Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-09-001-RSG
Submitted: April 3, 2001
Decided: September 4, 2001
Decision Below Reversed and Remanded.
Michael J. McGonigle, Pro Se, Bear, Delaware, for the Claimant/Appellant, Michael J. McGonigle.
Richard D. Abrams, Esq., Heckler Frabizzio, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Employer/Appellee, George H. Burns, Inc.
Opinion and Order INTRODUCTION:
The Superior Court must ensure that government agencies, such as the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Board, ("Agency"), follow the statutes that provide their authority. All agency processes, findings, determinations, and decisions (collectively "Agency Actions") are governed by the principles of due process found in the United States and Delaware Constitutions.
In this case, the court does not find that there is substantial evidence needed to uphold the Agency's decision, the Agency Action violated Claimant's due process rights available to him to have an intelligent, expeditious appellate review.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
A. Standard of Review
It is well established law that the court can only decide an appeal on the record below. The Court may not expand the record to include other evidence, such as, additional records, testimony, etc. The role of the Court in reviewing Agency Actions is limited to determining whether the Agency's Action is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance. In the absence of an error of law, the Court will affirm an Agency Action which is supported by substantial evidence. In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court will consider the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below.
Parker v. State of Delaware, Del. Super., I.D. No. 97A01020-NAB, Baron, J. 9 August 26, 1997 See Super. Ct. Rule 72(g). See also 21 Del. C. § 10142.
See id. (citing Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Br., Del. Supr., 352 A.2d 761 (1976) (holding that the Court cannot expand the record to include additional reports or testimony because the Court is limited to consideration of the evidence of record).
Smith v. The Places. Inc., Del. Super., 1993 Lexis 483, 4 (citing 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) (1985); Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. of Dep't of Labor v. Duncan, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 309 (1975); Ridings v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd,. Del. Super., 407 A.2d 238, 239 (1979); Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690, 692, (1971), aff'd, Del. Super., 293 A.2d 295 (1972).
Smith at 4-5 (citing Olney v. Cooch, Del. Supr., 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981); Plants v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 86A-OC-1, Martin, J. (Oct. 22, 1987)).
Longobardi at 692.
Id. At 5 (citing GMC v. Guy, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90A-JL-5, Gebelein, J. (Aug. 16, 1991)).
B. Jurisdiction
The Court will lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal when the notice of appeal is not filed in a timely manner unless a Claimant can demonstrate that the failure to file a timely notice of appeal is attributable to court-related personnel. Likewise, the Court can remand a case to a government Agency for the purpose of determining whether the untimeliness of a Claimant's notice of appeal is attributable to Agency-related personnel.
Giordano v. Marta, Del. Supr., 723, A.2d 833, 834 (1998) (emphasis supplied) (citing Bey v. State, Del. Supr., 402 A.2d 362, 363 (1979); Riggs v. Riggs. Del. Supr., 539 A.2d 163, 164 (1988); Carr v. State, Del. Supr., 554 A.2d 778, 779 (1989); 10 Del. C. § 145)).
Id.; Kirby v. State, Del.Supr., 719 A.2d 947, 947 (1988); Bey at 363.
C. Due Process of Law
In any appeal of an Agency Action, the Court must assure that the Agency Action meets the constitutional requirements, of due process, i.e., procedural due process of law. Procedural due process requires that "parties whose rights are to affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified." Parties must be adequately, property, and lawfully notified of Agency Actions that affect or will affect their rights, privileges, and immunities. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Therefore, when an Agency gives the required notice of an intention to affect a party's rights, privileges, or immunities, the Agency must do so in a meaningful manner. The notice at a minimum must inform the Party of what action is intended by the Agency.
Tsipouras v. Tsipouras. Del.Supr., 677 A.2d 493, 496 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (citations omitted).
Fuentes at 80 (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1863). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876). See also Den ex dem. Murrary v. Hoboken Land Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855) (holding due process of law generally . . . includes . . . allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings (quotations omitted) (citing Taylor v. Porter, N.Y. Sup.Ct. (New York's court of last resort), 1843 N.Y. Lexis 16; Greene v. Briggs, R.I. Cir.Ct., 1852 U.S. App. Lexis 337 (other citations omitted)).
Fuentes at 80 (emphasis added) citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
Id.
II Facts and Merits of Claimant's Appeal
A. Pro Se Claimants
Claimant is a pro se Claimant; the Court is at liberty to reasonably interpret a pro se Claimant's filings, pleadings, and appeals in a favorable light to alleviate the technical inaccuracies typical in many pro se legal arguments, without unfairly affecting the other party's rights. While procedural requirements are not relaxed for any type of litigant (barring extraordinary circumstances or to prevent substantial injustice), the Court may grant pro se Claimants accommodations that do not affect the substantive rights of those parties involved in a case at bar. As such, the Court has construed Claimant's appeal to sound in failure to provide "meaningful notice" and failure to comply with "procedural due process."
