Opinion
NO. 3:98CV104-P-B
June 19, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is presently before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Pontotoc County, Mississippi, and Randy Roberts (in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pontotoc County, Mississippi). The facts of the case are as follows:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jerry McCollum was arrested by the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department on June 26, 1995, after he turned himself in for a parole violation. He was incarcerated in the Pontotoc County Jail as a Mississippi Department of Corrections (hereinafter "MDOC") prisoner to await transport to the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. According to the Plaintiff, Penny McCollum, Jerry McCollum's ex-wife, McCollum had a history of drug and alcohol use and had been treated for his addictions at Haven House. Ms. McCollum, who lived with her ex-husband for the five months preceding his arrest, stated in her deposition that she did not believe that Jerry McCollum had used any drugs or alcohol during the time they lived together. However, she also admitted that on the afternoon of June 26, 1995, prior to his arrest, he drank beer with his father. Consequently, he was drunk at the time of his arrest.
At 8:30 p.m. on June 27, 1995, while incarcerated in the Pontotoc County Jail, McCollum was transported to the emergency room of the Pontotoc Health Services for treatment of seizure-like symptoms. Dr. William C. Kellum treated McCollum, and diagnosed him with "affected reaction" or "withdrawal problems." Dr. Kellum also recommended that McCollum be seen at Behavioral Health in Tupelo, Mississippi, a facility that was equipped with staff psychiatrists who were trained in the area of drug and alcohol withdrawal. On his record, Dr. Kellum noted that he "gave [medication] and told deputy to make arrangements for mental health care in Tupelo this a.m. This was not done." McCollum was then released into the custody of the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department.
At 3:00 p.m. on June 28, 1995, he was again transported to the emergency room for treatment of his seizure-like symptoms. Dr. Kellum diagnosed him with "withdrawal shakes," prescribed medication for him, and again released him to the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department. Dr. Kellum was told that McCollum was going to be sent "ASAP to Parchman Behavioral Health." Later that same day, at 11:45 p.m., McCollum again demonstrated seizure-like symptoms, and he was given his prescription medication by the jailor. His medication was given to him yet again the following morning at 6:30 a.m.
Pontotoc County has a policy in place which requires the county to notify Parchman officials of any medical condition or diagnosis of any state inmate in the county's care awaiting transfer to Parchman. As such, the county was required to inform Parchman of Dr. Kellum's recommendation to admit McCollum into Behavioral Health in Tupelo. According to Patricia Hogue, the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department employee responsible for contacting Parchman, if the county had transported McCollum, an MDOC prisoner, to Behavioral Health without Parchman's permission, then the county would have to pay the bill. Hogue was out of the office on June 27, 1995, and Parchman was not notified of Dr. Kellum's recommendation until she returned to work on June 29, 1995. Parchman officials told her that McCollum should not be sent to Behavioral Health in Tupelo, but rather he should be transported to the Parchman hospital that same day.
McCollum was admitted to the psychiatric ward of Parchman on June 29, 1995, for treatment of his alcohol and drug withdrawal symptoms. His initial examination was "normal," and no evidence of attempted suicide was discovered. On June 30, 1995, McCollum committed suicide by hanging himself with a bedsheet in his cell in the psychiatric ward.
No one informed Parchman doctors that McCollum was suicidal or that suicide precautions were needed. Had they received information that McCollum was suicidal, he would have been placed in a "stripped cell," meaning a cell with no clothing, no sheets, or anything of that nature. However, he was placed in an isolated cell and placed under watch because of his withdrawal from alcohol and drug use.
Penny McCollum, as mother and next friend of Jeremy and Ashley McCollum, Jerry McCollum's two minor children, and Margaret McCollum, administratrix of Jerry McCollum's estate, have filed suit against Pontotoc County, Mississippi, and Randy Roberts as sheriff of Pontotoc County. The complaint alleges that Randy Roberts showed "deliberate indifference" to the known medical needs of McCollum. The plaintiffs also claim that Randy Roberts ignored a doctor's orders with respect to McCollum's care, and that Roberts' actions constituted cruel and inhuman punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that McCollum's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated. Lastly, the plaintiffs claim that transferring McCollum to Parchman constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the county was not deliberately indifferent to McCollum's medical conditions. In support of their opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiffs have submitted the deposition of Dr. Kellum and an affidavit of Dr. Mark C. Webb, a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry. Dr. Kellum stated in his deposition that withdrawals from alcohol or drugs could be a serious medical condition, one that could possibly result in the death or suicide. Kellum Dep. at 21, 35. Dr. Webb claimed in his affidavit that the two-day delay in McCollum's treatment could have been the cause of his suicide.
