Opinion
Civil Action 6:21-3936-JFA-KFM
10-25-2022
Brent Christopher McLaurin, Jr., also known as Brent Christopher McLauren, Jr., Petitioner, v. Warden McCormick Correctional Institution, Respondent.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review posttrial petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
The petitioner is presently incarcerated at McCormick Correctional Institution in the South Carolina Department of Corrections. During its June 2014 term, the Pickens County Grand Jury indicted the petitioner for grand larceny (2014-GS 39-0499), entering a bank with the intent to steal (2014-GS-39-0497), and armed robbery (2014-GS-39-0498). On February 17, 2015, the petitioner moved to relieve counsel and proceed toward trial pro se. After an extensive colloquy and motion hearing, the Honorable R. Scott Sprouse granted the petitioner's motion (app. 1-15). On April 19, 2015, the Solicitor's Office dismissed the charge of armed robbery. On May 18-19, 2015, the petitioner proceeded to trial as a pro se defendant with former counsel, John W. DeJong, serving as standby counsel (app. 17-508). Assistant Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Brandi Batson Hinton prosecuted the case. The trial was presided over by the Honorable John C. Hayes, III. A jury convicted the petitioner on his remaining charges of grand larceny and entering a bank with the intent to steal. Judge Hayes sentenced the petitioner to thirty years for entering a bank with the intent to steal and to ten years for grand larceny, with the two sentences running concurrently (app. 507-08).
A. Direct Appeal
Robert M. Pachak of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, filed a brief on the petitioner's behalf pursuant to Anders v. California on October 25, 2016 (doc. 22-2). Counsel raised a single issue for review: “Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict to the charge of entering a bank with intent to steal and grand larceny when the State failed to present any substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt [sic] the identity of the person who entered the bank?” (id. at 4).
On March 21,2017, the petitioner filed a pro se response to the Anders brief, wherein he chiefly complained about the condition of the trial transcript, questioned the transcript's verbatim accuracy, admonished the destruction of the recordings after the transcript was created, and stated:
[T]he office of so called Appellate Defense, meanwhile, did get around to affording appellate with what appeared to be a copy of some trial transcript, however, upon careful perusal, the purported “transcript” was clearly nothing but a sanitized, poorly altered; revised “version” [sic] and one, sadly which can be of no use to the Court of Appeals, or anyone else for that matter. ...
Appellants nor their lawyers can ever be certain that any so called transcript is actually a verbatim representation. In my own case, I am able to clearly see that major portions of the so called transcript have been cleaned up, so to speak. Bench conferences are not on the record, nor are motions I made and neither is dialog between myself and the solicitor or others in the court room.(Doc. 22-3 at 2-3). The petitioner then argued for formal charges against the State and that spoliation prevented the Court of Appeals from conducting meaningful appellate review (id. at 4-5). The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal by unpublished opinion No. 2017-UP-376 on October 11,2017 (doc. 22-4). The petitioner sought certiorari from the South Carolina Supreme Court, which was denied on November 2, 2017 (doc. 22-5).
B. Post-Conviction Relief
The petitioner filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) on August 6, 2018 (app. 510). The State served a return, partial motion to dismiss, and motion for more definite statement on March 19, 2019 (app. 521). As summarized by the return, the petitioner raised the following claims in his PCR application:
1. Constitutional Violations
a. Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
b. Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
c. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
d. Article 1, Section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution
e. Article 1, Section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution
f. Ineffective Assistance of (Trial) Counsel
2. Ineffective Assistance of (Trial) Counsel.
a. “My attorney failed to conscientiously discharge his professional responsibilities while handling my case.”
b. “My attorney failed to act as a diligent conscientious advocate on my behalf.”
c. “My attorney did not have my best interest in mind while he was employed as my professional advocate.”
d. “My attorney failed to serve my cause in good faith.”
e. “My attorney neglected to do the necessary investigations to properly prepare for my case.”
f. “My attorney did not try to have my case settled in a manner that would have been to my best advantage.”
g. “My attorney, knowing that I was illiterate to the legal process and complexities of a trial as well as the fact that I was an elderly man with numerous health issues, and that I did not fully understand the consequences involved.”
h. “My attorney never consulted with me about the possible consequences of proceeding to trial.”
i. “My attorney failed to file any effective pretrial motions on my behalf.”
j. “My attorney failed to inform me of the dangers associated with self-representation.”
k. “Because of my attorney's gross neglect and numerous mistakes and legal errors, Applicant has been subjected to unjust trial and conviction.”