B. Facts
Employer alleged, and the Agency found, that Claimant was verbally warned on several occasions for not making calls to customers and leaving early from off-site jobs. It was also found by the Agency, Claimant would indicate that he worked eight hour days when he had not. Employer alleged, and the Agency found, that the violations of employer's regulations were supported by customer complaints. Ultimately, Claimant's violations of Employer's regulations resulted in his dismissal. Claimant had filed for unemployment insurance benefits on May 21, 2000.
"Fact Finding Statement," Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Michael McGonigle, Claimant [May 21, 2000][1].
Claimant alleged that he did not receive any past oral or other warnings prior to his dismissal about being paid for work not actually completed. He also alleged that he requested to be temporarily relieved of working in a hot attic.
The Claims Deputy in his "Notice of Determination" only set forth the competing claims of both parties in the "Findings of Fact" section. The Claims Deputy then proceeded to write, "Misconduct connected with the work is just cause for discharge [and] unsatisfactory performance that includes misconduct is disqualifying . . ." for the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. While the Claims Deputy did not provide a reasoned determination as to why he chose to believe Employer's allegations over those of the Employee if indeed he did so, that issue need not be addressed.
The Court will address the merits of Claimant's appeal claiming that the Agency failed to give meaningful notice of Claimant's right to appeal the above Agency Acton because it failed to properly address the notice sent to the Claimant.
C. Merits
Claimant makes a simple argument. He is entitled to notice of an Agency Action in a meaningful manner that comports with the constitutional requirements of procedural due process. The Court finds that the Claimant's correct address is "3 Vincent Court, Bear, Delaware, 19701." However, the notice of appeal of denial of unemployment insurance compensation benefits set to Claimant (including the statutory maximum number of days Claimant may appeal) was addressed to "3 Vincent Court, Water-ford Apts., Bear, DE 19701-0000."
Under oath, Claimant states that his address is as above in the "Transcript of Hearing" before Referee Theresa Matthews on page 5 dated July 31, 2000. See, e.g., "Fact Finding Statement," Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, Michael McGonigle, Claimant [May 21, 2000[[1] (using correct address); "Interview Notice," State of Delaware, Department of Labor, [author unknown] (June 1, 2000) (using correct address); "Citation on Appeal from the Decision of: UIAB," Superior Court, New Castle Delaware, Sharon Agnew, Prothonotary (filed September 18, 2000 ( (using correct address); "Appellant's Opening Brief," [1] (using correct address).
"Notice of Determination," Delaware Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance, R. White Hurst, Claims Deputy (June 13, 2000)[1].
While the addition of four zeros to Claimant's ZIP code would not substantially create an improperly constructed postal address, the addition of "Waterford Apts" is however, a substantially different address from the Claimant's correct address. Typically, an apartment complex has a single street address which is then followed by letters or numbers that identify specific units. An apartment complex can contain hundreds of specifically identified units.
The Court cannot conclude that defendant lives in an apartment complex on the record presented; there is some indication that the Claimant may actually live in a mobile home community.
The substantially improper postal address used by the Agency in light of the fact that the Claimant provided the Agency with his proper address is, as a matter of law, a failure to provide meaningful notice consistent with procedural due process. Therefore, because the Agency addressed the notice of denial and the corresponding notice of a right to appeal in a substantially improper fashion, the Agency's decision to affirm the decision of the Claims Referee must be reversed and remanded so that the appeal may be heard. The law favors a decision based upon the merits, not on a procedural defect. This is especially true when short time limits are imposed and postal service is used.
Employer asserts that "In Delaware, there is a presumption that mailed matter, correctly addressed, stamped[,] and mailed was received by the party whom it was addressed. Employer is correct as to the law stated. Employer relies on the decision in Funk v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board in which an allegedly similar issue was raised. In Funk the Agency mailed a decision to a correct address, but the post office mistakenly delivered the decision to the Claimant's parent's home. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the post office mistake did not interfere with the procedural due process concerning the appeal time limitation because the parent's home was on the same street as the Claimant's home. The Supreme Court further held that Agencies are not liable when a mailing fails to reach a Claimant because of a mistake committed by the post office and not the Agency. However, the Funk decision does not help the Employer in this case.
"Appellee's answering Brief," 4.
State v. Camper, Del. Super., 347 A.2d 137 (1975).
Del.Supr., 591 A.2d 222 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Funk states that when notices are correctly addressed and properly post paid, Claimants are deemed to have received the notice irrespective of post office mistake. In this case, the notice went to the Claimant at bar was not properly addressed by the Agency. Consequently, the Agency failed to send a properly addressed notice to the Claimant. Claimant cannot be held responsible for the error of the Agency when the Claimant had provided the Agency with his correct mailing address.
V. Conclusion and Order
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board with instructions to further remand the case to the Claims Referee (or the Agency's proper designee) for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion and Order. Specifically, the Claims Referee (or the Agency's proper designee) shall accept and hear the appeal of the June 13, 2000, "Notice of Determination" denying Claimant Unemployment Insurance Compensation Benefits as timely filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.