Opinion
3:22-cv-00245-ART-CSD
08-16-2022
ZAFFERINE AMIT McGILBRA, Plaintiff, v. WASHOE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
ANNE R. TRAUM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Zafferine McGilbra, who is detained in the custody of the Washoe County Sheriff's Office, has submitted a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1-1, 4). The matter of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens McGilbra's civil-rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person's claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if the plaintiff clearly cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See id.
A reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed sua sponte if that person's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable, like claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist, as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations, like fantastic or delusional scenarios. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
In his Complaint, McGilbra sues multiple Defendants for events that took place while he was detained at Washoe County Detention Facility (“WCDF”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). McGilbra sues Defendants Washoe County, WCDF, and Naphcare, Inc. (Id. at 1-2). McGilbra brings three claims and seeks monetary relief. (Id. at 5-10). McGilbra alleges the following.
A. Factual allegations
It can be inferred from the allegations that Naphcare contracts with Washoe County to provide medical services at WCDF. (Id. at 5). McGilbra alleges that he is a pretrial detainee. (Id.) When the coronavirus pandemic began, inmates in WCDF were not provided any personal protective equipment (“PPE”) like masks, face shields, gowns, or hand sanitizer to protect against spreading the virus. (Id.) None of the staff at WCDF used PPE like masks to protect against spreading the virus. (Id.) And staff at WCDF did not test new inmates or inmates who had foodhandling or porter jobs for the virus. (Id. at 6).
McGilbra contracted coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) while he was detained at WCDF. (Id.) After McGilbra tested positive for the virus, he was thrown in “the SHU along with other inmates from [his housing] unit who had also tested positive. (Id.) McGilbra complained about his symptoms but his “cries for help went unheard by all other deputies besides Deputy Stuyvesant.” (Id.) McGilbra was then moved to the infirmary, but his vital signs were not tested until two or three days later. (Id.) Upon checking, medical staff discovered that McGilbra's oxygen was under 60 percent, and he was “rushed” to St. Mary's Hospital “and put on life support.” (Id.) McGilbra contracted COVID-19 again while detained at WCDF when another inmate was not immediately tested or placed into quarantine after he developed symptoms. (Id. at 7).
Based on these allegations, McGilbra contends that Defendants deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The Court liberally construes the Complaint as alleging claims based on two different theories of liability: (1) Fourteenth Amendment unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and (2) Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care. The Court addresses each theory and any issues in turn.
B. WCDF is a building and cannot be sued
McGilbra cannot sue WCDF. The statute that allows inmates to bring civil-rights actions like this one-42 U.S.C. § 1983-authorizes suits against a “person” acting under the color of state law only. As a result, courts routinely hold that jails and prisons are not persons who can be sued under § 1983. See, e.g., Smith v. Charleston Cnty., 2019 WL 2870406, at *1 (D.S.C. June 11, 2019) (“Courts have routinely held that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds, such as the Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center, do not act under color of state law and are not a ‘person' subject to suit under § 1983.”); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the [Pembroke County Jail] is not a person amenable to suit.”); see also Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that California Adult Authority and San Quentin prison are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983). Because WCDF is a building, not a person who can act or be sued, the Court dismisses with prejudice the claims against it because amendment would be futile.
C. Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement
A pretrial detainee's claims challenging unconstitutional conditions of confinement fall under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2018). Courts evaluate Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims under the objective deliberate-indifference standard. See id. at n.2 (recognizing that “[t]he Second Circuit also recently extended the objective deliberate indifference standard to all conditions of confinement claims brought under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must plead facts that (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) the conditions were not necessary to serve the penological interest related to the confinement of the pretrial detainee or the conditions were excessive as to the particular penological purpose; (3) the conditions were objectively dehumanizing, uncivil, or unsanitary; and (4) the defendant did not take reasonable steps to alleviate or remedy the conditions. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068-71 (9th Cir. 2016); Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125.
McGilbra alleges that when the coronavirus pandemic began, staff at WCDF did not provide PPE to any of the inmates, did not wear PPE themselves, did not test new inmates for the virus, and did not test inmates who had jobs that brought them into contact with many persons-like porters and food-service workers-for the virus. McGilbra caught COVID-19 twice while detained at WCDF. The first time McGilbra contracted the virus, he was rushed to the hospital and placed on life support.
The Court finds that these allegations are enough for screening purposes to state that the conditions McGilbra was exposed to at WCDF were sufficiently unsafe or unsanitary for the Fourteenth Amendment's purposes. But McGilbra does not name any individual as a defendant in this action, nor does he plead facts that any individual made an intentional decision about the conditions of his confinement. The only viable defendants McGilbra identifies are Washoe County and Naphcare. A municipality like Washoe County can be found liable under § 1983 if it causes the violation at issue. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). And private entities like Naphcare are treated like municipalities for claims brought under § 1983. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012).
