Opinion
4:21-cv-12307
12-09-2022
CHRISTOPHER McDANIEL, Plaintiff, v. MS. WOODS, Defendant.
DISTRICT JUDGE SHALINA D. KUMAR
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 17)
KIMBERLY G. ALTMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction
This is a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Christopher McDaniel (McDaniel), currently incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility in Lenox Township, Michigan, filed a pro se complaint on September 22, 2021, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations against Defendant Lynn Wood (Wood), a principal with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) for actions arising at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility (JCS) in Jackson, Michigan. (ECF No. 1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), all pretrial matters were referred to the undersigned. (ECF No. 9).
The undersigned uses the spelling for Defendant's name found in her motion papers.
Before the Court is Wood's motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (ECF No. 17). The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 19 (response), 20 (reply), 21 (surreply)). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Wood's motion to dismiss McDaniel's Fourteenth Amendment claim be GRANTED and that McDaniel's Fourteenth Amendment claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and that Wood's motion for summary judgment on McDaniel's First Amendment retaliation claim on the basis of exhaustion be DENIED.
II. Factual Background
McDaniel alleges that on March 29, 2021, he was written a misconduct ticket for allowing another inmate to use his laptop, which he used to attend education courses within JCS, against MDOC policy regarding school laptops. (ECF No. 1, PageID.10). That day, he spoke to Wood, and she provided him with documents to sign, which upon inspection appeared to be forms for him to drop his classes. (Id.). Wood stated that because of his misconduct ticket, he would be required to sign the forms and drop his classes. (Id.). McDaniel told her that he did not violate any rules and that he was entitled to a hearing on the misconduct ticket before being dropped from classes for the misconduct. (Id.).
Some number of days after that, McDaniel challenged his misconduct ticket at a hearing, at which the misconduct was dropped because McDaniel did not consent to the other inmate's use of his laptop. (Id.). However, McDaniel discovered days later that he had been dropped from his courses. (Id.). This resulted in him receiving a failing grade in all courses and owing $1,587.00 for dropping the courses. (Id., PageID.11).
McDaniel claims that Wood had him dropped from his courses in retaliation for refusing to sign the documents and challenging the misconduct against him, and that he was denied equal protection of the law because other students who were found not guilty of misconduct after receiving a ticket were able to return to class. (Id., PageID.6-7). Wood now moves for dismissal of the equal protection claim, arguing that McDaniel did not plead every element of such a claim, and for summary judgment on the retaliation claim on the basis that McDaniel did not exhaust his administrative remedies for that claim.
III. Legal Standards
A. Motion to Dismiss
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action ...”). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Furthermore, the Court holds pro se complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).
“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists....” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact,” the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.' ” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The fact that McDaniel is pro se does not reduce his obligations under Rule 56. Rather, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 Fed.Appx. 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006). In addition, “[o]nce a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage, ... ‘the liberal pleading standards under [Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-513 (2002)] and [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable.' ” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., & Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)).
IV. Discussion
A. Dismissal of McDaniel's Equal Protection Claim
Wood argues that McDaniel's equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment has not been adequately pled, and that by failing to address this in his response to her motion, McDaniel has waived any defense to this argument.
1. Legal Standard
“To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.' ” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, Mich., 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008), as recognized in Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 442 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2012)).
2. Application
McDaniel has devoted a single sentence of the complaint to addressing the elements of an equal protection claim, stating that “[a]ll the students whom when found not guilty returned to class, except me.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.7). In arguing against dismissal, McDaniel cites cases pre-dating the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal. With Iqbal, “the Court has ushered in the era of so-called ‘plausibility pleading,' which represents a more exacting standard[.]” Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1107, 1108-09 (2010). This threadbare recital of a single requirement of an equal protection claim does not suffice to state a cause of action under Iqbal and McDaniel's citations to seemingly more lenient pleading requirements from prior Supreme Court cases are unavailing.
McDaniel is correct that his claim is not subject to a specifically heightened pleading standard. But even under the general rules of pleading, his singular statement regarding other students does not constitute “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). McDaniel has also failed to plead that his disparate treatment “burdens a fundamental right” or “targets a suspect class[.]” Napolitano, 648 F.3d at 379. He is therefore left with a claim that his treatment had no rational basis, id., but his claim falls short of meeting this standard as well. McDaniel has not alleged that there was no rational basis for him to be dropped from his classes, only that it went against MDOC regulations and was disparate from the treatment of other prisoners. Thus, his complaint fails to state a claim for violation of equal protection.
However, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice. If McDaniel becomes aware of facts during discovery that show, for instance that he was treated disparately due to his membership in a protected class, he may move for leave to amend the complaint and reinstate an equal protection claim in more detail.
B. Exhaustion of McDaniel's First Amendment Claim
1. Legal Standard
The PLRA requires prisoners to “properly” exhaust all “available” administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-90, 93 (2006). Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies “means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court and produces a useful administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). The PLRA does not detail what “proper exhaustion” entails because “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 218.
“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the defendant has the burden to plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015). But a prisoner countering a motion alleging failure to exhaust “must offer competent and specific evidence showing that he indeed exhausted his remedies, or was otherwise excused from doing so.” Sango v. Johnson, No. 13-12808, 2014 WL 8186701, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 1245969 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2015). Granting summary judgment because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits and thus requires dismissal without prejudice. Adams v. Smith, 166 Fed.Appx. 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2006).
The MDOC has established a three-step process to review and resolve prisoner grievances. “Under the [Michigan] Department of Corrections' procedural rules, inmates must include the ‘[d]ates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved' in their initial grievance.” Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010). As noted by the Sixth Circuit in Woodford, one of the purposes of requiring proper exhaustion is to “provide[ ] prisons with a fair opportunity to correct their own errors.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 94. To be sufficient, a grievance need not “allege a specific legal theory or facts that correspond to all the required elements of a particular legal theory.” Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003) abrogated with respect to other principles by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Nonetheless, the grievance must give “fair notice of the alleged mistreatment or misconduct that forms the basis of the constitutional or statutory claim made against a defendant in a prisoner's complaint.” Id.
Under MDOC PD 03.02.130, prisoners must provide the following information at Step I of the grievance process: “The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. Information provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ S (underscoring omitted).
Furthermore, MDOC PD also 03.02.130 sets forth time limits regarding the three-step grievance process.
Inmates must first attempt to informally resolve a grievable issue within two business days of becoming aware of the issue, and then may file a Step I grievance about any unresolved issues with a grievance coordinator within five business days of the attempted informal resolution. (Id. at ¶¶ Q, W.) If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after the response was due. (Id. at ¶¶ U, DD.) If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same procedure. (Id. at ¶¶ U, HH.) The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days after the date the Step II response was due. (Id.)Moses v. Campbell, No. 20-cv-13366, 2022 WL 2805145, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2022). “Step III grievances are ‘generally' responded to within sixty (60) days.” Johnson v. Burt, No. 1:20-cv-802, 2021 WL 3476449, at *3 (W.D. Mich. June 14, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3473483 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2021) (citing MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ II). “The grievance process is exhausted once the final response is issued in Step III.” Parker v. Turner, No. 2012794, 2022 WL 1787037, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 1, 2022).
2. Application
Wood argues that even though she was personally named in the Step I grievance that McDaniel filed and fully exhausted through Step III, he did not properly exhaust his claims because the grievance failed to assert retaliation or a violation of his right to equal protection of the law. In support of this argument, Wood cites Ward v. Luckey, No. 12-cv-14875, 2013 WL 5595350, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2013) and Jordan-El v. Harrington, No. 2:06-cv-10431, 2006 WL 1791261, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2006). However, Wood overstates the applicability of these cases.
In Ward, “the plaintiff exhausted a grievance alleging the defendant had interfered with his yard time, but sought redress in the complaint for a later incident in which the defendant allegedly retaliated against him for filing that grievance. As the court noted, the grievance plaintiff exhausted could not preemptively exhaust later events.” Alexander v. Nietzel, No. 2:16-CV-12071, 2018 WL 3685455, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3659525 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2018). The Alexander court distinguished Ward where, as here, a plaintiff's claims “flow from the same facts complained of in the grievance at issue.” Id.
To find otherwise would, on the one hand, reward conspiratorial misconduct in which the tortfeasor cloaks his intent to confound the victim and hamper her recovery. And on the other hand, prisoners should not feel compelled to include baseless or frivolous allegations in grievances simply for fear that the rigidity of a court's exhaustion standards may prevent the due consideration of evidence not yet available.Id.
More on-point is Jordan-El v. Harrington, in which the court reasoned that, “[s]ince retaliation is a separate form of misconduct or mistreatment, the Plaintiff was required to give prison officials fair notice of a First Amendment retaliation claim.” 2006 WL 1791261, at *3. This case, too, is distinguishable, because “in Jordan, the plaintiff did not set forth any facts or claims in his grievances that his mistreatment was related to his having filed a previous lawsuit or grievance against the defendant Corrections Officer.” Reed-Bey v. Lewis, No. 13-10168, 2016 WL 5109542, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5071197 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2016). Here, McDaniel's Step I grievance was summarized by the MDOC as follows:
McDaniel states that his laptop was taken without his consent. He was written a misconduct, but it was dismissed. He was removed from Jackson College and wants to be reinstated with grades adjusted for being removed so he does not have to repeat the classes.(ECF No. 17-3, PageID.122).
Reed-Bey v. Lewis is instructive. There, the plaintiff's property was confiscated by a corrections officer subject to a property hearing. 2016 WL 5109542, at *1. The property hearing was held by the same officer that confiscated the property. Id. The plaintiff complained about this fact, and the hearing was postponed; the plaintiff then brought this complaint to the warden. Id. Upon reconvening the hearing, that same officer found that the plaintiff's property should not be returned. Id. A subsequent property hearing was later held by a different officer, but the result was the same. Id. at *2.
The plaintiff in Reed-Bey then sued, claiming “a due process violation based on the non-return of his property,” and “that his property was disposed of in retaliation for his complaining about the unfairness of the property hearing.” Id. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's grievance did not mention the word “retaliation” and therefore did not exhaust his retaliation claim, but the court found that this argument overstated the requirements of the MDOC grievance procedure. Id. at *3.
“ ‘The MDOC policy does not contain a precise description of the necessary degree of factual particularity required of prisoners.' Rather, ‘a grievant need only object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming and need not lay out facts, articulate legal theories, or demand particular relief.' ” Id. (quoting Davison v. MacLean, No. 06-12755, 2007 WL 1520892, *5 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (internal quotations omitted)). Here, as in Reed-Bey, McDaniel included the facts in his grievance necessary to encompass a claim of retaliation, even though the retaliation claim is not spelled out in the grievance. To require more and “suggest that he should have intuited a stranger's motives at the very moment of his mischief is to demand from an ordinary man the skill of supernatural foresight.” Alexander, 2018 WL 3685455, at *3 (citing Reed-Bey, 2016 WL 5109542, at *3). Thus, under Woods' “notice pleading” theory of exhaustion, McDaniel has exhausted his retaliation claim.
Furthermore, Wood's heightened theory of exhaustion has been called into doubt by the Supreme Court. In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007), the Court stated that, while the “Sixth Circuit rule may promote early notice to those who might later be sued,” the “ ‘primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued[.]' ” (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also Cary v. Washington, No. 17-13217, 2018 WL 5117812, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4501480 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2018) (“Since the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Bock, the Sixth Circuit has stated that courts ought not impose severe technical requirements on prisoners who comply with the spirit and purpose of the administrative exhaustion rules.”); Moffat v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 09-14696, 2010 WL 3905354, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2010) (“[T]he primary purpose of the exhaustion requirement is not notice-it is not intended to substitute either the summons or the complaint.”); Diaz v. Rutter, No. 2:05-CV-239, 2006 WL 3370875, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2006) (“[T]here is no requirement that a prisoner must exhaust specific legal theories. It is enough that Plaintiff presents factual allegations that could support a legal theory against the Defendants in a Step I grievance.”).
Overall, McDaniel's grievance sufficiently alerted prison officials to his retaliation claim against Wood so as to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Thus, McDaniel should be allowed to proceed on this claim.
Wood also contends that this grievance did not exhaust McDaniel's equal protection claim. This presents a closer question, as his grievance did not allege that he was treated disparately from other prisoners. However, in light of the recommendation, supra, that the equal protection claim be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the undersigned need not address this issue.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Wood's motion to dismiss McDaniel's Fourteenth Amendment claim be GRANTED and that McDaniel's Fourteenth Amendment claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. She further RECOMMENDS that Wood's motion for summary judgment on McDaniel's First Amendment retaliation claim on the basis of exhaustion be DENIED.
If the District Court adopts this Report and Recommendation, a scheduling order will be entered, and McDaniel's case will be able to proceed as to the retaliation claim alone.
NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation. Any objections must be filed within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 144 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Under Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.