Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 05AS05330
NICHOLSON, J.
Jefferson A. McGee, in pro per, appeals from the dismissal of his complaint for wrongful eviction after he failed to comply with superior court case management program guidelines. There was no error. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
McGee’s complaint, filed in November 2005, alleges defendants wrongly evicted him from leased premises where he was operating a restaurant and bar. Defendants are MMDD Sacramento Project, Ltd., and its property managers, Asset Investment Managers, Inc., John Lawrence Tiner and John Benjamin Tiner. McGee sought in this action to recover possession of the premises and damages, including emotional distress damages, in excess of $25,000.
Defendants moved to quash service of the five-day summons, to dismiss the complaint, and to have McGee declared a vexatious litigant. In support of the motion, defense counsel averred (among other things) that lawful possession of the premises was determined in a prior proceeding, Sacramento County Superior Court case No. 05UD06252; in that case, an unlawful detainer judgment was entered in favor of defendant MMDD Sacramento Project, Ltd., and McGee’s efforts to set aside that judgment and regain possession of the property had been denied.
The court granted defendants’ motion in part: it found that, because the issue of possession of the premises had already been finally adjudicated in the prior proceeding, the instant complaint cannot state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, and must proceed by a 30-day summons.
While defendants’ motion was pending, McGee filed an amended complaint, in which he sought return of the property, general damages in excess of $40,000, and punitive damages of $1.2 million. The proofs of service showed that defendants were personally served with the summons and amended complaint on April 10, 2006 (all other dates refer to events in 2006).
Defendants filed their answer to the amended complaint on May 10.
Two days later, on May 12, McGee filed a request to enter defendants’ default on the amended complaint; the request was granted and defendants’ default was entered on that date by the court clerk.
The following week, McGee unsuccessfully sought entry of a default judgment against defendants in the amount of $1.4 million.
Thereafter, McGee failed to appear at the Case Management Conference in this matter. Sanctions were imposed against him for failure to file a Case Management Statement in accordance with local rules, and the court issued an order that McGee appear to show cause why the matter should not be dismissed. (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Local Rules, rules 11.05 (B), 11.055 (A), (C).) A copy of the court’s order to show cause was mailed to McGee at the address he used on all pleadings and filings.
By separate motion, defendants ask that we take judicial notice of the local rules governing Case Management Conferences and the sanctions for noncompliance with local rules. We have done so. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (e), 459, subd. (a).)
All further references to Local Rules are to the Superior Court of Sacramento County Local Rules.
McGee failed to appear as ordered, and the court dismissed the entire action. McGee appeals from the dismissal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, McGee asserts that the court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint because “[d]efendants were in default on May 12, 2006 and as a matter of law plaintiff is entitled to an entry of judgment in his favor.”
We review the dismissal of a case for failure to follow a court’s local rules under an abuse of discretion standard, and affirm unless the trial court’s exercise of its discretion was a clear abuse. (Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1380.) “The burden is on the party challenging the trial court’s decision to show that the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] Thus, even if there is no indication of the trial court’s rationale for dismissing an action, the court’s decision will be upheld on appeal if reasonable justification for it can be found.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443.)
Here, there was no abuse of discretion.
Local Rules, rule 11.05 (B) states that “counsel for each party and each self-represented party must appear personally” at the Case Management Conference. Prior to the conference, each party shall have filed a Case Management Statement. (Local Rules, rule 11.055 (A), (C).)
McGee neither filed a Case Management Statement nor appeared at the Case Management Conference.
Local Rules, rule 11.12 sets the possible sanctions for noncompliance with these rules. It provides in part: “If any counsel, party, person or entity subject to these rules, fails to comply with any part thereof, the court on motion of a party or on its own motion may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof . . . .” (Local Rules, rule 11.12.)
Thus, the trial court had authority to dismiss the action following McGee’s failure to comply with the local rules associated with participation in the mandatory Case Management Conference.
McGee argues the court should nonetheless have refrained from dismissing his action because “defendants were in default on May 12, 2006.” He is wrong, for two reasons.
First, we agree with defendants that the default was improperly entered and therefore invalid. When the trial court clerk entered a default against them on May 12, defendants already had an answer to the amended complaint on file. Under these circumstances, the clerk had no power to enter the default. (See Baske v. Burke (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 38, 45 [a “clerk in possession of a responsive pleading has no authority to enter the default”]; see also Baird v. Smith (1932) 216 Cal. 408, 411 [the “clerk is not authorized to enter a default for failure to file an answer when such answer is on file at the time such default is attempted to be entered”].)
In a related argument, McGee asserts the dismissal of his action was “contrary to public policy” because “it was entered without first granting a judgment [in his favor] for the relief requested in the complaint.” As we have explained, because defendants had answered the amended complaint on May 10, no default against them should have been entered on May 12. McGee was not entitled to a judgment in his favor.
Second, that the court clerk had -- however mistakenly -- entered defendants’ default did not exempt McGee from the requirement he prepare and file a Case Management Statement in advance of the Case Management Conference. Local Rules, rule 11.055 (C) states that if, at the time a Case Management Statement is due, a plaintiff has filed a request for a default judgment as to all opposing parties remaining in the case, he must “file a Default Judgment Status Statement on a form provided by the court in lieu of a Case Management Statement.” McGee’s failure to comply with the Case Management Statement requirement -- by filing either a Default Judgment Status Statement or Case Management Statement -- exposed him to the possibility of dismissal sanctions.
That exposure was not reduced by his status as a pro per litigant: with respect to the imposition of sanctions, in propria persona litigants are entitled to the same, but no greater, rights than represented litigants. (Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 795.) “A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985.)
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action for McGee’s failure to comply with local rules.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND , P.J., RAYE , J.