To state a claim for municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local government unit. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions. Id. at 60.
A policy has been defined as “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690); see also Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). The weight of authority has established that a “policy can be one of action or inaction” within the meaning of Monell. Waggy, 594 F.3d at 713 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). “Both types of claims require that the plaintiff prove a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The Court finds that the allegations are not enough to state a colorable claim for deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conditions of confinement under any theory of liability. Although McGilbra adequately alleges that he was exposed to unsafe or unsanitary conditions at WCDF, he does not causally connect that injury to any Defendant. For example, McGilbra does not plead facts that any individual made an intentional decision about his conditions of confinement. Nor does he plead facts that the failure to provide inmates PPE, require additional testing, or require staff to wear PPE was a final policy of either Washoe County or Naphcare, or was a custom so persistent and widespread that it had the force of law. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 5 (alleging what staff members didn't do “when COVID-19 cases started multiplying world wide [sic]”)). But it does not yet appear that McGilbra cannot state any set of facts upon which relief could be granted. So the Fourteenth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
D. Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care
Pretrial detainees may raise inadequate-medical-care claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124. Courts evaluate these claims under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 1125. The elements of a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim are:
(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.Id. The third element requires the defendant's conduct to be “objectively unreasonable,” a test that turns on the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. A plaintiff must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent- something akin to reckless disregard.” Id.
Based on the allegations, after McGilbra contracted COVID-19, he was placed in quarantine with other infected inmates from his housing unit. McGilbra complained about his symptoms but was ignored. Stuyvesant was the only staff member who didn't ignore McGilbra's cries for help. When McGilbra was transferred to the infirmary-presumably because of Stuyvesant's intervention- his vital signs were not checked for two or three days. When they were finally checked, it was discovered that McGilbra's oxygen was under 60 percent, and he was rushed to the hospital and placed on life support.
The Court finds that these allegations are enough for screening purposes to show that McGilbra was confined under conditions that placed him at risk of suffering serious harm. But McGilbra does not identify any individual who made an intentional decision to place or keep him confined under those conditions. He does not plead facts that any individual-even if the person's name is unknown to McGilbra-knew about the conditions and ignored them. And McGilbra does not plead any facts that this violation occurred because of a policy or custom of any Defendant. But it does not yet appear that McGilbra cannot state any set of facts upon which relief could be granted. So the Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Because it appears that McGilbra could cure the deficiencies of his Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Court grants him leave to amend to attempt to replead those claims. What this means is McGilbra has leave to plead true facts to show that (1) any individual made an intentional decision about the conditions he identified at WCDF, (2) the conditions at WCDF were the product of a final policy or so widespread they had the force of law, or (3) any individual purposefully ignored the risk posed by his COVID-19 symptoms. McGilbra also has leave to amend to add new defendants who personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. For example, McGilbra can name as defendants any jail official, officer, or employee or any medical-care provider who knew McGilbra was complaining about his COVID-19 symptoms and was purposefully indifferent to his medical needs. He can also name any jail official, officer, or employee or any medical-care provider who had authority to implement COVID-19 safety measures and did not reasonably do so. Or he can name any Washoe County official or Naphcare official or employee responsible for any final policy about COVID-19 safety measures at WCDF. But McGilbra does not have leave to amend to add new claims.
If McGilbra chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint replaces the original complaint, so the amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that for claims dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required to reallege such claims in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal). McGilbra must file the amended complaint on this Court's approved prisoner-civil-rights form, and it must be entitled “First Amended Complaint.” McGilbra must follow the instructions on the form. He need not and should not allege very many facts in the “nature of the case” section of the form. Rather, in each claim, he should allege facts sufficient to show what each defendant did to violate his civil rights. He must file the amended complaint by September 15, 2022. If McGilbra does not file an amended complaint by that deadline, this action will be subject to dismissal without prejudice for failing to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that a decision on the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) is deferred.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that Defendant Washoe County Detention Facility is dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that Defendants Washoe County and Naphcare, Inc. are dismissed from the Complaint without prejudice.
It is further ordered that if McGilbra chooses to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies of his complaint as outlined in this order, he will file the amended complaint by September 15, 2022. If McGilbra chooses to file an amended complaint, he should use the approved form and he will write the words “First Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint” in the caption.
It is further ordered that if McGilbra chooses to file an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint in a separate screening order. The screening process will take several months.
It is further ordered that if McGilbra fails to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies outlined in this order, this action will be subject to dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Finally, the Clerk of the Court is directed to send McGilbra the approved form for filing a § 1983 complaint, instructions for the same, and a copy of his original complaint (ECF No. 1-1).