Opinion
C. A. 3:19-2578-MGL-PJG
10-13-2021
Lamitthia McCormick; D'Mario K. Anderson, Loretta McCormick, individually and as parent and legal guardian of D.K., a minor under the age of eighteen 18, Plaintiffs, v. Kershaw County Sheriff's Office; Lee Doan, Sheriff of Kershaw County; Deputy David Jordan, Deputy Chris Boykin; 911 Operator Brenda Johnson; Responding Unit 202, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Paige J. Gossett UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiffs filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq., in the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas. The defendants removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 38.) The plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 50), and the defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 53). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that the defendants' motion should be granted as to the plaintiffs' federal claims and that the plaintiff's remaining state law claims should be remanded to the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, to the extent they find support in the record. This case arises out of a traffic stop in which Plaintiff Lamitthia McCormick was pulled over by Kershaw County Sheriff's Deputies. On January 21, 2018, Defendants Deputy David Jordan and Lieutenant Christian Boykin of the Kershaw County Sheriff's Office responded to a call about an armed robbery at a Dollar General store in Lugoff, South Carolina. Deputy Jordan and Lieutenant Boykin spoke to the victims and watched video from the store's security camera. Their investigation revealed that the suspect was a black male fleeing in a silver-colored sedan. Deputy Jordan reviewed the video himself and had a picture of the car. Deputy Jordan and Lieutenant Boykin left the scene separately to patrol the county and look for a vehicle that matched that description.
In nearby Elgin, South Carolina, three to four hours later, Deputy Jordan observed a silver Nissan sedan, which he described as the “same” as the car seen on the surveillance video. (Jordan Dep., ECF No. 50-2 at 12.) Deputy Jordan believed the sedan may have been the same one used in the armed robbery of the Dollar General, so he initiated a traffic stop. McCormick, a black female, was driving the Nissan, and Plaintiff D'Mario K. Anderson, a black male, was in the passenger seat. Deputy Jordan told McCormick that there had been an armed robbery and that her vehicle matched the description of the vehicle used the robbery. Deputy Jordan also observed yellow grocery bags in the car that resembled bags from Dollar General Stores. Deputy Jordan believed that at that point he had probable cause to detain McCormick and Anderson and ask to search the vehicle for evidence of the robbery.
Deputy Jordan asked for consent to search McCormick's vehicle, but McCormick refused and asked to speak to a supervisor. Deputy Jordan called his supervisor-Lieutenant Boykin- and asked him to come to the scene. Lieutenant Boykin started driving to the scene, but he was about thirty minutes away. While waiting for Lieutenant Boykin, McCormick began calling her family members and asking them to come to the scene, which they did. McCormick also called 911 and told the dispatcher-Defendant Brenda Johnson-that Deputy Jordan was harassing her and requested another officer. McCormick told Johnson that Deputy Jordan was attempting to unlawfully search her vehicle and that she had already been detained for an unreasonable amount of time. Johnson told McCormick that if she had nothing to hide, she should let Deputy Jordan search her vehicle. After speaking with Johnson, McCormick consented to a search of her vehicle. Deputy Jordan searched the vehicle and the yellow grocery bags for stolen items, but he found none.
Deputy Jordan told McCormick that she was free to leave but McCormick waited for Lieutenant Boykin to arrive. Lieutenant Boykin arrived a few minutes later, explained to McCormick the details of the armed robbery, and told her she was free to leave. McCormick stated that she understood and did not make any complaints to Lieutenant Boykin. McCormick left the scene.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. The Defendants' Motion
1. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants falsely imprisoned them during the traffic stop because they lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and the duration of the stop was not reasonable. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 26 at 5.)
a. Defendant Lee Boan
The defendants argue that Lee Boan should be dismissed as a defendant in his individual capacity because he was not the Sheriff of Kershaw County at the time of the traffic stop. The plaintiffs do not address this point in their response to the defendants' motion and the record indisputable shows that Boan was not the Sheriff at the time of the traffic stop. Consequently, Boan is entitled to summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claims against him in his individual capacity. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)).
