We disagree. Although, as the Parish contends, there are circumstances in which a court might award damages to a plaintiff who did not request them, see McMaster v. Strickland, 472 S.E.2d 623, 625-26 (S.C. 1996), such an outcome here was far too remote to constitute a reasonable possibility that the Parish would be held liable for damages. For this reason, we conclude that the trademark litigation did not trigger GuideOne's duty to defend.
Of Lanford's counter- and cross-claims, the following claims are suits at law: 1) misrepresentation, see Turnbull v. Gadsden, 1848 WL 2530, at *5 (S.C. Eq. 1848); 2) fraud, see Kaiser v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 65 S.E.2d 865, 871 (S.C. 1951); 3) civil conspiracy, see Hackworth v. Greywood at Hammett, LLC, 682 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009); 4) unjust enrichment, see Mosseri, Mosseri, Castro v. Austin's at the Beach, Inc., 642 S.E.2d 760, 761 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007); 5) violation of South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, see Taylor v. Hoppin' Johns, Inc., 405 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); and 6) breach of fiduciary duty, see Verenes v. Alvanos, 690 S.E. 2d 771, 773 (S.C. 2010). The following counter- and cross-claims are suits at equity: 1) rescission, see McMaster v. Strickland, 472 S.E.2d 623, 625 (S.C. 1996); 3) accounting, see HistoricCharleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 673 S.E.2d 448, 453 (S.C. 2009); and 4) dissolution, see Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 673 S.E.2d 448, 454 (S.C. 2009). Plaintiff seeks to have his case tried to the bench, while Defendant has invoked his Seventh Amendment Right to a jury trial on related claims.
Instead, the plaintiff asked only for specific performance and "such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper." 322 S.C. 451, 454, 472 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1996). Nonetheless, the special referee awarded plaintiff monetary damages.
This proposition has been interpreted by our courts to mean that an award for attorney's fees will not be reversed due to a lack of findings in the order when the record supports the judge's determination. See Jackson v. Speed, 326 S.C. 289, 308, 486 S.E.2d 750, 760 (1997) ("[A]n award for attorney's fees will be affirmed so long as sufficient evidence in the record supports each factor."); McMaster v.Strickland, 322 S.C. 451, 455, 472 S.E.2d 623, 626 (1996) (affirming special referee's award of attorney's fees notwithstanding his failure to make specific findings about each of the six Blumberg factors because the record contained ample support for each of the six factors). Encapsulating the facts of this case and the law, I conclude that the amount of the award of the attorney's fee is NOT supported by the evidentiary record.
Classification of property as wetlands does not constitute an encumbrance. McMaster v. Strickland, 305 S.C. 527, 530, 409 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct.App. 1991), rev'd in part onother grounds, 322 S.C. 451, 472 S.E.2d 623 (1996). Second, the record contains no evidence of either unilateral or mutual mistake.