Opinion
No. 99 Civ. 4062 (LTS) (FM)
July 2, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James E. McGrory ("Plaintiff") commenced this action on June 4, 1999, with the filing of a complaint, asserting causes of action against defendants City of New York ("NYC"), New York City Department of Correction ("DOC" and, together with NYC, the "Municipal Defendants") and Cynthia Owens ("Owens" and, together, "Defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 2000e, and state law, for race-based discrimination and harassment that he allegedly suffered during his employment as a Correction Officer for the DOC. Plaintiff's complaint asserts, inter alia, that he was wrongfully terminated by DOC in retaliation for obtaining a "Notice of Right to Sue" letter after filing a grievance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and that Owens, an African-American fellow Correction Officer, harassed and intimidated Plaintiff, a white male, because of Plaintiff's race. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint primarily to buttress his claims that he suffered retaliatory termination by the Municipal Defendants and that Owens, a member and secretary of the Correction Guardians Association (the "Guardians"), an African-American fraternal organization, was acting under color of state law when she allegedly discriminated against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion to amend is granted for the reasons I am about to explain.
The Honorable Deborah A. Batts presided over this action until it was reassigned on September 22, 2000. Pursuant to a scheduling order, dated September 8, 2000, issued by Judge Batts, the parties were to commence discovery in time to have completed all discovery by January 8, 2001. By letter dated December 26, 2000, Plaintiff sought an extension of the discovery cut-off. Counsel for the Municipal Defendants did not submit written opposition to the request, but counsel for Owens, by letter dated December 27, 2000, opposed the extension and requested that Plaintiff be precluded from relying on any expert testimony because his intention to use expert witnesses was expressed, according to counsel for Owens, almost at the end of discovery. After considering the parties' arguments, the Court preliminarily denied Plaintiff's request for an extension of the discovery deadline and reserved decision on Owens' request to preclude Plaintiff's use of expert witnesses.
A pre-trial conference was held on March 1, 2001. at which Plaintiff's request to extend discovery and Owens' request to preclude Plaintiff from relying on expert testimony were discussed, as well as Plaintiff's intention to file a motion to amend his complaint to add factual allegations to support his causes of action. Plaintiff indicated that his purpose in amending the complaint was to plead his causes of action with greater specificity based on facts uncovered in discovery, in particular the chronology of events preceding his termination. At the conference, counsel for Owens objected to the proposed amendments on the grounds of undue delay and prejudice, while counsel for the Municipal Defendants noted that they had not seen the amendments but did not expect to oppose them if they were legally sound. (Tr. at 8-9, March 1, 2001.) The Court set a briefing schedule for Plaintiff's anticipated motion to amend the complaint.
Plaintiff filed the instant motion on March 19, 2001; defendant Owens filed opposition on March 26, 2001. The Municipal Defendants interposed no opposition. By order dated June 12, 2001, and after thorough consideration of the arguments concerning Plaintiff's request for an extension of discovery, by order dated June 12, 2001, the Court extended the deadline for completion of all discovery to September 28, 2001, and denied Owens' request for preclusion of plaintiffs use of expert witnesses.
Plaintiff's proposed complaint amendments center on the chronology of events leading to his termination (see Not. of Motion, Ex. A, Amend. Compl. ("Amend. Compl.") at ¶ 39-51; 57-58), the relationship between the Guardians and DOC (Amend. Compl. at ¶ 17), Owen's conduct (Amend. Compl. at ¶ 27(f), and allegations that Owens acted under color of state law (Amend. Compl. at ¶ 20, 21; compare Compl. at ¶ 21 with Amend. Compl. at ¶ 24). In addition, Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint modifies several paragraphs of the original complaint. (See Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 16, 18; compare Compl. at ¶¶ 44, 45 with Amend. Compl. at ¶ 58). The opposition to Plaintiff's motion focuses primarily on the amendments relating to the Guardians and Owens.
Leave to amend a complaint must be freely granted when justice requires. See Rule 15(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. Nonetheless, it is within the district court's discretion to grant or deny leave to amend. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 179(1962). "The Supreme Court has emphasized that amendment should normally be permitted, and has stated that refusal to grant leave without justification is `inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.'" Rachman Bag Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182).
Owens challenges Plaintiff's motion to amend on the grounds that it was made late in the litigation and that it was made in bad faith. In Owens' opposition papers, she asserts that "the court ordered discovery deadline was January 8, 2001 [and] discovery in this matter is complete." (Memo of Law in Opposition to Pl.'s Motion for Leave to Amend Compl., at 1.) Owens' discovery-deadline argument has been rendered moot by the Court's order extending discovery for reasons unrelated to the present motion. Although Owens also notes that an amended complaint would necessitate the filing of responsive pleadings, the Court finds any resulting delay an insufficient basis for denying leave to amend. See Silberblatt. Inc. v. East Harlem Pilot Block Bldg. 1 Housing Development Fund Co., 608 F.2d 28, 42 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing district court's denial of leave to amend complaint, noting that delay caused by defendant's need to analyze discovery material over several months "is insufficient prejudice to deny leave to amend," where trial had not yet commenced and was not expected to commence for some time).
Owens argues that Plaintiff's motion should be denied as one interposed in bad faith because, Owens contends, the proposed allegations concerning Owens and the Guardians are not supported by the evidence thus far adduced in discovery. No case law is offered to support this argument. Indeed, unless the complaint as proposed to be amended would clearly fail to state a cause of action, the likelihood of success on the claim is not an appropriate factor in the Rule 15(a) analysis. An amendment should be permitted if there are at least colorable grounds for relief. See DeJesus v. Sears Roebuck Co., 87 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing cases);Silberblatt, 608 F.2d at 42; see also In re Northern Telecom Ltd. Securities Litigation, 42 F. Supp.2d 234, 250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting argument that amendments that relied "on information and belief" were improper where there was at least colorable claim for relief). The adequacy of proof to support the allegations can be raised at a later stage, such as on a motion for summary judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also make provision for an application for sanctions in the event the requisite degree of evidentiary support for allegations is found to have been lacking. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.
At this stage of pleading, it can be said that Plaintiff has articulated at least a colorable claim for relief against Owens in the proposed amended complaint. The amendments seek, inter alia, to show that Owens acted under color of state law (a necessary predicate for success on certain of Plaintiff's federal claims, see Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1999)), when she allegedly discriminated against Plaintiff. The merits of the claims can be tested at a later stage of the litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint is granted. He shall file and serve on all Defendants the proposed amended complaint, in the form submitted to the Court as Exhibit A to his Notice of Motion, no later than July 9, 2001. Defendants shall have until July 30, 2001 to file and serve their responses. The scheduling orders previously entered in this matter shall continue unaffected, pending further order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.