Summary
finding no evidence of any contract that might form the basis of a wrongful termination claim, except the collective bargaining agreement, which plaintiff referenced in the complaint, and therefore concluding that plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination and breach of the labor agreement were both premised on the collective bargaining agreement
Summary of this case from Caravello v. American Airlines, Inc.Opinion
NO. 4:01-CV-898-A
December 11, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendant, The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company ("BNSF"), for summary judgment. Plaintiff, R.C. McCuin, has not filed a response to defendant's motion. The court, having reviewed the motion, the record, and applicable authorities, concludes that the motion should be granted.
I. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff, a seventy-five year old African-American male, alleges that after he fainted at work, defendant withheld him from service pending a medical evaluation, and has since refused to allow him to return to work. Contending that this employment action constitutes discrimination on the basis of perceived disability, age, and race, plaintiff asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). In addition, plaintiff sets forth causes of action for wrongful termination, punitive damages, and breach of the labor agreement.
II. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant argues that plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination, punitive damages, and breach of the labor agreement are preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151-188. Def.'s Br. at 8-11. In addition, defendant urges that there is no factual basis to support plaintiff's claims of race, age, and disability discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. Id. at 11. In particular, defendant contends, plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing under these statutes because there is no evidence to suggest that any of the respective protected factors caused BNSF's employment decisions. Id. at 11-13. Further, defendant asserts that its safety concerns represent a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decisions of which plaintiff complains, and that plaintiff has adduced no evidence to show that this reason is pretextual for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 13-15.
III. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff has fifty-five years of service with BNSF, most recently working as a "carman" and forklift operator. Compl. ¶ 3; Pl.'s Dep. at 35-36, 43. On July 5, 2000, after taking his blood-pressure medication on an empty stomach, plaintiff became light-headed, and fainted while standing near a forklift at work. Compl. ¶ 4; Pl.'s Dep. at 45-46. An ambulance transported plaintiff to the hospital, where tests were performed. Pl.'s Dep. at 51. The next day, Blair Wallace ("Wallace"), a mechanical superintendent with BNSF, notified plaintiff by letter that he was being withheld from service pending a medical evaluation. Compl., Ex. A; Wallace Decl. at 2. BNSF requires the completion of a Medical Status Form, which allows BNSF's Medical and Environmental Health Department to "determine if the employee is fit to return to work or if additional information is needed to decide the employee's status." Jarrard Decl. at 1.
Dr. Edward Guinn ("Guinn") performed a medical examination on plaintiff, and by letter signed July 11, 2000, he reported to BNSF that plaintiff suffered a syncopcal attack, but that he was otherwise in "an excellent state of health, capable and safe as an employee of BNSF as he has been for many years." Def.'s App. to Mot., Ex. 3A. Guinn also completed the Medical Status Form on July 15, 2000, and, while he recommended that plaintiff be restored to full-duty work status effective August 7, 2000, he also placed several permanent restrictions on the types of activities that plaintiff should be permitted to perform. Id., Ex. 3B.
Bob Hosutt ("Hosutt"), BNSF's Field Manager of Clinical and Rehabilitation Services in the Medical and Environmental Health Department, received the letter and Medical Status Form completed by Guinn. He explained that the Medical Status Form contained contradictory information and "created more questions in [his] mind than it answered." Hosutt Decl. at 2. On August 1, 2000, Hosutt expressed his concerns to Guinn, and requested the results of plaintiff's upcoming medical examination, as well as recommendations concerning further medical evaluations and current work status. Def.'s App. to Mot., Ex. 3C. In response, Guinn submitted a slip, with an attached cardiology evaluation from Dr. Marilyn King-Rankine ("King-Rankine"), indicating that plaintiff would be able to return to work on August 14, 2000. Id., Exs. 3D-E. King-Rankine's evaluation detailed certain test results and indicated that she would "send for the records at osteopathic hospital and then we can make some decision as to whether or not anything needs to be done."Id., Ex. 3E.
