We presume the Legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38(3) and (4); McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666. We construe statutes in a practical manner and give consideration to the context of the statutes and the purposes for which they were enacted. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-03; Grey Bear v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 2002 ND 139, ¶ 7, 651 N.W.2d 611.

By their very nature, negligence claims are usually poor subjects for summary judgment. Latendresse v. Latendresse, 294 N.W.2d 742, 748 (N.D. 1980); accord McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 21, 626 N.W.2d 666 (stating issues involving reasonableness standards generally are inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment). III

Tuhy v. Schlabsz, 1998 ND 31, ¶ 13, 574 N.W.2d 823, 826. A question of fact becomes a question of law only when a reasonable person can draw a single conclusion from the evidence. McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 5, 626 N.W.2d 666, 668; see also Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that the district court may resolve fact issues as a matter of law when "the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable difference of opinion"). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Johnsons, the Court concludes there is sufficient disagreement on the reasonableness and necessity of continued medical treatment to require full consideration by a jury.

We construe statutes to avoid absurd or illogical results. State v. Hirschkorn , 2016 ND 117, ¶ 11, 881 N.W.2d 244. Statutes are to be construed in a practical manner with consideration given to the context of the statutes and the purposes for which they were enacted. McDowell v.Gillie , 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. McCoy v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp. , 2014 ND 119, ¶ 8, 848 N.W.2d 659.III

statutes and the purposes for which they were enacted.McDowell v. Gillie , 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666 (citations omitted).[¶ 13] The 2004 version of N.D.C.C. § 38–18.

(Emphasis deleted.) Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 1993 OK 155, 864 P.2d 839, 845. "[L]imited and technical definitions given to the concepts of ‘emergency’ and ‘emergency care’ frustrate the purpose of Good Samaritan legislation," McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, 626 N.W.2d 666, ¶ 18, and should be avoided. This is particularly true given the intent of Good Samaritan laws, which is to abrogate the common-law rescue doctrine and to encourage people to risk helping strangers in need of emergency assistance without fear of liability, even when they have no duty to render aid. "Generally, a bystander has no duty to provide affirmative aid to an injured person, even if the bystander has the ability to help."

Falcon v. State, 1997 ND 200, ¶ 9, 570 N.W.2d 719. McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666. In enacting a statute, it is presumed the legislation is intended to comply with the state and federal constitutions, the entire statute is intended to be effective, a just and reasonable result is intended, a result feasible of execution is intended, and public interest is favored over any private interest.

[¶ 6] This Court interprets rules of court in accordance with principles of statutory construction. State v. Herauf, 2012 ND 151, ¶ 7, 819 N.W.2d 546. Statutory interpretation is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal. McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666. In statutory interpretation, this Court's primary objective is “to ascertain the intent of the Legislature by looking at the language of the statute itself and giving it its plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.”

SeeN.D.C.C. § 1–02–38(3) and (4). We construe statutes in a practical manner, and we consider the context of statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted. McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666.Bragg v. Burlington Res. Oil and Gas Co. LP, 2009 ND 33, ¶ 8, 763 N.W.2d 481 (quotations omitted).

In fact, to hold that the remedy of civil contempt under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 is available only within the ten-year statute of limitations prescribed for actions upon a judgment, or within twenty years if the judgment is renewed, would defeat the legislature's intent to provide parties to a divorce judgment with the additional remedy of civil contempt. M.M. v. Fargo Public School Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶ 12, 783 N.W.2d 806 (citation omitted) ("This Court's primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain legislative intent."); see also McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666 (stating this Court interprets statutes in a practical manner and considers the context of the statute and the purpose for which it was enacted). We have repeatedly stated that statutes must be construed to avoid absurd results and that we presume the legislature intended a just and reasonable result in enacting a statute.