Summary
applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(B) to pro se plaintiff not proceeding in forma pauperis by dismissing complaint and imposing filing restrictions
Summary of this case from Harbison v. U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign RelationsOpinion
Civil Action No. 04-00623 (PLF).
April 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Federal Defendants' motion for imposition of filing restrictions against plaintiff, as well as a virtually identical motion filed by the Union Defendants. Before filing the instant lawsuit, pro se plaintiff Linwood McCreary filed two similar claims in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See Compl. ¶¶ 49, 132, 271, 315; McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 01-1451 (D.D.C. 2001); McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 9 (D.D.C. 2003). Both were dismissed. See id.
The term "Federal Defendants" includes named defendants Lee R. Heath, Chief Postal Inspector of the United States Postal Inspection Service ("USPS"); Karla Corcoran, Inspector General of USPS; Alberto Gonzales (plaintiff originally named John Ashcroft), Attorney General of the United States; Kenneth L. Wainstein (plaintiff originally named Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.), United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; and John E. Potter, Postmaster General of United States. The term "Union Defendants" refers to William Burrus, President of the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Patricia A. Johnson, President of the Nation's Capital Southern Maryland Area Local, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO; and Raymond Williams, Vice President of the Nation's Capital Southern Maryland Area Local, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
In the first lawsuit, Judge Jackson simply granted a motion to dismiss against Mr. McCreary without indicating whether he relied on the procedural (failure to exhaust contractual remedies) or substantive theories for dismissal asserted in the motion. See McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 01-1451 (D.D.C. 2001); McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 11 (D.D.C. 2003). In the second lawsuit, Judge Collyer considered the res judicata arguments set forth by the defendants, but ultimately dismissed for Mr. McCreary's failure to exhaust his contractual and administrative remedies.See McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 10-12 (D.D.C. 2003).
Well before filing the current complaint, plaintiff announced his plans to keep filing similar claims, regardless of any adverse outcome. In filings related to his second lawsuit, plaintiff noted the defendants' argument that he may not re-litigate "' when' he had a full and fair opportunity to do so," and responded by writing that "[u]ntil such time as the defendants cease and desist with the aforementioned [harms], the plaintiff will not receive his ' when' and will live the American dream to litigate and re-litigate until the plaintiff realizes his ' when.'" McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 10 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Plaintiff's Opposition ¶ 3 (emphasis in original)). As a corrective response to this statement, Judge Collyer instructed that "if Mr. McCreary disagrees with the result of this decision, he should appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District Court of Columbia Circuit and not institute a third lawsuit at the district court level." McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 12 n. 8. On April 19, 2004, in direct violation of Judge Collyer's instruction, plaintiff filed the current complaint. In it, he stated that "the defendants . . . know that I will never ever quit until justice prevail [sic], and they stop killing my co-workers, some defendants knew that I would return with still another, and another, and another complaint until they either kill me or I succeeded in freeing all postal workers from that hell hole." Compl. at 84. Clearly, no adverse decision will deter Mr. McCreary from filing future claims in this Court.
Mr. McCreary has flooded the judicial system with duplicative, unduly voluminous, and hyperbolic filings. For example, in support of the complaint before Judge Collyer, plaintiff submitted eleven non-dispositive motions to the Court before the dismissal of his complaint. Judge Collyer denied all but two of these motions. In the current litigation, plaintiff filed a 162-page, disorganized complaint riddled with hyperbole. Plaintiff later filed a 34-page response to the defendants' motion to dismiss that he asked the Court to treat as an amended complaint, in violation of Local Civil Rule 7(e). He has also filed three motions for summary judgment — one of which was over 70 pages in length in violation of Local Civil Rule 7(e). Plaintiff's further filings, as styled by him, include: Motions to Dismiss Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike Federal Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Opportunity to Prove That Defendants' Parties and/or Their Attorneys Commit Frauds When Not Giving Answer to Complaint, Motion to Strike Federal Defendant's Evidence, Plaintiff's Opposition to/Federal Defendants' Protective Motion to Enlargement of Time to File Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Amend/Correct Page 5 of Plaintiff's Opposition to/Federal Defendants' Protective Motion to Enlargement of Time to File Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Amend/Correct Court's Record, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike "Government Exhibit F," Plaintiffs Motion for Imposition of Arbitrator Christopher E. Mile's Final Binding Decision — the Merit Systems Protection Board Decision and This Court's Decision, and Plaintiff's Opposition to/Federal Defendants' Motion for Imposition of Filing Restrictions Against Plaintiff and Memorandum in Support Thereof/. Plaintiff filed all of these motions while the defendants' original motion to dismiss was pending. The Court has previously authorized sanctions against litigants who confuse quantity with quality and barrage the Court with filings, as plaintiff has in this case. See Pigford v. Veneman, Civ. Action No. 97-1978 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Moore v. National Children's Center, Civil Action No. 96-0118 (D.D.C. 1997)).