On August 22, 2000, Hosutt sent a letter to Guinn, inquiring as to whether Guinn received an update from King-Rankine. Id., Ex. 3F. As Guinn did not respond, see Hosutt Decl. at 3-4, Hosutt sent a follow-up letter on September 19, 2000, see Def's App. to Mot., Ex. 3G, to which Guinn also failed to respond, see Hosutt Decl. at 4. Hosutt then sent plaintiff a letter on November 7, 2000, requesting that he work with Guinn to obtain the additional information to assist with plaintiff's return to service or a leave of absence. Def's App. to Mot., Ex. 3H.
Plaintiff subsequently underwent treadmill testing, Pl.'s Dep. at 84, and by letter signed December 15, 2000 — apparently sent only to Guinn — King-Rankine explained that the test results were normal, and she cleared plaintiff to return to work, id. at 84-85; Def's App. to Mot., Ex. 4A. Apparently, Guinn did not transmit this information to BNSF.
Angela Jones ("Jones"), BNSF's Regional Manager in the Medical and Environmental Health Department, having not received any additional information regarding plaintiff's ability to return to work, obtained on May 24, 2001, plaintiff's medical records from King-Rankine, which included the December 15, 2000, letter clearing plaintiff to work. Jones Decl. at 2. Upon review of the records, BNSF's Corporate Medical Officer, Dr. Michael Jarrard ("Jarrard"), suggested that plaintiff undergo a Holter Monitor Examination to follow-up on the medical findings and determine whether plaintiff could safely return to his job. Id.; Jarrard Decl. at 2. On June 13, 2001, Jones offered to arrange the examination. Jones Decl. at 2-3; Def.'s App. to Mot., Ex. 4B; Pl.'s Dep. at 90.
Plaintiff participated in the Holter Monitor Examination on August 21, 2001. Def.'s App. to Mot., Exs. 4C-D; Pl.'s Dep. at 90. After several attempts to secure plaintiff's test results from Guinn, see Jones Decl. at 3-4; Def.'s App. to Mot., Ex. 4D, Plaintiff eventually faxed them to Jones in early October 2001, Pl.'s Dep. at 93-94, 97-98; Def.'s App. to Mot., Ex. 4E. A few weeks later, after receiving and reviewing these test results, BNSF cleared plaintiff to return to work. Jarrard Decl. at 2; Pl.'s Dep. at 98-99. Hosutt shared the news with plaintiff, who told him that he needed to talk with his attorney; to date, plaintiff has not returned to work. Pl.'s Dep. at 101-02. Plaintiff is currently on a one-year leave of absence, which expires February 1, 2003, at which point he is expected to return to work, and failure to do so would be cause for dismissal. Id. at 102-03. Moreover, plaintiff applied for, and has begun to receive, Railroad Retirement benefits. Id. at 160.
IV. General Summary Judgment Principles
A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256. To meet this burden, the non-movant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s]." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994). An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Unsupported allegations, conclusory in nature, are insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1984).
The standard for granting a summary judgment is the same as the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
V. Analysis
A. Plaintiff's Claims for Wrongful Termination, Punitive Damages, and Breach of the Labor Agreement
Plaintiff alleges causes of action for wrongful termination, punitive damages, and breach of the labor agreement. The court first notes that punitive damages are a form of damages, not an independent cause of action.
To establish a claim for wrongful termination under Texas law, plaintiff must show that "(1) he and his employer had a contract that specifically provided that the employer did not have the right to terminate the employment contract at will; and (2) the employment contract was in writing." Lumpkin v. H C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (citing Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, there is no evidence of any contract that might form the basis of a wrongful termination claim, except the 1974 collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), which plaintiff references in his complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 23-25. Thus, plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination and breach of the labor agreement are both premised on the 1974 CBA.