b. Defendants Jordan, Boykin, and Johnson
The defendants argue that Deputy Jordan, Lieutenant Boykin, and Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims. The court agrees as to Deputy Jordan.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government and requires warrants be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, and courts judge its reasonableness under the two-prong reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009); United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016). First, the investigatory stop must be lawful. It is well established that law enforcement may initiate a brief traffic stop to investigate a reasonable suspicion that vehicle occupants are involved in criminal activity, even where no traffic violation has occurred. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 73, 881 (1975). Second, the officers' actions during the stop must be reasonably related in scope and duration to the basis for the seizure. Palmer, 820 F.3d at 649 (citing United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 764 (4th Cir. 2011)). Thus, to state a claim pursuant to § 1983 for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that she was detained without reasonable suspicion or that the officer's actions were not reasonable in light of the basis of the seizure. Here, the plaintiffs assert both that Deputy Jordan lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and that the duration of the detention was unreasonable.
However, qualified immunity shields governmental officials performing discretionary functions from liability for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id. at 235, 242.
In determining whether the right violated was clearly established, the court defines the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “If the right was not clearly established in the specific context of the case-that is, if it was not clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted-then the law affords immunity from suit.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
[a] Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (first alteration added). In analyzing this prong, a court in this district must first look to case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the South Carolina Supreme Court, and in the absence of binding authority, the court must next consider whether the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority. Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017). The “salient question” “ ‘is whether the state of the law' at the time of an incident provided ‘fair warning' to the defendants ‘that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.' ” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
Where a law enforcement officer asserts qualified immunity from a Fourth Amendment claim, the court need not determine whether reasonable suspicion actually existed; rather, the court must ask, objectively, whether a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would have believed he had reasonable suspicion to stop the plaintiff. Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Sowers v. City of Charlotte, 659 Fed.Appx. 738, 740 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The arresting officer's belief need not be correct or even more likely true than false, so long as it is reasonable.”). The court must define the right at the appropriate level of specificity, and the Supreme Court has cautioned against defining the right at too high a level of generality. Booker, 855 F.3d at 543 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). Given the fact-specific nature of the reasonable suspicion standard under Fourth Amendment law, defining the precise nature of the purported violation is especially important when analyzing qualified immunity in this context, and the United States Supreme Court had stressed the need to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 552 (2017)); but see al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (stating a case directly on point is not required). That is, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the detention “beyond debate.” Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
Moreover, “[w]hen a court addresses qualified immunity in the summary judgment context, it can condense its analysis.” Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996). The court need not determine directly whether the plaintiff's evidence shows a constitutional violation, because it can combine the two prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry by asking whether “the plaintiff has ‘allege[d] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.' ” Id. (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)) (alteration in original). If so, the court must then determine whether the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was illegal. Id. (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795 (1995)). The Fourth Circuit has described this inquiry as whether “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates” the Constitution. Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). “Although the exact conduct at issue need not have been held unlawful for the law governing an officer's actions to be clearly established, the existing authority must be such that the unlawfulness of the conduct is manifest.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Here, the court finds that Deputy Jordan is entitled to qualified immunity for initiating the traffic stop because the controlling law did not clearly establish that he lacked reasonable suspicion to suspect that McCormick's vehicle was involved in the robbery. The record is devoid of many facts that would aid the court's reasonable suspicion analysis-specific details about the suspect's car and McCormick's car, the distance between the location at which McCormick was stopped and the Dollar General store, or the similarities or lack thereof between the robbery suspect and Anderson. In the absence of such information, the court is left with Deputy Jordan's conclusory testimony that states McCormick's vehicle matched the suspect's vehicle. (Jordan Aff. ¶ 7, ECF No. 38-2 at 2; Jordan Dep., ECF No. 50-2 at 12.) Without more, the only facts within the court's knowledge are that Deputy Jordan stopped a vehicle more than three hours after the robbery in a different, albeit nearby, town because vehicle was “the same” as the vehicle used in the robbery. (Jordan Dep., ECF No. 50-2 at 12.) The plaintiffs do not point to any evidence in the record to undercut Deputy Jordan's assertion that the vehicles were similar.