3. Ineffective Assistance of (Appellate) Counsel
a. Failed to raise issues on appeal
4. Prosecutorial Misconduct(App. 522-23). A PCR evidentiary hearing was conducted on October 22, 2019, before the Honorable Edward W. Miller (app 531-51). The petitioner was represented by Rodney Richey, and the State was represented by Assistant Attorney General Taylor Smith (app. 531). At the outset of the hearing, the petitioner, through counsel, abandoned all of the allegations of his application with the exception of the claim that his former attorney, Mr. DeJong, was constitutionally ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation, which the petitioner argued forced him to relieve counsel and represent himself at trial (app. 536). The PCR court heard testimony from the petitioner and Mr. DeJong (app. 540, 547). The PCR court found no merit to the allegation, ruling from the bench that the application should be dismissed and filing a subsequent order to the same effect on February 18, 2020 (app. 550, 552-65).
C. Post-Conviction Relief Appeal
On January 22, 2021, Wanda H. Carter, Deputy Chief Appellate Defender of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, filed and perfected a Johnson petition on the petitioner's behalf, seeking certiorari to appeal the decision of the PCR court (doc. 22-7). The petitioner raised a single issue on PCR appeal: “Trial counsel erred in failing to object to petitioner's motion to appear pro se because the motion was arguably one to obtain counsel of his choice for trial” (id. at 3). The petitioner filed a pro se response to the Johnson petition on April 1, 2021 (doc. 22-8). Therein, the petitioner argued: 1) a directed verdict should have been granted in his favor; 2) Mr. DeJong violated the order of the court and continued to represent the petitioner; 3) Mr. DeJong gave false testimony at the PCR hearing; and 4) the petitioner's initial PCR attorney, Mr. Thompson, informed the petitioner he could not help him in any way and that such attorney allegedly instructed the judge not to let the petitioner out of prison (id. at 1). The matter was transferred to the South Carolina Court of Appeals on April 14, 2021 (doc. 22-9), and on September 14, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued an order denying certiorari and dismissing the appeal (doc. 2210). The remittitur was issued on October 12, 2021 (doc. 22-11).
Johnson v. State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988).
D. Federal Petition
On December 6, 2021, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief under § 2254 in this court (doc. 1). In his petition, the petitioner raises the following ground for relief: “The State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that I entered the bank. Only 1 witness stated that it was I who entered. I did not enter the bank” (id. at 6; doc. 11-1 at 5). On May 18, 2022, the respondent filed a return and motion for summary judgment (docs. 22, 23). On May 19, 2022, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately (doc. 24). After requesting and receiving three extensions of time (docs. 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33), the petitioner filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on September 1, 2022 (doc. 35). The respondent then filed a reply on September 8, 2022 (doc. 37). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for review.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
1. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
2. Section 2254
Because the petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision,” and “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101-102 (2011) (citations omitted). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B. Exhaustion and Timeliness
The respondent acknowledges that the petitioner has technically exhausted his state court remedies and that the petition is timely (doc. 22 at 6-9).
C. Procedural Default
Procedural bypass, sometimes referred to as procedural bar or procedural default, is the doctrine applied when a petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief on an issue after he failed to raise that issue at the appropriate time in state court and has no further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In such a situation, the person has bypassed his state remedies and, as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. Procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings if the state has procedural rules that bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion.
If a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court. If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. As the Supreme Court has explained:
[State procedural rules promote] not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims
together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984).