The RLA provides a mandatory arbitration procedure "for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 U.S.C. § 151a; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1994). In the Fifth Circuit, "a claim is preempted by the RLA only if it relies on the interpretation of a provision of the CBA; if the claim is brought under state law without any reference to the CBA, then it is not preempted."Kollar v. United Transp. Union, 83 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1996) (citingHirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that BNSF's conduct breached Rules 25, 27, and 43 of the 1974 CBA. Compl. ¶ 9. Moreover, whether plaintiff was "wrongfully terminated" under the CBA would require extensive interpretation and construction of the CBA. Accordingly, the court concludes that the RLA preempts plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination and breach of the labor agreement, and the court concludes that plaintiff's causes of action for wrongful termination, punitive damages, and breach of the labor agreement should be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff's ADA, ADEA, and Title VII Claims
Plaintiff asserts causes of action under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, claiming that his race, perceived disability, and age unlawfully motivated BNSF's employment decisions. Under each statute, plaintiff bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that defendant made an employment decision that was motivated by a protected factor.See, e.g., Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995) (reciting the standard for a Title VII race discrimination case);Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications, Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that in an ADA action, plaintiff must show that the "negative employment action occurred because of the disability") (citing Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1998)); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that one element of the prima facie ADEA case is that plaintiff "was replaced by someone outside the protected class, someone younger, or was otherwise discharged because of age") (citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff has not satisfied his prima facie burden under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA.
Putting aside conclusory allegations and opinions, plaintiff has presented no evidence as to BNSF's discriminatory motives in delaying his return to work, and a review of the summary judgment record similarly indicates a lack of any such evidence. He admitted that he did not know who was responsible for deciding whether he could return to work, Pl.'s Dep. at 119, and remarked: "I have in my mind that they realized that I was a black man." Id. at 120. Yet plaintiff did not know if those decision-makers were aware of his race or age, id. at 120-21, and he never heard anyone in management utter any inappropriate comments, id. at 118. In addition, plaintiff only believes that one person, Wallace, discriminated against him, and admits that that is only his opinion, and that he has no facts to support that opinion. Id. at 159. Plaintiff's unsupported, conclusory allegations are insufficient to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment. Simmons, 746 F.2d at 269.
In addition to plaintiff's lack of evidence to support his allegations of discrimination, defendant has shown that BNSF had procedures in place for handling workplace injuries such as plaintiff's, which had to be followed before an employee could return to work. Jarrard Decl. at 1; Jones Decl. at 1. It is clear that plaintiff was aware of these procedures, see, e.g., Def.'s App. to Mot., Exs. 2A, 3C, 3F, 3G, 3H, and that BNSF's purpose in adhering to these procedures was to ensure plaintiff's well-being and his ability to return to work safely, see, e.g., id. Exs. 3C, 3F; Pl.'s Dep. at 43-44. Further, the record is clear that upon finally receiving, in late May 2001, responsive medical information related to plaintiff's fainting episode, BNSF promptly reviewed the information, and suggested to plaintiff on June 13, 2001, that he undergo the Holter Monitor Examination to determine his fitness to return to work. Def.'s App. to Mot., Ex. 4B; Jones Decl. at 2-3; Pl.'s Dep. at 90. After BNSF finally secured these test results in early October 2001, BNSF cleared plaintiff to return to work a few weeks later. Def.'s App. to Mot., Exs. 4D-E; Jarrard Decl. at 2; Pl.'s Dep. at 98-99.
Defendant's evidence shows that plaintiff's race, age, and perceived disability played no role in BNSF's delay in allowing him to return to work. Rather, the delay was caused by the collective failure of plaintiff, Guinn, and King-Rankine to timely provide BNSF with responsive medical information, despite BNSF's repeated requests. Because plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, the court concludes that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
VI. ORDER
For the reasons discussed,
The court ORDERS that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and is hereby, granted.
The court further ORDERS that all of plaintiff's claims and causes of action be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.
The court further ORDERS that defendant shall have and recover from plaintiff costs of court incurred by it.
FINAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the order of dismissal signed by the court this same day,
The court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that all claims and causes of action asserted by plaintiff, R.C. McCuin, against defendant, The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, in the above-captioned action be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.
The court further ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that defendant shall have and recover from plaintiff costs of court incurred by it.