Given the vague information available to the court-that Deputy Jordan observed “the same” car three hours after the robbery and one town over-the court cannot say that Deputy Jordan's conduct violated a clearly established right. In generally similar circumstances, the Fourth Circuit has found that officers have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop where a vehicle matches the description of a vehicle seen fleeing the scene of a crime in close proximity and time to the stop. See, e.g., United States v. Monroe, 396 Fed.Appx. 33, 37 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized in a traffic stop, finding reasonable suspicion existed to justify the traffic stop where the officer who initiated the stop observed the car immediately after receiving a description of a robbery suspect's fleeing car that was nearly identical to the defendant's car and travelling from the direction of the robbery scene); United States v. Dunmire, 7 Fed.Appx. 155, 156 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized in a traffic stop, finding reasonable suspicion existed to justify the traffic stop where the defendant was driving evasively, late at night, near the crime scene, and the defendant and his vehicle matched the victim's descriptions of the suspect). Other district courts within the Fourth Circuit have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Cabey, No. 1:09CR413-1, 2010 WL 617365, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Feb. 17, 2010) (finding officers had reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff's vehicle was involved in a completed felony nearby and six days prior because of distinctive similarities the vehicle shared with a vehicle seen on surveillance video), aff'd, 438 Fed.Appx. 196 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jackson, 680 F.Supp.2d 772, 777 (S.D. W.Va. 2009) (finding that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a car that had two occupants who fit the description of armed robbery suspects, where the armed robbery occurred in close proximity and time to the stop).
The plaintiffs do not provide any argument in response to the defendants' assertion that they are entitled to qualified immunity, other than to argue that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment. Crucially, the plaintiffs do not cite to any controlling authority that clearly establishes that Deputy Jordan's specific conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, and the court is not aware of any such authority within the Fourth Circuit. Cf. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590 (stating courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of generality, especially in the Fourth Amendment context because officers will find it difficult to know how the general standard of probable cause applies in “the precise situation encountered”) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017)); al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”). The court is aware that case law from other circuit courts of appeal may establish in those jurisdictions that the facts known to Deputy Jordan at the time did not establish reasonable suspicion. Compare United States v. Martinez, 910 F.3d 1309, 1317 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of a vehicle that matched the “general make and color” description of a vehicle involved in criminal activity and that was driving in a location reachable in light of the time the crime was committed); with United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 252 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle of the same make, model, and color of a vehicle seen leaving a robbery and in close time and proximity to the robbery, even though the vehicle's occupant did not match the description of the suspect); and United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a car “roughly matching” in “color and style” the appearance of a car used in a burglary minutes before, traveling away from the vicinity of the crime, even though the car had one more occupant than suspected perpetrators of the crime). But case law from other jurisdictions is not binding on this court's qualified immunity analysis, and the authority on this point is not overwhelming in one direction or the other such that it creates a “consensus of persuasive authority.” Booker, 855 F.3d at 543. Therefore, whether Deputy Jordan had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop in this case is at least arguable, and the court is not aware of any controlling precedent that would place the unlawfulness of the traffic stop beyond debate. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Accordingly, Deputy Jordan is entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's claim that he lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.
The plaintiffs also argue that the duration of the traffic stop was unreasonable. Again, the court finds that Deputy Jordan is entitled to qualified immunity because controlling law does not clearly establish that the duration of the traffic stop was unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Under the two-prong Terry analysis, if an officer's investigatory stop of a vehicle was justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, the stop must still be limited in scope and duration-no longer than reasonably required for the officer to complete his investigation. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 381-82 (4th Cir. 2017). The court must consider whether the totality of the circumstances shows that the officer diligently pursued the investigation. United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2018); Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d at 765-66.