The respondent first argues that the petitioner's sole ground presented in his federal habeas petition - that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt - is procedurally defaulted (doc. 22 at 11-12). As set out above, the claim raised by the petitioner here was raised by counsel as the sole ground for relief in the Anders brief in the direct appeal (doc. 22-2). However, the petitioner, representing himself, failed to make a motion for directed verdict at trial (app.. 435-36), which, as argued by the respondent, is the issue-preserving action for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in South Carolina. State v. Burton, 589 S.E.2d 6, 9 (S.C. 2003); State v. Green, 567 S.E.2d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 2002). See also State v. Bailey, 626 S.E.2d 898, 900 n.4 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that “[i]f a defendant presents evidence after the denial of his directed verdict motion at the close of the State's case, he must make another directed verdict motion at the close of all evidence in order to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence.”); State v. Adams, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
The petitioner attached a copy of the Anders brief to his § 2254 petition (doc. 1-1).
As there was no directed verdict motion, there consequently was no ruling from the trial court as to the insufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, the question then becomes whether the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's direct appeal as procedurally defaulted. Federal habeas courts generally “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). This doctrine bars federal courts from addressing federal claims raised pursuant to § 2254 when a state court has declined to grant relief because the petitioner failed to meet a state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-30. “A state rule of procedure cannot command default of a claim asserted by a federal habeas petitioner unless the last state court to consider the claim actually relies on the rule to reject it.” Thomas v. Davis, 192 F.3d 445, 453 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.255, 261-62 (1989)). However, the Harris presumption “applies only when it fairly appears that a state court judgment rested primarily on federal law or was interwoven with federal law, that is, in those cases where a federal court has good reason to question whether there is an independent and adequate state ground for decision.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled as follows in the petitioner's direct appeal: “Dismissed after consideration of Appellant's pro se brief and review pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel's motion to be relieved is granted” (doc. 22-4). In a footnote, the Court of Appeals further stated that the case was decided without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR (id.). The Fourth Circuit has announced principles for determining when an unexplained state court decision like this one may fairly be considered as grounded in federal law:
The rub comes in attempting to decipher the basis for an unexplained state order, i.e., in deciding whether a state court's summary disposition-like the one-sentence denial at issue here-“fairly appears” to rest on federal law or on an adequate and independent state ground. Fortunately, there are some general guideposts to direct our inquiry. First, federal habeas courts should simply look to the text of the state court's order
for clues, see Skipper v. French, 130 F.3d 603, 611 (4th Cir.1997), in particular whether the state order mentions federal law, see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Smith, 14 F.3d at 963-64. Also, the language used by the state court in disposing of the claim may suggest a basis for the order. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802, 111 S.Ct. 2590 (noting the use of “dismissed” rather than “denied” may be instructive). Second, federal habeas courts should consider the circumstances surrounding the entry of the state order. See id., 501 U.S. at 802, 111 S.Ct. 2590; Smith, 14 F.3d at 964-69. For example, the federal habeas court's decision might be informed by examining whether the claims presented to the state court were subject to summary denial on procedural grounds under state law, see Smith, 14 F.3d at 967, or whether the state court refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing, see id. at 968; see also Skipper, 130 F.3d at 611 (noting that it may be helpful to consider the procedural posture of the state decision and the motion papers submitted to the state court).Wilson v. Moore, 178 F.3d 266, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court of Appeals' order dismissed, rather than denied, the petitioner's appeal without mentioning federal law. “[T]he failure to mention federal law supports the conclusion that the state order ‘fairly appears' to rest on state law, even though the state order does not refer expressly to state law.” Id. at 274 (citing Coleman 501 U.S. at 738). Further, as to the second factor, the petitioner's claim was subject to summary dismissal because it was not preserved for appellate review based upon the petitioner's failure, in representing himself at trial, to move for a directed verdict. Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that the Harris presumption does not apply, and the petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted.
