Opinion
21-35883
10-18-2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding No. 3:21-cv-05222-JLR
Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Former federal prisoner Steven Allen McCracken appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his civil action brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1595. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed McCracken's action because McCracken failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant held McCracken in a condition of peonage or compelled McCracken into involuntary servitude or forced labor. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1584, 1589; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911) (defining peonage as "compulsory service in payment of a debt"); United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing involuntary servitude under § 1584); United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that under § 1589, the alleged "threat, considered from the vantage point of a reasonable person in the place of the victim, must be 'sufficiently serious' to compel that person" to continue to work).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing McCracken's action without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).