Opinion
No. 01-08-00363-CV
April 16, 2009
On Appeal from the 309th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2002-47785B.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices ALCALA and HANKS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is one of several proceedings filed by appellant, Michael McLane, in this Court — all of which appear to be related to his July 2003 divorce from Sandra McLane, and the trial court's various decisions regarding child support and child custody for their son.
Michael has previously challenged a finding below — made while he was seeking a reduction in child support payments for his son, M.R.M. — that he was underemployed. See McLane v. McLane, 263 S.W.3d 358 (Tex.App. 2008, pet. denied). Michael now brings this appeal, which he characterizes as an "accelerated appeal," challenging the trial court's temporary orders naming the Department of Family and Protective Services (the "Department") as sole temporary managing conservator of M.R.M. Michael contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the Department failed to carry its burden of proving all three prongs of Section 262.201 of the Texas Family Code and because "there is no evidence to support a total limitation or denial of access of the parents of the child." Accordingly, Michael requests that we name him sole temporary managing conservator of the child and "remand the case to the trial court to enter order that the mother demonstrate that she is able to co-parent the child." In the alternative, Michael asks that he be named as temporary joint possessory conservator, along with Sandra, with "equalized standard visitation."
Michael has also filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in this Court, complaining of the same issues and alleging that the trial court's temporary orders entitle him to habeas corpus relief. See MRM v. Texas Dep't of Family Protective Servs., 01-08-00763-CV.
Jurisdiction
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory orders may be appealed only when expressly permitted by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001); Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Texas courts strictly construe statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals. America Online, Inc. v. Williams, 958 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
The Texas Family Code specifically precludes the interlocutory appeal of temporary orders, except those appointing a receiver. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.507 (Vernon 2006); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(e) (Vernon 2006) (stating temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship are not subject to interlocutory appeal). Michael's own brief admits that he is attempting to appeal an interlocutory order, and cites no authority which might vest us with appellate jurisdiction over this matter.
Conclusion
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.