“[A] federal court ordinarily may not consider claims that a petitioner failed to raise at the time and in the manner required under state law unless ‘the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error.'” Teleguz v. Pearson, 689 F.3d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006)). To show cause, a petitioner must “show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule,” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), or that “the factual or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available to the claimant at the time of the state proceeding.” Roach v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 210, 222 (4th Cir. 1999). “Alternatively, Petitioner may prove that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). A fundamental miscarriage of justice equates to the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. However, “actual innocence” requires “factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998).
In his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the petitioner concedes that he did not make a directed verdict motion at trial and that his ground for relief is procedurally defaulted (doc. 35 at 2-3). The petitioner does not attempt to argue cause and prejudice. Rather, he argues in support of his ground for relief that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction (id. at 1-5). To the extent this can be considered an attempt to prove that failure to consider his claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the petitioner has failed to make an actual innocence showing. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (stating that a petitioner must show factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency, by demonstrating that “in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, should the district court find that the petitioner's sole ground for relief is not procedurally defaulted, the claim also fails on the merits, as discussed below.
D. Merits
1. Evidence Presented at Trial
The SunTrust Bank in Pickens, South Carolina, was robbed a few minutes before 3:18 p.m. on January 14, 2014 (app. 188, 385). On that date, the petitioner was driven to Pickens by two young men, Skylar Harris and Jared Bearden. Faye Padgett testified that she saw these two young men enter her Nestfeathers store in the mid afternoon on January 14, 2014 (app. 157-58, 162). She also saw an older gentleman, who was probably in his early 60's, enter moments later and join them (app. 157-58). She heard the older gentlemen say that the two younger guys wanted to buy guitars, but that he had to go somewhere and would be back to get them (app. 159). She witnessed the older gentleman leave and head in the direction of the nearby SunTrust Bank (app. 160-61). The young men then quickly left once the older gentleman had been gone for approximately 10-15 minutes (app. 162). Ms. Padgett confirmed on cross-examination that the petitioner was the older gentleman she saw in her store that day (app. 164).
Ms. Lessie Swayngham testified that she was likewise in Nestfeathers that afternoon and also saw the two young men and older gentleman (app. 169). She described the older man as wearing a black hoodie, with a white undershirt, jeans, and tennis shoes (app. 174-75). She saw this man head in the direction of the bank as well (app. 182).
Loretta Rohrer-Norris testified that at the time of the crime she was employed with SunTrust Bank as a regional security manager and handled the surveillance footage of the bank entered into evidence in this case, along with photographs taken from the same (app. 183, 210).
Tracy Batson testified that on January 14, 2014, she worked as a teller-coordinator at the Pickens SunTrust Bank (app. 194-95). She testified that a white gentleman came in wearing a black hoodie, with white shoes, and blue jeans. He never spoke, but he handed her a note instructing her to give him large bills and to not press any dye packs, give him fake money, or press the silent alarm (app. 195-96, 203). The note was on a regular sheet of notebook paper and also conveyed that he was fully armed and would shoot (app. 201-02). She complied, and the man put the money in a manila envelope (app. 200, 202). He then had her provide the same type of note to the drive-through teller, along with a manila envelope for the money (app. 196, 200). In total, he received more than $3,000 (app. 213). She could not see the man's face because he had sunglasses, white gloves, and was pulling the hoodie tightly so as to cover some of his face. However, she was able to note that he had gray facial hair and a mustache, was thin with a medium build, and was probably in his 50s or 60s (app. 199-200, 203-04). Vikki Shulte, the drive-through teller, testified to essentially the same facts (app. 216-22).