Withdrawal from substances, such as alcohol and drugs, is an extremely dangerous situation and, without medical treatment, these conditions can progressively worsen to the point that a person becomes desperate and commits suicide. It is my opinion that had Dr. Kellum's orders been followed, and Mr. McCollum taken immediately to the Behavioral Health Center in Tupelo, Mississippi, on June 27, 1995, this suicide would have been prevented. Webb Aff. ¶ 5. The defendants maintain that their conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, since no evidence demonstrates that the county knew or should have known that McCollum would commit suicide.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be entered only if ". . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating through the evidentiary materials that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On motion for summary judgment, "[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In determining whether this burden has been met, the court should view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 322.
The summary judgment procedure does not authorize trial by affidavit. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 255. Accordingly, a court may not decide any factual issues found in the record on motion for summary judgment, but if such material issues are present, the court must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Impossible Elec. Tech. v. Wackenhut Protection Systems, 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5 Cir. 1982); Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5 Cir. 1981); Lighting Fixture Electric Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5 Cir. 1969).
Under the provisions of Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is made may not merely rest upon his pleadings, but must, by affidavit, or other materials as provided in Rule 56, inform the court of specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 324. The facts stated in uncontradicted affidavits or other evidentiary materials must be accepted as true. However, the moving party must still show that he is entitled to judgment on those facts as a matter of law, and if he fails to discharge that burden he is not entitled to judgment, notwithstanding the apparent absence of a factual issue. 6-Pt. 2, Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.), ¶ 56.22[2], p. 56-777.
Summary judgment is not proper if a dispute about a material fact is "genuine," or in other words the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, supra at 248. There is no such issue unless the evidence sufficiently supports the non-moving party's version of the facts for a jury to return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Id., at 249. The relevant inquiry is whether or not there is sufficient disagreement on the facts to submit them to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party should prevail as a matter of law. Id., at 251. The issue must be genuine, and not pretended, and the evidence relied on to create such an issue must be substantial. Southern Distributing Co. v. Southdown, Inc., 574 F.2d 824, 826 (5 Cir. 1978); Schuchart Associates v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 939 (WD Tex. 1982).
LEGAL ANALYSIS Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of convicted prisoners constitutes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed by the Eight Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1996). The Supreme Court has consistently held that liability for inaction attaches only when a prison official's failure to act amounts to deliberate indifference to a prisoner's rights. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291, Wilson v. Sieter, 501 U.S. 294, 303-305, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).
Pontotoc County can be held liable for its non-policy-making employees' acts only if its employees were carrying out the county's policies when they acted. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-392, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205-06, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Therefore, the plaintiffs in this case can only recover from Pontotoc County under § 1983 if they can show that the defendants acted with subjective deliberate indifference to a known risk, and that the defendants' act was the result of a municipal policy maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the prisoner's rights. See Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997).
The treatment of pretrial detainees, not convicted state prisoners, was the issue in Scott; however, "since pretrial detainees and convicted state prisoners are similarly restricted in their ability to fend for themselves, the State owes a duty to both groups that effectively confers upon them a set of constitutional rights that fall under the Court's rubric of `basic human needs.'" Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the test as set out in Scott applies to pretrial detainees as well as convicted state prisoners.
Was the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department Deliberately Indifferent to Jerry McCollum's Known Medical Needs?
In order to establish that the Sheriff's Department was deliberately indifferent, the plaintiffs must show that the defendants disregarded a known or obvious consequence of refusing to comply with Dr. Kellum's recommendation. The plaintiffs are of the opinion that since the defendants did not send McCollum to Behavioral Health in Tupelo, as Dr. Kellum suggested, then they acted with deliberate indifference to McCollum's known medical needs. Basically, the plaintiffs are asking this Court to determine that Pontotoc County knew or should have known that if McCollum was not sent to Behavioral Health, then McCollum would commit suicide. Given the facts presented, this Court can make no such determination.It is not enough to demonstrate that Pontotoc County was negligent in not following Dr. Kellum's recommendation. Rather, the plaintiffs must establish that Pontotoc County employees knew or should have known of an unjustifiably high risk that McCollum would hurt himself in failing to adhere to Dr. Kellum's advice. See Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 1999). Although the county may have been negligent, no county employee acted in such a way as to rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department employees immediately transferred McCollum to the emergency room on June 27, 1995, when he began suffering from seizures. Dr. Kellum, as the physician on duty that night, diagnosed him with possible drug and alcohol withdrawal problems and gave McCollum medication. Dr. Kellum did not note that McCollum was suicidal, but he did suggest that McCollum be seen at Behavioral Health in Tupelo for his withdrawals. Dr. Kellum recommended that facility because it had psychiatrists on staff who were trained in the area of drug and alcohol withdrawal. Instead of following Dr. Kellum's recommendation of sending McCollum to Behavioral Health, McCollum returned to the Pontotoc County jail. The next day, McCollum again was transported to the emergency room. Again, Dr. Kellum did not indicate that McCollum was suicidal. Dr. Kellum was told that McCollum was to be sent to Parchman as soon as possible, and McCollum was again released into the custody of the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department.
