Opinion
5:22-cv-373 (GTS/TWD)
11-10-2022
CURTEZ MCLAURIN, Plaintiff, v. ONONDAGA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
CURTEZ MCLAURIN Plaintiff, Pro Se
CURTEZ MCLAURIN Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Curtez Mclaurin (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action pro se on or about April 19, 2022, asserting numerous claims against Onondaga County and the Syracuse Police Department (collectively, “Defendants”). (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2, 8-9.) On April 27, 2022, then Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby denied Plaintiff's in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application as incomplete, ordered the administrative closure of the matter, and permitted Plaintiff to reopen the matter by timely filing a complete IFP application and inmate authorization form. (See Dkt. No. 2.) Due to a clerical error entering Plaintiff's name and his Onondaga County Justice Center identification number, Judge Suddaby issued an amended order on October 20, 2022. (See Dkt. Nos. 3-4.) The case was reopened on October 26, 2022, when Plaintiff filed a complete IFP application and inmate authorization form. (See Dkt. Nos. 5-7.)
The Clerk sent Plaintiff's IFP application and Complaint to the undersigned for initial review. Plaintiff's IFP application is hereby GRANTED for purposes of this review. (Dkt. No. 5.) The undersigned now considers the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff's Complaint consists of a series of form documents with different legal captions, boilerplate legalese, and check-box lists for various causes of action. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Through these form documents, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants unlawfully arrested and detained him on January 15, 2020. See id. at 1, 5, 7. He claims these actions constituted treason, unlawful arrest, unlawful detention, hate crimes, fraud, defamation, kidnapping, extortion, “RICO,” “white collar crimes,” “blue collar crimes,” “Breach of Contract/Promissory Estoppel,” “Conspiracy,” “Conversion,” “Injurious Falsehood,” “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,” “Invasion of Privacy,” “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,” “Negligent Media Publication,” “Prima Facie Tort,” “Tortious Interference with Contract/Prospective Economic Damages,” “Trespass,” and “Trespass to Chattels.” See id. at 1, 7-8. He further claims Defendants' actions violated his right to a speedy trial, his right to freedom, and his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 1.
Plaintiff requests the dismissal of his criminal case in New York State, his release from detention, and $1,000,000. See id. at 7-9.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must conduct an initial review of complaints filed in forma pauperis, and “complaints in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (governing complaints filed in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (governing complaints filed by prisoners against the government). When reviewing these types of complaints, this Court must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (applying Section 1915(e)(2)(B)); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Section 1915A).
Plaintiff is a “prisoner” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (See Dkt. No. 5 at 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (defining “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”).)
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
This Court must exercise caution when determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a pro se complaint on the grounds that it is frivolous. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
When undertaking this initial review, the Court must construe pro se pleadings with the utmost leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
At the outset, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff's Complaint is nearly identical to the complaint filed in this District by Curtis Mclaurin in Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al. Compare Dkt. No. 1, with Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al., Case No. 5:22-cv-372-BKS-DJS, Dkt. No. 1. In that case, Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart concluded the claimant had failed to state a claim, and accordingly recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. See McLaurin v. City of Syracuse Police Dep't, No. 5:22-CV-372 (BKS) (DJS), 2022 WL 4085731, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4079190 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2022). Chief Judge Brenda K. Sannes adopted Judge Stewart's Report and Recommendation in its entirety. See Mclaurin v. City of Syracuse Police Dep't, No. 5:22-CV-372 (BKS) (DJS), 2022 WL 4079190, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2022).
Plaintiff spells his first name “Curtez,” while the claimant in Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al. spelled his first name “Curtis.” (Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 1, with Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al., Case No. 5:22-cv-372-BKS-DJS, Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff's identification number at the Onondaga County Justice Center is 19000388, while the claimant in Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al. has an Onondaga County Justice Center identification number of 96002141. (Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 23, with Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al., Case No. Case No. 5:22-cv-372-BKS-DJS, Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff accordingly appears to be a different individual than the claimant in Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al. However, the close spelling of the two individuals' names and the nearly-identical pleadings may account for the clerical error made in Plaintiff's case. (See Dkt. No. 3.)
Just like the complaint in Mclaurin v. Syracuse Police Department et al., Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient factual content to allow this Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for the myriad federal and New York State violations alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. He failed to set forth a short and plain statement stating who did what to him, when they did it, and how he was injured. See id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Absent these basic details, Plaintiff's Complaint has failed to give Defendants fair notice of what his claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Moreover, Plaintiff only advances two factual allegations through his Complaint-that Defendants arrested and detained him on January 15, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 5, 7.) Accepting these two facts as true and construing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Hernandez, 18 F.3d at 136, the Court is left with “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The undersigned accordingly recommends that the Court dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); see, e.g., McLaurin, 2022 WL 4085731, at *2 (recommending the dismissal of a complaint that is essentially identical to the one issued in this case for failure to state a claim).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 1.)
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 5) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and ReportRecommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).