Opinion
No. 05-08-01398-CV
Opinion Filed October 1, 2009.
On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05-11179-H.
Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices O'NEILL and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant challenges the trial court's dismissal of appellant's claims, contending in three issues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to follow rule of civil procedure 18a before denying a motion to recuse, (2) granting appellee's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, and (3) exhibiting "insubordination" to a prior opinion of this Court. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Appellant filed this suit in Bee County requesting writ of habeas corpus relief pursuant to chapter 11 of the code of criminal procedure and asserting violations of his constitutional rights by "Clerk of the Court at Frank Crowley Courts Building." Specifically, appellant contended appellee "denied and refused filing and docketing" of evidence "filed" by appellant respecting "controverted, previously unresolved factual issues material to the legality of [appellant's] confinement." In addition, appellant asserted appellee "violated" the duty owed to appellant pursuant to article 40.001 of the code of criminal procedure, which provides that a new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial.
The 156th Judicial District Court in Bee County transferred this case to Dallas County where it was assigned to the 134th Judicial District Court. The 134th Judicial District Court dismissed the case "due to the failure of [appellant] to comply with § 14.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." We reversed on appeal because the 156th Judicial District Court failed to transfer the entire file to Dallas County. Accordingly, the 134th Judicial District Court did not have all available information before it prior to dismissing the case. McCray v. Clerk of the Court, No. 05-06-00755-CV, 2007 WL 2473334, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 4, 2007, no pet.) (memo. op.).
The trial judge for the 134th Judicial District Court recused herself following the remand of the case, and the case was transferred to the 160th Judicial District Court. Appellant subsequently wrote a letter to the judge of the 160th Judicial District Court asserting the judge was biased, prejudiced, and had violated the code of judicial conduct. Evidently considering appellant's letter to be a motion to recuse, the trial judge declined to recuse himself and referred the matter to the administrative judge. The administrative judge denied the motion.
Appellee filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss arguing (1) it was not a proper jural entity and, therefore, had no capacity to be sued, (2) it was entitled to sovereign immunity, and (3) to the extent appellant was attempting to sue an individual Dallas County employee or official, that person was also immune from suit. Appellee also filed a motion to dismiss any claims against any individual Dallas County employee or official pursuant to section 101.106(f) of the civil practice and remedies code. Appellee finally sought to dismiss the case due to appellant's failure to comply with the inmate litigation filing requirements in chapter 14 of the civil practice and remedies code and to plead a legally recognized cause of action. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction finding appellee was not a proper jural entity and that appellee had not waived sovereign immunity. The trial court also granted the motion to dismiss as to any individual employee of Dallas County sued by appellant and found appellant failed to state a legally recognized cause of action.
Section 101.106(f) provides:
If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee's employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee's official capacity only.
Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(f) (Vernon 2005).
Recusal
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial judge and the administrative judge failed to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a by not serving appellant with appellee's motion to recuse and by ruling on the motion without obtaining a concurring or opposing statement from all parties. The record does not reflect appellee filed a motion to recuse. Rather, the trial judge evidently considered appellant's letter accusing the judge of being biased and prejudiced and of violating the code of judicial conduct as a motion to recuse. Accordingly, the trial judge was not required to serve appellant with a copy of the motion or obtain an opposing or concurring statement from appellant. We overrule appellant's first issue.
Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss
We construe appellant's second issue as challenging the trial court's order granting appellee's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. Although appellant is appearing pro se, it is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable rules of procedure. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Amir-Sharif v. Mason, 243 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). The rules of appellate procedure require an appellant's brief to contain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authority and to the record." Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Although we must interpret this requirement liberally, an issue not supported by authority is waived. McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).
Appellant makes numerous conclusory statements in his brief regarding the plea to the jurisdiction. However, he neither cites any authority under this issue nor discusses any applicable law with respect to the trial court's order. We conclude this issue is inadequately briefed and presents nothing to review. See McIntyre, 50 S.W.3d at 682; Favaloro v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 13 S.W.3d 831, 840 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). We resolve appellant's second issue against him.
Compliance with Prior Opinion
In his third issue, appellant apparently contends the trial court's order granting appellee's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss conflicts with this Court's prior opinion. We did not reach the merits of appellant's claims in our prior opinion. Rather, we addressed whether the 134th Judicial District Court properly dismissed appellant's claims due to his failure to comply with chapter 14 of the civil practice and remedies code. We reversed the dismissal of the case because the 134th Judicial District Court did not have the entire record before it at the time it dismissed the case. McCray, 2007 WL 2473334, at *4. We remanded the case for reconsideration based on the supplemented record. Id.
The current appeal involves the trial court's granting of appellee's plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. The trial court made no findings regarding whether appellant complied with chapter 14. Accordingly, the trial court's order does not conflict with our prior opinion. We overrule appellant's third issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.