Opinion
# 2015-049-014 Claim No. 121863 Motion No. M-85929
02-20-2015
REGINALD G. MCFADDEN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Reginald G. McFadden, Pro Se Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General By: Ray A. Kyles, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Defendant's motion for a protective order relieving it from responding to certain discovery demands served by pro se inmate is granted.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-049-014 |
| Claimant(s): | REGINALD G. MCFADDEN |
| Claimant short name: | MCFADDEN |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 121863 |
| Motion number(s): | M-85929 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | DAVID A. WEINSTEIN |
| Claimant's attorney: | Reginald G. McFadden, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney General By: Ray A. Kyles, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | February 20, 2015 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant Reginald McFadden, an inmate proceeding pro se, commenced this action by verified claim filed October 12, 2012. The claim alleges that on August 1, 2012, McFadden was assaulted by "state employees" in a correctional facility, while he was suffering from chest pain. Claimant further alleges that while he was being transported "to Southport and Attica C.F." the following day, staff failed to provide him with medication for his heart problems.
This matter is before the Court on a motion by defendant for a protective order, which would relieve it from responding to certain discovery demands served by claimant. For his part, claimant has filed papers in opposition, in which he argues that the motion is frivolous, and he seeks sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1.
This rule provides, in pertinent part: "The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct as defined in this Part."
Subsequent to bringing the action, claimant made various efforts to obtain discovery from defendant. He first served several sets of interrogatories, seeking responses from certain identified employees. The State responded to the first of these, but then objected to the next one on the ground that it sought disclosure from non-parties. Claimant moved to compel, which motion was denied by Decision and Order filed October 7, 2014.
On October 22, 2014, claimant served on defendant three additional sets of discovery demands (referenced below as Demands 1, 2 and 3) that are the subject of the present application. These demands contain a mixture of interrogatories and notices to admit, along with (in Demand 1) a request for documents relevant to defendant's responses. In its motion, the State argues that the notices to admit address "fundamental and material issues or ultimate facts" (Aff. in Supp. ¶ 6), inappropriate for this discovery device, and that the interrogatories are "combative, leading and assume[] facts not in evidence" (Aff. in Supp. ¶ 8). It therefore seeks a protective order, so that it need not respond to these demands.
Although the requests are not labeled by discovery device, the notices to admit may be distinguished from the interrogatories by McFadden's statement at the end of each of the former that defendant should, in response, "admit, deny or object."
Discussion
Notices to admit are governed by CPLR 3123, which provides that a party may seek admissions regarding "the genuineness of any papers or documents, or the correctness or fairness of representation of any photographs, described in and served with the request, or of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry." Notices to admit thus may be used to "eliminate from dispute those matters about which there can be no controversy" (Howlan v Rosol, 139 AD2d 799, 802 [3d Dept 1988]). They cannot be employed for "material issues or ultimate issues or facts" (id.).
The admissions sought by Demand 1 clearly do not meet this standard. They are multi-parted (and thus do not lend themselves to a simple admission), and in some instances, argumentative. For example, request number 6 in the first set states: "As employer, is it your admission that upon arrival at Southport C.F. without at least (5) days supplies of essential medication that State employee: Dr. Wesley Canfield, M.D. and Nurse Administrator, did not provide essential medication from August 2nd - 3rd, 2012 due to the lack of a pharmacy on site?" This interrogatory presumes certain facts (i.e., that McFadden arrived at Southport without five days of medication), and includes multiple and overlapping factual allegations, some of which defendant might admit and others which it might not. Moreover, it uses terms that are open to varied interpretations (i.e., "essential") (see Taylor v Blair, 116 AD2d 204, 206 [1st Dept 1986] [notice to admit not proper when it contains terms that are "not clear cut"] ). All of the notices to admit contained in Demand 1 are essentially cut from this cloth, and are therefore impermissible.
