Opinion
19313-22
06-06-2023
ROBERT A. MCMILLAN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Kathleen Kerrigan, Chief Judge.
On October 6, 2022, respondent filed in the above-docketed case a Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, on the ground that the petition was not filed within the time prescribed by section 6213(a) or 7502 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). Respondent attached to the motion copies of a notice of deficiency and corresponding certified mail list (U.S. Postal Service (USPS) Form 3877), as evidence of the fact that such notice of deficiency for the taxable year 2020, dated April 11, 2022, had been sent to petitioner by certified mail on April 11, 2022.
The petition herein was filed with the Court on August 22, 2022, which date is 133 days after the date of the notice of deficiency for tax year 2020 mailed to petitioner. The petition had been received by the Court in an envelope that bears a postmark dated August 15, 2022, which date is 126 days after the date of the notice.
This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case seeking the redetermination of a deficiency, the jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Rule 13(c), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; Hallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. No. 6 (Nov. 29, 2022); Brown v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 215, 220 (1982). In this regard, section 6213(a), I.R.C., provides that the petition must be filed with the Court within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day). The Court has no authority to extend this 90-day (or 150-day) period. Joannou v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 868, 869 (1960). However, a petition shall be treated as timely filed if it is filed on or before the last date specified in such notice for the filing of a Tax Court petition, a provision which becomes relevant where that date is later than the date computed with reference to the mailing date. Sec. 6213(a), I.R.C. Likewise, if the conditions of section 7502, I.R.C., are satisfied, a petition which is timely mailed may be treated as having been timely filed.
In the present case, the time for filing a petition with this Court expired on July 11, 2022. However, the petition was not filed within that period.
Petitioner was served with a copy of respondent's motion to dismiss and, on May 18, 2023, filed an objection. Therein, petitioner did not directly deny the jurisdictional allegations set forth in respondent's motion and did not allege that petitioner had filed with the Tax Court before the statutory deadline. Rather, the brief submission stated in its entirety: "In regards to Docket No. 19313-22 I am filing an objection and requesting dismissal of this motion as no documentation has been provided to me substantiate any claim in this matter.". Nonetheless, review of the earlier petition provides additional context. In that document, petitioner had represented that he contacted the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on June 14, 2022, had apparently been advised that he did not need to file a petition, had then sent further material to the agency on June 15, 2022, and had received in response a Letter 4314C dated August 11, 2022, indicating that the IRS needed further time to review petitioner's information. Copies of various items of the correspondence were attached. As regards the substance of the case, petitioner's contentions centered on a lack of any documentation on the part of the IRS to support alleged cancellation of debt income shown on the notice of deficiency.
Thus, given the foregoing, the record indicates after issuance of the notice of deficiency, petitioner endeavored to communicate with and to submit information to, and to seek information from, the IRS. The law is well settled, however, that once a notice of deficiency has been issued, further administrative contact or consideration does not alter or suspend the running of the 90-day period. Even confusing IRS responses or correspondence during the administrative process cannot override the clearly stated deadline in the statutory notice of deficiency. Such confusion is not uncommon given that the IRS frequently treats as separate processes or proceedings what taxpayers view as a single dispute. Taxpayers not infrequently have also conflated this Court with an IRS unit, but the IRS is a completely separate and independent entity from the Tax Court. In a similar vein, audit reconsideration is unrelated to, and has no bearing on, rights to petition the Tax Court.
Although section 7502, I.R.C., allows a timely mailed petition to be treated as timely filed, that section mandates that the envelope bearing the petition be "properly addressed to the agency, officer, or office with which the document is required to be filed.". Sec. 7502(a)(2)(B), I.R.C. A petition seeking redetermination of a deficiency must be filed with this Court and not the IRS. Sec. 6213(a), I.R.C. Hence, the mailing (or faxing) of a petition, correspondence, return, or other documentation to the IRS is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256 (1972). The statute is clear, and this Court must follow it. Estate of Cerrito v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 896 (1980). The Court would also note that a notice of deficiency issued to a taxpayer states on its face the last day to petition the Tax Court (not the IRS) and provides expressly in multiple places that the filing period extends 90 days from the date of the letter. The first pages of the notice are likewise explicit in providing that petitions must be filed with the U.S. Tax Court and in giving the Court's address as "400 Second Street, NW, Washington, DC 20217". With these definitive rules regarding the inefficacy of written correspondence to the IRS, it is clear that efforts to contact the IRS by phone or fax can offer no greater protection.
Notably, the Letter 4314C that petitioner received is consistent with the above parameters, stating explicitly: "We received the information you sent after we issued the Notice of Deficiency. The Notice of Deficiency advised you of the deadline for petitioning the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court can't consider your case if your petition is late. This letter and our consideration of the information you sent doesn't extend your time to file a petition with the United States Tax Court, if you decide to do so."
Furthermore, it is equally well settled that where the Commissioner's representatives provide erroneous advice based upon a mistaken interpretation of the law, courts and the Commissioner are not bound by the agent's statements and must follow the applicable statutes, regulations, and caselaw. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Neri v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 767, 771-772 (1970). Consequently, the same result must obtain regardless of whether the jurisdictional question is later raised by the Commissioner or by the Court sua sponte. Moreover, despite its superficial appeal, it has long been the rule that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is unavailable in these circumstances. As this Court has stated, an "estoppel argument must fail for the simple reason that the doctrine of estoppel cannot create jurisdiction where none otherwise exists." Energy Res., Ltd. v, Commissioner, 91 T.C. 913, 917 (1988). Thus the apparently erroneous advice that petitioner received from IRS personnel is highly regrettable, but it cannot alter the legal outcome.
Hence, while the Court is sympathetic to petitioner's situation and understands the unintentional character of the inadvertence here, as well as the challenges of the circumstances faced and the good faith efforts made, the fundamental nature of the filing deadline precludes the case from going forward. As a Court of limited jurisdiction, the Court is unable to offer any remedy or assistance when a petition is filed late. Rather, the Court is barred from considering in any way petitioner's case or the correctness of petitioner's claims. Unfortunately, governing law recognizes no reasonable cause or other applicable exception to the statutory deadline, and the allegation that the petition was sent more than a month late remains unrebutted.
The Court has no authority to extend that period provided by law for filing a petition "whatever the equities of a particular case may be and regardless of the cause for its not being filed within the required period." Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256, 259 (1972). Accordingly, since petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was mailed to or filed with this Court within the required 90-day period, this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court would, however, encourage petitioner to continue working administratively through the IRS, which, being entirely separate from the Tax Court, may be able to offer alternative avenues for relief, not dependent on the existence of a Tax Court case, such as audit reconsideration or a refund action.
The premises considered, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.