 Conn. App. 669, 677, 716 A.2d 127 (1998).
"Connecticut first adopted a statutory scheme of workers' compensation in 1913. The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act . . . General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.; is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault . . . Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount . . . In return, the employee is compensated for his or her losses without having to prove liability . . . In a word, these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation . . . The intention of the framers of the act was to establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method for determining claims for compensation." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Casey v. Northeast Utilities, 249 Conn. 365, 378-79, 731 A.2d 294 (1999).
"It is well established that the Workers' Compensation Act is remedial in nature and that it should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose . . . Construing the statute liberally advances its underlying purpose of providing financial protection for injured workers and their dependents." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted.) Crook v. Academy Drywall Co., 219 Conn. 28, 32, 591 A.2d 429 (1991).
The plaintiff has shown that she is within the zone of interests protected by the Act. As noted, the parties stipulated to the fact that the plaintiff has a claim pending before the Commission for injuries which she sustained in the course of her employment. In addition, they stipulated to the fact that she is subject to the rules, regulations, guidelines, and mandates of the Commission. They also agreed that the defendant issued the Guidelines.
In support of his argument concerning standing, the defendant refers to statutes concerning the confidentiality of medical information, asserting that since General Statute § 31-294f (b) requires the provision of all medical reports to the employer, the plaintiff has no interest to protect. The court is unpersuaded. For example, this argument does not resolve the plaintiff's contention that the Guide illegally authorizes meetings by the respondent's attorney with her physician. See Complaint, ¶ 4 A. While General Statute § 52-146f (5), cited by both parties, provides that, as to a psychiatrist, the patient's consent is not required and communications or records may be disclosed in a proceeding where the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim, that statute does not refer to a meeting with the psychiatrist. "[S]tanding does not hinge on whether the plaintiff will ultimately be entitled to obtain relief on the merits of an action, but on whether he is entitled to seek the relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Swan, supra, 49 Conn. App. 675.
Section 31-294f (b) provides, "All medical reports concerning any injury of an employee sustained in the course of his employment shall be furnished within thirty days after the completion of the reports, at the same time and in the same manner, to the employer and the employee or his attorney."
Section 52-146f (5) provides, "Consent of the patient shall not be required for the disclosure or transmission of communications or records of the patient in the following situations as specifically limited: . . . (5) Communications or records may be disclosed in a civil proceeding in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, when his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the patient and the court or judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychiatrist be protected."
As noted above, the court has made no determination as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to obtain relief on the merits of her complaint.
The court concludes that the plaintiff has standing. In a recent analogous context, our Supreme Court rejected a claim that the Town of Southington lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of General Statute § 31-310 (b). See Donahue v. Southington, 259 Conn. 783, 785-87, 792 A.2d 76 (2002). There, the Town, which employed the workers' compensation claimant, contended that it had sustained economic injury by having to pay an unconstitutionally higher level of compensation. The court concluded, "the town is clearly basing its claim on its own injury, rather than the injury of the plaintiff or some third party. That is a sufficient stake in the outcome of this case to confer standing upon the town." Id., 792.
Similarly, the plaintiff here alleges injury to herself, as a workers' compensation claimant, as a result of certain provisions of the Guide, which she contends are either unconstitutional or illegal. Thus, she is basing her claims on her own claimed injuries, which is sufficient to confer standing.
D. Injunctive Relief
Finally, the defendant argues that, even if the court has subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff has not pleaded the requisite elements for injunctive relief, such as the lack of an adequate remedy at law and irreparable injury. See Deft.'s Memo., pp. 9-10.
"A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law." Tighe v. Town of Berlin, 259 Conn. 83, 87, 788 A.2d 40 (2002). While the complaint, which seeks injunctive relief, is lacking in these respects, these omissions are not dispositive for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, since the plaintiff's complaint also seeks a declaratory judgment against the State.
Plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction is not before this court for adjudication.
"[D]eclaratory relief controls state activity no less completely than injunctive relief. The issuance of a declaratory judgment in this action would have the practical effect, even in the absence of a request for injunctive relief, of prompting the defendant . . . to comply with the [law]. Moreover, because declaratory relief controls state activity no less completely than injunctive relief . . . there is no prerequisite that there be a request for injunctive relief, which, indeed, might be redundant." (Internal quotation marks omitted and citation omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 324.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. It is so ordered.
BY THE COURT
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT