Opinion
09-17-1887
McCULLOUGH v. ABSECOM LAND IMP. CO. and others.
D. J. Pancoast, for the motion. H. M. Snyder and P. L. Voorhees, for defendants.
Bill to quiet title. On motion for injunction.
D. J. Pancoast, for the motion. H. M. Snyder and P. L. Voorhees, for defendants.
This bill is filed to quiet title to certain lands. After the filing of the bill, the complainant filed a petition, showing that the defendants had filed a bill asking for the partition of the same lands, in which the complainant in the first-named suit is not a party. The present complainant now comes in by petition, and asks to have the suit for partition restrained until the suit to quiet the title is determined.
To this it is objected that he cannot seek the aid of the court for the purpose of restraining another suit, i. e., the suit in partition, through an independent proceeding. It is urged, with zeal, that the court cannot hear him until he has become a party to the suit in partition; that not being in court on motion of the complainant in that cause, if he desired to be heard, or to obtain any relief, it was his duty, first to apply to the court to be made a party in that suit. I do not understand this to be the law. The complainant shows by his bill, that he has been, and is, in possession of the land described, and that there is some claim of title set up by others, with other allegations sufficient upon their face, perhaps, to bring him within the statute which authorizes him to file such bill. Now, as intimated, the persons who make this adverse claim are seeking a partition of these lands, or a part of them. In such case, I am quite certain, the complainant in the suit to quiet title is not obliged to become a party in the suit for partition in order to restrain that suit.
Again, I understood counsel to urge that a court of equity will not, in such case, restrain the proceedings in one suit, at the instance of a party in another suit. I cannot bring my mind to this method of reasoning. I cannot understand why injustice cannot be committed by proceedings in equity as well as at law. Nor can I understand why, when such injustice is pointed out in a separate or independent suit, and relief asked, it should not be granted. Let us look at this very case. A partition of these lands is sought. The parties who claim and who are admitted to have rights under the bill for partition are very numerous. The complainant in the partition suit insists on going on with his suit, and says, let the complainant in the suit to quiet title proceed with that suit also. Suppose the court were to adopt this view, what would ensue? In case of partition, there would be several score of lot-owners to resist the complainant in the suit to quiet title, (his suit having been instituted after the others.) And in case of a sale, there would be as many new defendants for him to bring in, and possibly, by as many separate bills of complaint. It seems to me that this course cannot be tolerated without burying in oblivion the valuable rule requiring the court to prevent, as far as possible, a multiplicity of suits. I shall advise an order for an injunction. The costs will await the final hearing.