Demand 3 contains further notices to admit (nos. 3 through 6), which - while not suffering all of the defects of those in Demand 1 - nonetheless contain multiple factual assertions within each notice, and so cannot be answered in the way contemplated by CPLR 3123. Thus, number 3 states: "On August 9th, 2012, CO Conroy was working in the second floor hospital with Nurse D. Bonning RN #425, who signed discharge from the hospital. Admit or Deny or object with reason." Defendant is thus asked to admit to numerous facts in a single notice to admit - the date, the identity of the employees, the identity of the person who signed the discharge, the place of work, and so forth. This does not fall within the ambit of permissible notices to admit.
In regard to interrogatories, these are properly denied when they seek information that is "irrelevant, overly broad, or burdensome," or when they are drafted in a manner that is "vague and indefinite" (Jefferson v State of New York, 60 AD3d 1215, 1215 [3d Dept 2009]). That is the case, for example, when interrogatories are "unreasonably detailed" when viewed against the backdrop of a case that does not warrant complex discovery (see Village of Mamaroneck v State of New York, 16 AD3d 674 [2d Dept 2005]). So, too, interrogatories may be struck when they consist of multiple subparts or reference outside documents (see Botsas v Grossman, 7 AD3d 654, 655 [2d Dept 2004]).
Many of McFadden's interrogatories run afoul of these principles, as they are confusing and do not appear reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence. The first set of interrogatories asks defendant to confirm whether its policies have particular meanings (e.g. Demand 1, Interrogatory 2 ["As employer, is it your policy entitled: Medications Health Care Services # 1.22 that in preparing an inmate for transfer that facility health staff will follow directive 4918 to ensure that the transfer process do not interrupt receipt of ordered/prescribed medication, this is mandatory, non-discretionary"]; Demand 1, Interrogatory 3 ["As employee [sic], is it also your policy entitled - Preparing Medication for Inmates Leaving the Facility #3.07 that your employees at Auburn C.F. were obligated to pack[] those medications that were necessary along with a notice labeled 'for immediate attention - medical unit only' in the upper right corner form #8000 via a central pharmacy requisition, pursuant to Directive 4918(iii)(D)(3)"]). To the extent that these interrogatories are asking defendant to reiterate the contents of its existing policies, there is no reason that the policies should not speak for themselves, and such interrogatories are therefore unnecessary. To the extent they are asking defendant to construe the meaning of those policies, they "call for opinions and interpretations to be made by the defendant," and are therefore improper (see Blotcher v Upjohn Co., 54 AD2d 851 [1st Dept 1976]).
Other interrogatories by McFadden make broad and difficult to understand inquiries, or are based on a presumption of particular facts. Thus, for example, Interrogatory 2 of Demand 2 reads as follows: "As employer, can you cite any exception why employees within DOCCS [the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision] movement and control and Inspector General Office and CERT teams would authorize a transfer on August 1-2, 2012 from Upstate University Hospital without glasses, hearing aids and medication?" This asks DOCCS to assume certain events took place, and then to speculate on what the reason might have been therefor. This question is "vague and indefinite," and not a proper interrogatory.
Finally, the subjects of the remaining inquiries bear, at best, marginal relevance to this action. It is not clear, for example, why the names of all employees who authorized McFadden's transfer on August 1-2, 2012 (Demand 2, Interrogatory 4), or the current place of employment of various individuals (Demand 3, Interrogatory 9) are material to the issues raised by McFadden's claim. In any case, given that the great majority of discovery requests are improper, the Court is not required to parse through the remainder so as to permit those with some marginal relevance to proceed (see Rush v Insogna, 119 AD2d 879, 880 [3d Dept 1986] [proper for court to strike interrogatories rather than "prune" them]; EIFS, Inc. v. Morie Co., 298 AD2d 548, 549 [2d Dept 2002] [same]).
In light of the foregoing, defendant's motion no. M-85929 is granted. Since the motion is not frivolous, claimant's application for sanctions is denied.
February 20, 2015
Albany, New York
DAVID A. WEINSTEIN
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Defendant's Notice of Motion for a Protective Order, Affirmation in Support and annexed Exhibit.
2. Claimant's Opposition to Defendant's Motion and Application for Sanctions.