It must be noted that Dr. Kellum recommended sending McCollum to Behavioral Health in Tupelo for his drug and alcohol withdrawals, not because he felt that McCollum was suicidal. Therefore, the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department had no knowledge that denying McCollum treatment at Behavioral Health would result in his committing suicide. McCollum's only medical need known by the Sheriff's Department was his withdrawal from drugs and alcohol. Within the brief two-day time period that McCollum was incarcerated in the Pontotoc County jail, he was sent to the emergency room twice for seizures, and he was watched closely by Pontotoc County employees and given medication if any other seizure-like activity occurred. This Court cannot determine that any Pontotoc County employees acted with deliberate indifference to McCollum's medical needs.
Was the Policy Maintained by the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department Objectively Indifferent to Jerry McCollum's Constitutional Rights?
Even if it were determined that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the known medical needs of McCollum, the only way the county could be held liable is if the Pontotoc County Sheriff's Department's policy was objectively indifferent to McCollum's constitutional rights. See Scott, 114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1997). Pontotoc County has a policy in which the Mississippi Department of Corrections must be notified of any information regarding a convicted state inmate, such as McCollum. In essence, before McCollum could be transferred to Behavioral Health in Tupelo, officials at Parchman must authorize the transfer. Pontotoc County could not take on that responsibility itself; otherwise, Pontotoc County would be responsible for paying the bill.
The Court must point out that it was not Ponotoc County's policy to ignore the serious medical needs of state inmates in the county's care. To the contrary, the undisputed facts in this case show that the county jail employees took McCollum's condition very seriously. McCollum was transported to the emergency room twice for seizures. In addition, jail records show that the employees closely observed McCollum's actions while he was under their care. Whenever his seizures would begin, employees promptly gave him the medication prescribed to him by Dr. Kellum. Moreover, the county had a policy of relaying information to Parchman about the medical conditions of MDOC prisoners in the Pontotoc County Jail. If a physician felt that an MDOC prisoner should be hospitalized, the county policy required that Patricia Hogue, office deputy for the county jail, contract Parchman and obtain directives on how to proceed.
Unfortunately, on the day Dr. Kellum recommended McCollum's hospitalization, Hogue was out of the office; thus, Parchman was not notified until two days later, when Hogue returned to work. Parchman directed Hogue not to follow Dr. Kellum's advice of sending McCollum to Behavioral Health, but rather directed her to transport McCollum immediately to the Parchman hospital. Based on the evidence presented, this Court cannot determine that, had Hogue contacted Parchman two days earlier on June 27, McCollum would have been sent to the Tupelo facility. Indeed, as soon as Hogue did inform Parchman of Dr. Kellum's recommendation, she was instructed to send McCollum directly to Parchman, where Parchman doctors could diagnosis him. In addition, while the Court concedes that perhaps some sort of "back-up policy" should have been enacted to inform Parchman of Dr. Kellum's recommendation earlier, the failure to institute such a plan cannot rise to the level of deliberate indifference. At the most, the county may have been guilty of negligence, which is not a basis for § 1983 liability. See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claims should be dismissed.
Fourteenth Amendment Claim
"[N]egligent inaction by a jail officer does not violate the due process rights of a person lawfully held in custody of the State." Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996). The protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment are "just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials." Id. (citations omitted). Since this Court has determined that the defendants' actions did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, then no Fourteenth Amendment violation has occurred, since negligence alone does not violate a prisoner's due process rights. The plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed.
Fourth Amendment Claim
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated McCollum's Fourth Amendment rights when he was transferred to Parchman, because the transfer constituted an unreasonable seizure. The Fourth Amendment states in part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." Based on the evidence, this Court cannot determine that transporting McCollum, an MDOC prisoner, to Parchman at the direction of MDOC officials constituted an unreasonable seizure. As such, the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby finds that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted. An order will issue accordingly.