The record here contains limited information on the circumstances causing the duration of the traffic stop. A report generated by the dispatcher shows that Deputy Jordan initiated the stop at 12:32 p.m. and the encounter ended at 1:22 p.m. The report also shows that McCormick called 911 at 1:04 p.m. to request the additional officer, and Lieutenant Boykin arrived at 1:17 p.m. Thus, what is known is that the stop was initiated at 12:32 p.m. and McCormick gave consent to search her car sometime after 1:04 p.m. but before Lieutenant Boykin arrived at 1:17 p.m. What is unknown is when McCormick denied Deputy Jordan's request to search the vehicle, which occurred between 12:32 and 1:04 p.m.
Importantly, the court need only consider the time between Deputy Jordan's initiation of the stop and the end of his search when he told McCormick that she was free to leave-sometime after 1:04 but before Lieutenant Boykins arrived at 1:17-in considering the reasonableness of the duration of the stop. Once McCormick was free to leave, the encounter became consensual, and Deputy Jordan's conduct was no longer constrained by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Meikle, 407 F.3d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that where a traffic stop becomes consensual, the encounter is no longer covered by the Fourth Amendment) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)). Therefore, for purposes of the Terry analysis, the record shows that the duration of the traffic stop was between thirty-two minutes and forty-five minutes.
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record shows that Deputy Jordan diligently pursued the investigation of the armed robbery. There is no evidence in the record that Deputy Jordan extended the stop for a purpose other than to investigate the armed robbery. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (providing that a Terry stop must last no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose); Florida. v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”). To the extent the traffic stop lasted longer than would normally be required to investigate whether the vehicle and its occupants were involved in the robbery, the duration of the stop was extended in part to allow for Lieutenant Boykin to travel to the site at McCormick's request. While the record is unclear what happened during most of the stop, it appears that when McCormick denied Deputy Jordan consent to search her vehicle and requested to speak to a supervisor, Deputy Jordan paused his investigation to allow Lieutenant Boykin to travel to the site, during which time McCormick ultimately consented to the search. Deputy Jordan testified that they “literally sat there and did nothing for a very long period of time while waiting for [Lieutenant Boykin] to get there so [McCormick] could talk to [Boykin].” (Jordan Dep., ECF No. 50-2 22.) Therefore, even if the stop was longer than would typically be required in those circumstances, that appears to be a result of Deputy Jordan's compliance with McCormick's request for a supervisor. The plaintiffs again do not point to any binding authority that would show that Deputy Jordan's specific actions violated the Fourth Amendment, and the court is aware of none. Therefore, Deputy Jordan is entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs' claim that the duration of the stop was unreasonable.
In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs also argue that facts material to whether McCormick's vehicle was illegally searched are in dispute, precluding summary judgment. However, the plaintiffs did not raise a claim of illegal search in their Amended Complaint. The only Fourth Amendment claim raised in the Amended Complaint is for false imprisonment based on the justification and duration of the plaintiffs' detainment. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 26 at 4-5.) Therefore, the defendants had no notice that the plaintiffs sought to raise an unlawful search claim, and the plaintiffs cannot now assert that such a claim exists and precludes summary judgment. See Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., 262 Fed.Appx. 556, 563 (4th Cir. 2008) (“A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”) (citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)).
2. Claims Pursuant to the SCTCA
In light of the recommendation that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to the plaintiffs' federal claims, the court should exercise its discretion to remand the state law claims to the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (authorizing a district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1988) (discussing the factors in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after removal). Here, the plaintiffs raise several state law claims that, in the interest of comity, are more appropriate for consideration in South Carolina's courts because they include complex issues of state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (listing bases for declining supplemental jurisdiction, including the presence of novel or complex issues of state law and the dismissal of federal claims); Hinson v. Nw. Fin. S.C, Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion to remand the case to state court where the federal claims were no longer at issue, the state claims predominated, and the state claims involved interpretations of complex state statutes on which there was no state precedent).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to the plaintiffs' federal claims, and that the plaintiffs' state law claims be remanded to the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).