On January 15, 2014, Detective Samuel Byers of the Pickens City Police Department testified that he received a lead as to the identity of the robber, and he spoke with Skylar Harris and Jared Bearden. Detective Byers developed the petitioner as a suspect as a result of those conversations (app. 240). That conversation also provided a location for the petitioner at the Traveler's Inn off Augusta Road in Greenville (app. 241). The petitioner was arrested at that location wearing a white t-shirt, blue jeans, and white tennis shoes (app. 243). A search warrant was also obtained, and, upon a search of the room, officers found a laptop bag, a green spiral notebook containing lined white notebook paper, manila envelopes, a razor (at the time of arrest, the petitioner did not have a mustache), and a yellow metal watch (which the State argued matched the watch shown in the bank surveillance photos) (app. 243, 246-51, 253, 451). Detective Byers also testified that the petitioner's shoes were taken into evidence because surveillance video showed the suspect wearing white shoes. He further testified that these shoes had the same darkened area in the bridge of the shoe as well as matching dark markings on the back (app. 254-57).
Detective Byars testified that no hoodie, sunglasses, gloves, or robbery notes were found in the petitioner's hotel room (app. 245-46).
Skylar Harris, who was 19 years old, testified that he met the petitioner by happenstance at the hospital when discussing his car and stereo. The petitioner inquired as to whether he would be interested in a job working on cars (app. 285). Skylar testified that he was in Pickens on January 14, 2014, along with his friend Jared Bearden and the petitioner. Skylar drove, using his father's truck, at the request of the petitioner who claimed he needed to see a friend who owed him money (app. 286-87). Skylar testified that they just “drove around some” with the petitioner instructing him where to drive. However, Skylar got tired of wasting gas, so he pulled over and went into Nestfeathers (app. 287). The petitioner and Jared went in with him, but the petitioner left shortly after. The petitioner then called Jared's cell phone and said he was ready to go. The petitioner was waiting on them at the truck. It was at that time that Skylar saw police cars going by with their lights and sirens on (app. 288-89). He described the petitioner as acting “sketchy like, let's get out of here,” and the petitioner told them to “go” in a loud voice (app. 290). Skylar testified that before taking the petitioner back to his room at the Traveler's Inn, they stopped at a nearby Hardee's at the petitioner's instruction, where the petitioner threw two grocery bags into the dumpster. Skylar was unable to see the contents of the bags (app. 291). He described the petitioner as wearing what he thought was a turtleneck that day, along with blue jeans and white tennis shoes (app. 291).
Skylar testified that he and Jared spent the night at Jared's house, and they saw the news of the bank robbery on television the next day (app. 292). They realized that it seemed “sketchy” that they were nearby at that time, and they told Jared's dad, who called the Pickens Police Department. Skylar testified that he spoke to the police and told them what he had testified to at trial (app. 292).
Jared Bearden, who was eighteen years old, also testified. Jared testified that when they picked up the petitioner on January 14, 2014, at the Traveler's Inn, he had a black laptop bag with him, which was closed with the exception of “yellow envelopes” poking out of the top of the bag; he confirmed that these envelopes looked like the ones presented to him during trial (app. 338). In addition to the comparable testimony offered by Skylar, Jared testified that upon arriving in Pickens, they rode around the block maybe four to six times at the instruction of the petitioner before parking (app. 336). Jared testified on cross-examination that the petitioner left the Nestfeathers store for approximately five to ten minutes, after which he called Skylar's phone to inform them that he was ready to go (app. 345). Jared testified that when he and Skylar returned to the truck, the petitioner “wasn't really acting too different,” but confirmed that the petitioner told them to “go” (app. 338). He further confirmed the stop at the Hardee's dumpster (app. 338-39).
Jared testified that he told his father about the events of the day and that his father called the police. He testified that he spoke to his father because he had seen on the news the report of the SunTrust bank robbery and that there was a mention of two accomplices. Jared testified that he did not want to get wrapped up in anything and wanted to be “better safe than sorry.” The petitioner attempted to contact Jared numerous times following these events (app. 340-41). On redirect examination, Jared testified that the bit of color on the petitioner's white tennis shoes was either dark blue or black and that his statement to police identified them as “white with blue” (app. 357).
