Opinion
21-P-1119
01-24-2023
KELLEY E. MCGOLDRICK v. ROBERT D. DAVIS.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The mother appeals from the denial of her motion for relief from a judgment that was entered five years earlier reducing the father's child support obligation. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the motion judge and affirm the order.
Background.
On June 28, 2016, a Probate and Family Court judge reduced the father's child support obligation following a two-day trial. Five years later, on July 8, 2021, the mother filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b), alleging that during the 2016 trial, the father had knowingly and fraudulently concealed compensation and assets, and that the fraudulent conduct had impacted the judge's calculation of father's child support obligation. The judge treated the rule 60 (b) motion as one brought under rule 60 (b) (3), and denied it as untimely because it had not been brought within one year of the judgment.
Mother filed a notice of appeal from the modification judgment but failed to perfect her appeal, which was dismissed in July 2017.
Discussion.
Motion for relief.
A motion to vacate a judgment under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b), "for whatever reason, must be made within a reasonable time. For reasons (1), (2), and (3) [of rule 60 (b)], however, the motion must be made within one year following the entry of judgment." Chavoor v. Lewis, 383 Mass. 801, 803 (1981). Motions based on "fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party" are governed by Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b) (3), to which the one-year limitation period applies.
The gravamen of the mother's motion for relief was the father's alleged fraudulent concealment of income and assets. The judge was not bound by the mother's characterization of her claim as one brought under rule 60 (b) (6) (which is not subject to the one-year time bar) or under the "catchall" provision of rule 60 (which does not specify a time limit for bringing an independent action for relief from judgment "for fraud upon the court"). See Honer v. Wisniewski, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 291, 294 (1999) ("[c]ourts may determine whether and under what section relief might be granted; the label attached to the motion is not dispositive").
Since the mother filed her motion approximately five years after the underlying judgment, the judge properly concluded that the motion was time barred. "Relief under [rule 60 (b) (6)] must be justified for reasons other than those set forth in rule 60 (b) (1) through (5)." Honer, supra at 294. See Paternity of Cheryl, 434 Mass. 23, 35 (2001) ("[b]ecause [her] arguments are not requests for relief independent of subsections (1)-(5), [she] may not seek relief under rule 60 (b) (6)").
Additionally, even if the mother's allegations were true, they do not establish a fraud on the court. There is only a fraud on the court "where 'it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense.'" Paternity of Cheryl, 434 Mass. at 35, quoting Rockdale Mgt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 418 Mass. 586, 598 (1994). "Proof of conduct that amounts to common-law fraud -- that is, a knowing, materially false statement of fact that induces reliance thereon -- is not sufficient" to establish fraud on the court. Guardianship of Ingrid, 102 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 10 (2022). "This high bar is an expression of 'the system's important interest in finality.'" Id., quoting Owens v. Mukendi, 448 Mass. 66, 76 (2006). Accordingly, the motion judge did not abuse her discretion, or commit other error of law, in concluding the mother's motion was governed by rule 60 (b) (3), and thus was time barred.'
The parties have indicated that there are proceedings pending in the Probate and Family Court. This decision has no applicability to those proceedings and is limited solely to this appeal.
The father's request for costs and attorney's fees is denied.
Order denying motion for relief from judgment affirmed.
Wolohojian, Englander & D'Angelo, JJ.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.