In the previous constitutional provision, Art. 3, § 9 of the Constitution of 1921, the requirement was that a representative candidate be an "actual resident". See Stavis v. Engler, 202 So.2d 672 (La.App. 1967) and McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 1967). The substitution of the word "domiciled" for "resident" effects a considerable change in the requirements of candidacy.
And, "We have done that [spent a week in Hahnville] many times, we have spent as long as a week and more, frequently we spent like three days." As a qualitative concept, the cases which have rejected a candidate include Hall v. Godchaux, supra, already discussed, and McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 1967). In McIntire, the candidate was a doctor whose only claim to the additional residence was "[spending] one or two nights a week sleeping on a small ambulance cot which was located in his office", which also contained a "hot-plate" and a refrigerator.
Thus, cancellation of the policy would not have been effective until September 4. Although Market's notice stated that cancellation would be effective at 12:01 A.M., September 3, 1970, this is of no effect because it would have resulted in a notice period shorter than that required by the policy itself. Moreover, this attempt to cancel at the beginning of the day conflicts with the Louisiana law which provides that, in computation of time, only whole days, not fractions thereof, are considered. McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 1967); Housing Auth. v. Miller, supra. The trial court did not err in refusing a new trial on the basis of the remarks during the voir dire examination or because of the alleged excessiveness of the verdict.
This Court rejected a similar argument in Shaw v. Shaw, supra, stating in Syllabus Point 3 that, "A change in residence for convenience in working conditions does not, without more, indicate a change in domicile." See also McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297, 300 (La.App. 1967) (rejecting a candidate's contention that he resided in his office which contained a small cot, a hot plate, and a refrigerator). Finally, we note that it is well established in this jurisdiction that, "A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed."
Even under the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result is contrary to law. See Hall v. Godchaux, 149 La. 733, 90 So. 145; Melerine v. Dem. Exec. Comm., 164 La. 855, 114 So. 711; McIntire v. Carpenter, La.App., 202 So.2d 297. Writ denied Sept. 21, 1967.
Moreover, it is well settled that in computing the time prescribed by law within which to perform an act, only whole days, not fractions thereof, are considered. McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297, 299 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 251 La. 57, 202 So.2d 661 (1967). See alsoHousing Authority of Town of Lake Arthur v. T. Miller Sons, 239 La. 966, 981, 120 So.2d 494, 500 (1960).
Plaintiff cites to La.C.C. art. 1784, as well as cases which state that parts of days may not be used in determining when an obligation became due. See La.C.C. art. 1784; Lowe v. O'Meara, 482 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1973); McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967). With this argument we disagree.
The above quoted findings of the trial court prove that the Canal Street address was Coney's business establishment but not his principal domestic establishment. On point is McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967). McIntire involved a medical doctor whose qualifications for public office had been challenged on grounds that he was not domiciled in the parish where he wished to run.
We find no interpretation of Art. 163; however, La.C.C.P. Art. 5059 (as to civil matters) has been construed to mean whole days and not parts or fractions. Lowe v. O'Meara, 482 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1973); McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967). Although civil procedure is not dispositive here, we find it logically persuasive.
Any mail received at the Diana Street house, therefore, probably was of an incidental nature. In McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967), this court addressed the question of residency of the plaintiff, a doctor who had a medical office in Jefferson Parish and was claiming residency in that parish. The plaintiff had a Jefferson Parish driver's license, a bank account in the parish, was a member of professional associations in the parish, was registered to vote in that parish, and was a Notary Public for Jefferson Parish.