Summary
invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity as basis for dismissing disabled plaintiff's Unruh Act claim
Summary of this case from Barker v. California Department of CorrectionsOpinion
No. C 01-1108 SI
February 13, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; DENY1NG PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND FOR APPOINTMENT. OF COUNSEL
On February 8, 2002, this Court heard argument on defendants' motions to dismiss and plaintiff's requests for leave to amend and for appointment of counsel. Having carefully considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS defendants' motions and DENIES plaintiff's requests for the reasons set forth below.
Ms. McColm and counsel for the Marin County defendants appeared at the hearing; Ms. McColm's oral request for appointment of counsel was made at that time. Counsel for the Judicial Council did not appear at the hearing, and its contentions were submitted on the pleadings.
BACKGROUND
On March 16, 2001, plaintiff Patricia McColm filed the above-captionedpro se complaint against Marin County, the Marin County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Robert T. Doyle, Sheriff's Deputy Dan Marrett, Sheriff's Sergeant Ken Frey, the Superior Court of Marin County, Clerk John P. Montogmery of the Superior Court of Marin County, Judge William T. McGivern, the State of California, the Judicial Council of California, and Deputy Attorney General Bradley Solomon. Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her civil rights, and pursuant to the Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, for alleged disability discrimination. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges state law causes of action for violation of right to privacy, representation in a false light, defamation, disability discrimination in violation of the Unruh civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 54.1, violation of California Rule of Court 989.3, violation of California Business and Professions § 17200, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff cites to the ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12101. However, because McColm is bringing an action against a public entity for discrimination and denial of access for participation in or denial of the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, her cause of action is pursuant to Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Plaintiff alleges that she sought an accommodation of her disabilities by filing a request for accommodation under California Rule of Court 989.3 seeking a three month stay of proceedings in her civil action pending before Judge McGivern in the Superior Court of Marin County. Plaintiff makes specific reference to proceedings on March 16, March 20 and March 23, 2000. Complaint ¶¶ 15, 16. Plaintiff alleges that she sought the three month stay as an accommodation to allow for improvement of her emergency medical requirements and circumstances, including post traumatic stress disorder resulting from a vandalism and sleep deprivation. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Judge McGivern ignored the accommodation request and proceeded with the hearing. Id. ¶ 16. Subsequently, Judge McGivern denied the entire request without stating specific facts for the denial which, Ms. McColm asserts, is in contravention of California Rule of Court 989.3. Id. ¶ 19.
Ms. McColm refers to her post-traumatic stress existing on March 16, 2000. However, she also refers to the March 16 hearing as occurring on March 16, 2001. See Complaint ¶ 16. However, Ms. McColm's complaint was filed on March 16, 2001 at 4:37 p.m and Ms. McColm refers to actions that occurred subsequent to the March 16 hearing in her complaint. The Court, therefore, will assume that the March 16 hearing occurred on March 16, 2000.
Thereafter, plaintiff sought disqualification of Judge McGivern based on his discriminatory and prejudicial failure to provide her with an accommodation for her disabilities. Following her complaints of discrimination, plaintiff alleges that Judge McGivern began dismissing defendants, refused to continue hearing dates, refused to provide her sufficient time to prepare opposition briefs, refused to calendar and hear motions for reconsideration, refused to allow her to appear by phone, and refused to allow her to file responsive papers, instructing the clerk to not accept plaintiff's filings. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff also alleges that Judge McGivern directed Deputy Marrett to confiscate audio and video recordings from her, and refused to allow her to take personal notes by audio recording under California Rules of Court 980(d). Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. Finally, plaintiff alleges that Judge McGivern retaliated against her by finding that she was a vexatious litigant under California Code of Civil Procedure § 391, and imposing "over a million dollars in security" to maintain her action, and then dismissing plaintiff's case with prejudice when plaintiff could not provide the required security.Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff asserts that the Judicial Council of California maintains an unconstitutional "black list" of predominantly disabled persons for denial of access to the courts through an unconstitutional and discriminatory application of Cal.Civ. Code § 391. Id.¶ 12.
With respect to Deputy Marrett, plaintiff alleges that he invaded her privacy by "confiscating," at the request of Judge McGivern and in the presence of Sergeant Frey, audio and video tapes recordings. Complaint ¶ 24. The sheriff's' department employees refused to return this property for several days. Id. ¶ 25. Finally, plaintiff alleges that Deputy Attorney General Bradley Solomon falsely represented to the Court that he had information that plaintiff had vandalized her own home and argued before Judge McGivern that plaintiff should not be given the stay requested to accommodate her disability. Id.¶ 17.
Ms. McColm's complaint seeks: injunctive relief ordering defendants to refrain from discrimination by failing or refusing to provide accommodations, to refrain from retaliation for complaints of discrimination, and to train and educate individuals associated with defendants' activities regarding required accommodations; a declaration that Cal. Civ. Code § 391 is unconstitutional and invalid as having a discriminatory impact against persons with a disability under Title II of the ADA and as applied to plaintiff general damages; exemplary and punitive damages; and costs of suit. Id. at p. 8.
On August 14, 2001, this Court, reviewing plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed in part plaintiff's complaint. Finding that plaintiff's claims against defendants Marin County Superior Court, Clerk Montgomery, Judge McGivern, the State of California, and Deputy Attorney General Solomon were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court dismissed these defendants with prejudice. The Court further ruled that plaintiff could only pursue her claims against the Judicial Council, if at all, only to the extent she seeks injunctive relief rather than damages. Finally, the Court found that plaintiff's claims against Marin County, the Marin County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Doyle, Sheriff's Deputy Marrett, and Sheriff's Sgt. Fry were sufficient to survive review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, but noted that defendants could bring motions to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment, qualified immunity, or any other appropriate theory. The remaining defendants subsequently moved to dismiss.