FBI Agent Robert Hamod testified that he assisted the Greenville County Sheriff's Office with the investigation of the bank robbery. He was not present at the moment of the petitioner's arrest, but he was informed that the petitioner had been read his Miranda rights and that the petitioner specifically asked to speak with him (app. 359-61). Agent Hamod spoke with the petitioner who asked to be placed in the federal prison system and asked what he needed to do to make that happen (app. 362-63). Agent Hamod testified that the conversation was what he considered to be “negotiations” (app. 363). Agent Hamod further testified that the petitioner explained to him that the two young men associated with him, Skylar Harris and Jared Bearden, “had absolutely nothing to do with the bank robbery.” Agent Hamod had not mentioned the names of these young men to the petitioner (app. 363).
Pickens City Police Assistant Chief Travis Riggs testified that on his way home from training on January 14, 2014, he heard dispatch “give out a panic hold-up alarm over the radio” for the SunTrust Bank at 3:18 p.m., and he immediately responded (app. 38485). Assistant Chief Riggs canvassed the area looking for suspects, but was not successful in those efforts. He testified that he did obtain statements from various witnesses, including Ms. Padgett, Vikki Swayngham, the tellers, and a lady who was at the bank ATM (app. 387). Assistant Chief Riggs was present for the petitioner's arrest and present for the conversation held between Agent Hamod and the petitioner (app. 397). He then read into the record the petitioner's voluntary written statement:
Jared Beardon and . . . Skylar Harris are in no manner, nor were they ever involved either directly or indirectly with any illegal activity, including but not limited to either any bank robbery, or the alleged bank robbery of the SunTrust. Both individuals set forth above - . . . are not involved in any illegal activities. And I'm aware they have no knowledge of the planning or any conspiracy level type scenarios in volunteering - involving either myself or others under any circumstances. . . . I also told the FBI precisely the same thing. . . . And [Skylar and Jared] at no period ever planned, conspired to commit the crime of bank robbery or any other crime with me. . . .(App. 402-403). Assistant Chief Riggs likewise confirmed that at no time did he inform the petitioner of the names of the young men the petitioner mentioned in his statement; the petitioner voluntarily offered those names to police (app. 404). Assistant Chief Riggs also testified, “[The petitioner] told me that I was perceptive and intelligent, and that even though I may not can prove it, I know that he knows that I know” (app. 404).
2. Analysis
The petitioner contends that the State failed to prove that he was the individual who entered the bank (doc. 1 at 6), which is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, the petitioner “is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). As discussed above, at no point was the trial court prompted to make a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, as accomplished by a directed verdict motion. Nonetheless, a review of the record reveals that a rational factfinder could readily have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of grand larceny and entering the SunTrust Bank with intent to steal.
As argued by the respondent, the most obvious evidence of guilt comes in the form of the petitioner's statements to law enforcement. The record shows that at no time did the police ever mention or name the young men who traveled with the petitioner to Pickens on the day of the robbery, but the petitioner stated to police that these young men “at no period ever planned, conspired to commit the crime of bank robbery or any other crime with me” (Tr. 403), and he then told Assistant Chief Riggs that even though Assistant Chief Riggs could not prove it, he knew that the Assistant Chief knew that he was guilty.
The record further shows through the testimony of multiple witnesses that the petitioner was seen walking in the direction of the nearby SunT rust Bank at the time of day the bank was robbed, was unaccounted for at the precise time in which it was robbed, and returned minutes after the robbery ended. The record shows that a witness described the petitioner as wearing the same description of clothing worn by the robber, and witnesses testified that the petitioner disposed of materials in a dumpster immediately after the robbery. Further, a search of the petitioner's hotel room revealed that he possessed a matching wristwatch, shoes, and jeans to those worn by the robber. The witnesses also testified that the robber matched the petitioner's general age, and the petitioner was in possession of both manila envelopes and notebook paper that matched the description of the materials used during the robbery. Likewise, the petitioner was in possession of a razor that could have facilitated his changing his facial hair appearance after committing the crime.
Based upon the foregoing record evidence, a rational jury clearly could have found proof of the petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant the respondent's motion for summary judgment (doc. 23).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).