Judge Collyer indicated that "Mr. McCreary has filed the following non-dispositive motions, as styled by him:"
• Motion for Judgment by Default Pursuant to "FRCP 55(b)(2)";
• Motion for Judgment by Default Pursuant to "FRCP 55(b)(2)(e)" and "FRCP 6(b)(1) and (2)";
• Motion for Judgment by Default Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2);
• Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion to Proceed to Trial as Demanded;
• Motion to Vacate Plaintiff's Previous Sworn Declaration/Motion to Resubmit a New Sworn Declaration or in the Alternative . . . Motion to Dismiss/Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/or in the Alternative/Motion for Summary Judgment as Defendant's Submission is Time Barred;
• Motion for Court to Appointed Counsel;
• Motion to Amend Certificate of Service;
• Motion for Preliminary Injunction;
• Motion for Court to Amend Plaintiff's Complaints
• Motion to Enter into the Record Acts or Threats and/or Extortion by the Defendants; and
• Motion to Amend Preliminary Injunction.
See McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 4-5 n. 3.
Judge Collyer granted only the Motion to Amend Certificate of Service and the Motion for Court to Amend Plaintiff's Complaints. See McCreary v. Potter, Civil Action No. 02-1986, Memorandum Opinion at 5-7.
Although pro se pleadings are to be read liberally, a pro se litigant, like any other litigant, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). While the Court does not intend to dismiss plaintiff's 162-page complaint based on Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court notes that Rule 8(a) requires, at a minimum, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Local Civil Rule 7(e) states that "[a] memorandum of points and authorities in support of or in opposition to a motion shall not exceed 45 pages and a reply memorandum shall not exceed 25 pages, without prior approval of the court." LCvR 7(e).
A number of these filings easily exceed 25 pages in length. To their credit, both sets of defendants have responded to all of these motions in a timely manner.
Plaintiff's claims have escalated in their allegations and rhetoric. Initially plaintiff asserted that the Federal Defendants and Union Defendants conspired to commit fraud against him. See generally Compl. In response to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff accused counsel for the Federal Defendants, without any evidence or reason, of committing perjury and fraud before the Court. See Opposition of Plaintiff to Federal Defendants Motion to Dismiss at 28; Motion for Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for Motion to Proceed to Trial by Jury at 29. In his latest motion for summary judgment and in a telephone call with counsel for the Federal Defendants, plaintiff's claims have become outlandish — he now accuses counsel for the Federal Defendants of killing people.See Federal Defendants' Motion for Imposition of Filing Restrictions Against Plaintiff at 2. Thus, plaintiff's recent motions and behavior towards counsel are not presented for a proper purpose, but instead are based upon unwarranted or frivolous argument and upon allegations and factual contentions without evidentiary support, in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2) and (3) (stating that litigants must present legal contentions "warranted by existing law," based on "nonfrivolous argument," and that have sufficient "evidentiary support")
Although plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court notes that the principle recognized in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) discourages the Court from considering claims that are "essentially fictitious," as opposed to doubtful or questionable.Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing, among other cases, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) and Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1973)). While plaintiff's original allegation of a conspiracy to commit fraud may appear somewhat questionable, his allegation that defense counsel has killed people is "essentially fictitious." The Court has previously ordered sanctions and a restriction on filing in a case where it found "[p]laintiff's most recent filings [to be] opaque, nonsensensical and frivolous." Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., 145 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2001). The Court also found that no adverse decision would deter the plaintiff from continuing to file. Id. As in that case, the "Court will tolerate [plaintiff's] abuses of the judicial system no longer. . . ." Id. Accordingly, upon consideration of the foregoing it is hereby
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) states, in pertinent part, that when a plaintiff files in forma pauperis, the court may dismiss sua sponte, "notwithstanding any filing fee . . . that may have been paid," complaints that are "frivolous or malicious" or "fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that, in retaliation for a labor strike, President Nixon initiated a conspiracy in 1970, which continues to this day, against the U.S. Postal Workers to keep wages down and place postal workers in harms way.See generally Compl.
ORDERED that the Federal Defendants' Motion for Imposition of Filing Restrictions Against Plaintiff is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Union Defendants' Motion for Filing Restrictions Against Plaintiff is GRANTED; it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that plaintiff shall not file any further motions without leave of Court; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that all defendants are relieved from their obligation to respond to any pending or further motions filed by plaintiff absent an order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.