When an attorney engages in a transaction with a client and is benefited thereby, a presumption arises that the transaction proceeded from undue influence. ( McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108.) Once a presumption is raised, the burden shifts to the attorney to come forward with evidence that the transaction was fair, equitable and just and that the benefit did not proceed from undue influence. ( Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean (1983), 95 Ill.2d 452.) Because a strong presumption of undue influence arises when an attorney engages in a transaction with a client and is benefited thereby ( McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108), courts require clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption ( Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean (1983), 95 Ill.2d 452). Some of the factors which this court deems persuasive in determining whether the presumption of undue influence has been overcome include a showing by the attorney (1) that he or she made a full and frank disclosure of all relevant information; (2) that adequate consideration was given; and (3) that the client had independent advice before completing the transaction.

Moreover, the existence of the attorney-client relationship results in a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. In re Czachorski (1969), 41 Ill.2d 459; In re Broverman (1968), 40 Ill.2d 302, 307; McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108; Gaffney v. Harmon (1950), 405 Ill. 273, 277. It is a time-honored principle that all transactions occurring between attorney and client, while the relationship continues, must be subject to the closest scrutiny.

When an attorney engages in a transaction with a client and is benefited thereby, a presumption arises that the transaction proceeded from undue influence. ( McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46) Once a presumption is raised, the burden shifts to the attorney to come forward with evidence that the transaction was fair, equitable and just and that the benefit did not proceed from undue influence. ( Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, (1983), 95 Ill.2d 452, 69 Ill.Dec. 960, 448 N.E.2d 872) Because a strong presumption of undue influence arises when an attorney engages in a transaction with a client and is benefited thereby ( McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46), courts require clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption ( Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean (1983), 95 Ill.2d 452, 69 Ill.Dec. 960, 448 N.E.2d 872). Some of the factors which this court deems persuasive in determining whether the presumption of undue influence has been overcome include a showing by the attorney (1) that he or she made a full and frank disclosure of all relevant information; (2) that adequate consideration was given; and (3) that the client had inde

As an attorney, Tucker owed his client, the Debtor, a fiduciary duty as a matter of law. See McFail v. Braden, 19 Ill.2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46, 51 (1960). Tucker responds that he did not owe Debtor a fiduciary duty, because he did not represent Debtor at the time of the foreclosure sale in July 2000, or when the Quitclaim Deed was executed on April 3, 2005.

This court has also held that where an attorney engages in transactions with a client and is benefited thereby, the burden rests on the attorney to show that it is fair, equitable and just, and that it did not proceed from undue influence. ( Schuyler, 91 Ill.2d at 11; Turner v. Black (1960), 19 Ill.2d 296, 305; McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108, 117.) In order to prove that the benefit received did not proceed from undue influence, the attorney must prove (1) that he made a full and frank disclosure of all the relevant information that he had, (2) that the consideration was adequate, and (3) that the client had independent advice before completing the transaction.

Stuhlfauth, 88 Ill. App.3d at 981, 410 N.E.2d at 1068. In McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46, an attorney was hired to give advice to decedent on her real estate. On the attorney's advice, decedent conveyed the tract of real estate to the attorney's secretary and she in turn conveyed it to decedent and the attorney's son as joint tenants.

Although the courts closely scrutinize dealings between an attorney and his clients, an attorney is not prohibited from contracting or getting benefits from a client, where the transaction is open, fair and honest, when deliberately made and not tainted with fraud, undue influence or corruption. Saladino, 71 Ill.2d at 270, 375 N.E.2d at 104; McFail v. Braden (1960), 19 Ill.2d 108, 117, 166 N.E.2d 46, 52. • 3 The supreme court clarified the rules regarding presumptions and burdens of proof in cases involving transactions between fiduciaries in Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean (1983), 95 Ill.2d 452, 448 N.E.2d 872. There, the court determined that when an attorney presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the presumption vanishes.

And in making this determination, Illinois courts consider three “significant” factors, also known as the McFail factors: whether (1) the fiduciary made a full and frank disclosure of all relevant information that he had; (2) the fiduciary paid adequate consideration; and (3) the principal had competent and independent advice. E.g., McFail v. Braden, 19 Ill.2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46, 52 (1960); Miller, 268 Ill.Dec. 276, 778 N.E.2d at 267. Kotter argued in the district court that the presumption of donative intent, which arises with the creation of a joint tenancy, cancelled out the presumption of fraud as to Unit 4705.

First, an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and defendants would surely establish a duty of reasonable care, and I believe the complaint adequately alleges such a relationship. In McFail v. Braden, 19 Ill.2d 108, 116, 166 N.E.2d 46 (1960), the Illinois Supreme Court found "ample" evidence of an attorney-client relationship upon the "sole proof . . . that [the grantor of some deeds] sought [an attorney's] legal advice for a solution of her problems, and that it was he who recommended the execution of the deeds in question." Such proof is, of course, closely analogous to what is alleged in the instant complaint.

As to the first count, we have no difficulty in deciding that there was error in the order of dismissal. See, e.g., McFail v. Braden, 19 Ill.2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46, 51, 52 (1960); Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W.2d 176, 178(1960); Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16, 18 (Fla.App. 1965); Gerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So.2d 493, 498 (Fla. 1957); American-Canadian Oil Drilling Corp. v. Aldridge Stroud, Inc., 237 Ark. 407, 373 S.W.2d 148, 150, 151 (1963); Simler v. Conner, 282 F.2d 382, 385 (10 Cir. 1960). We assert no such assurance respecting the second count entitled "Intentional Falsehood" as to which the District Judge in colloquy with counsel prior to his ruling made no reference.