On November 26, 2001, plaintiff filed an ex parte application to continue the hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiff's request was granted. Plaintiff subsequently filed oppositions to defendants' motions and requested leave to amend her claims against each. Those motions are presently before this Court.
Plaintiff's opposition to the Marin County defendants' motion, although filed on January 18, 2002, was not received by defendants until February 4, 2002. The Marin County defendants moved to strike plaintiff's opposition as untimely. Their motion (docket # 23) is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) cannot be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Coney v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. u, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal is disfavored, however, and should be granted only in "extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981).
In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. NL Industries, Inc. v. Kapla,F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Factual allegations may be disregarded, however, if contradicted by documents to which the court may properly refer. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by the facts alleged, need not be accepted as true. Hoden v. Hagopian, 9778 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992).
DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Council's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Judicial Council of California moves to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff cannot state a claim against it under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Judicial Council Mot. to Dismiss at 5:18-6:28. Defendant argues that the remainder of plaintiff's claims against it are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 5:3-17.
1. Plaintiff's ADA claim
Defendant argues that plaintiff's ADA claim against it is lacking in the factual detail necessary to support the elements of a claim under the ADA. Judicial Council Mot. to Dismiss at 5:26-6:25. Plaintiff's allegations against the Judicial Council are as follows:
Defendant JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA is and was at all relevant times an agency of the State of California responsible for maintaining judicial performance in accordance with mandates of law and is maintaining an unconstitutional `black list' of predominately disabled persons for denial of access to the court through prefiling orders under an unconstitutional and discriminatory statutory scheme CCP section 391, being used to discriminate and retaliate against persons with disability to deny this class of individuals access to the courts and its programs, processes and procedures.
18 Compl. at ¶ 12.
The ADA provides that no qualified individual with disabilities shall be "excluded from participation in or be denied the benefit of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such an entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Court finds that plaintiff's claims are conclusory, and therefore need not be accepted as true. Hoden v. Hagopian, 9778 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff's ADA claim against the Judicial Council is therefore DISMISSED.
If the Court dismisses a claim, it must then determine whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile and the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). If the only defect in plaintiff's claim were a failure to state facts sufficient to support it, plaintiff would be allowed leave to amend. The Court finds, however, that amendment would be futile, because the claim is defective in an additional respect.
As the Court noted in reviewing plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, plaintiff may only bring a "general" constitutional challenge to the actions of the Judicial Council, a challenge not requiring review of a state court decision in a particular case. To the extent that plaintiff's constitutional challenge does require review of a particular state court decision or order, it is precluded by the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. See Order Dismissing Complaint in Part (filed 11/14/01) at 6:12-27. Upon review of plaintiff's complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff's allegations against the Judicial Council are, in essence, a challenge to the state court's order, entered under California Code of Civil Procedure § 391, declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant and placing limitations on her ability to bring suit. As was made clear at oral argument, plaintiff's claims stem from and are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court orders and judgment in the Marin County Superior Court action. As such, it is not a general constitutional challenge and must be dismissed.
The Judicial Council did not make the determination of which plaintiff complains. It is neither a legislative body responsible for enacting what plaintiff claims is the "unconstitutional and discriminatory statutory scheme," nor a court empowered to impose prefiling conditions against individuals under the statute. Leg Cal. Const. Art. 6 § 6 (describing the duties of the Judicial Council). Consequently, plaintiff's claims against the Judicial Council amount to a challenge to the final determinations of the state court that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant; such challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against the Judicial Council, and the Court finds that the claim cannot be cured by amendment. The claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff's non-ADA claims
The Judicial Council is a state administrative agency. See Cal. Const. Art. 6 § 6. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal court lawsuits for legal and equitable relief against a state and its agencies, including cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pennhurst State School Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The remainder of plaintiff's claims against the Judicial Council are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Because amendment would be futile, the claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
B. Marin County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Marin County, the Marin County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Doyle, Sheriff's Deputy Marrett, and Sheriff's Sergeant Fey move to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them. Plaintiff's allegations against these defendants are as follows: Deputy Marrett invaded plaintiff's privacy by "confiscating," at the request of Judge McGivern and in the presence of Sergeant Frey, audio and video tapes recordings. Complaint ¶ 24. The sheriffs' department employees refused to return this property for several days. Id. ¶ 25. Defendants claim that suit against Marrett and Fey is barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. Main Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4:4-6:15.
Quasi-judicial immunity protects members of the support staff of a court who perform tasks integral to the judicial process, or who act under the command of a court decree or explicit instructions of a judge.Nike, Inc. v. Commercail Iberica De Exclusivas, 20 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp.2d 1244 (C.D.Cal. 1999) (reversed on other grounds) (internal citations omitted). By plaintiff's own account, Deputy Marrett acted under Judge McGivern's order. Although plaintiff does not allege any action by Sergeant Frey, he was a court bailiff and is therefore immune from suit as well. Plaintiff's claims against Marrett and Frey are therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. Because plaintiff's claims against Doyle, the Sheriff's Department, and Marin County are dependant upon her allegations against Marrett and Frey, her claims against these defendants are also DISMISSED with prejudice.
C. Plaintiff' Request for Appointment of Counsel
At the hearing, plaintiff made an oral request for appointment of counsel. A district court may appoint counsel "[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Appointment of counsel under this section may be considered where the plaintiff demonstrates an inability to pay for private counsel, past attempts to locate counsel, and some merit to the claims presented. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981). For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that plaintiff's claims are not meritorious. Therefore, the Court DENIES plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiff's requests for leave to amend and for appointment of counsel are DENIED. This order disposes of the following docket entries: ## 13, 15, 19, 20 and 23.