Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:05-2999-PMD-WMC.
May 23, 2006
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983. This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment of defendants Chris Harris and Mitch Tucker.
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
At the time he filed his complaint, the plaintiff was confined at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Columbia, South Carolina. The complaint concerns criminal proceedings and a probation revocation proceeding in the Court of General Sessions in Richland County. The moving defendants are employees of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services.
On January 26, 2006, defendants Harris and Tucker filed their motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. By order filed January 27, 2006, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the summary judgment dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. The plaintiff filed his response to the defendants' motion on February 15, 2006. Defendants John Ewing, Jr., Ellis Pearson, and H.J. Pooles filed a motion for summary judgment on March 22, 2006. That motion will be considered in a separate report.
FACTS PRESENTED
On October 29, 2004, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to harassment, unlawfully carrying of a pistol, and burglary in the second degree. He was given a probationary sentence, which included a condition that the plaintiff have no contact with the victim, Danita Wallace. Defendant probation agents Harris and Tucker contend that Ms. Wallace brought to their attention an audiotape of the plaintiff contacting her. The plaintiff was arrested for stalking Ms. Wallace, and a warrant for violation of probation was issued. He was placed in the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center in Columbia, South Carolina in February 2005. The stalking trial ended in a mistrial on August 2, 2005, and a jury later found the plaintiff not guilty on the stalking charge on August 17, 2005 (comp. 4-5). A hearing regarding the violation of probation was held before the Honorable Reginald I. Lloyd, who was at that time a circuit court judge, on November 22, 2005. According to the defendants, Judge Lloyd found the plaintiff in violation; however, due to the length of time he had served in jail, Judge Lloyd terminated the plaintiff's probation with all fines and fees converted to a civil judgment.
This hearing occurred after the plaintiff filed his complaint on October 25, 2005.
ANALYSIS
The defendants first argue that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against them. The plaintiff claims his arrest for violation of probation was in violation of his civil rights. The defendants argue that probable cause existed for issuance of the warrant for the violation of probation because the victim brought to them a recording of the plaintiff making harassing phone calls to her, which was a direct violation of a condition of his probation. The South Carolina Code provides in pertinent part:
Arrest for violation of terms of probation; bond. At any time during the period of probation or suspension of sentence the court, or the court within the venue of which the violation occurs, or the probation agent may issue or cause the issuing of a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence. . . .
The defendants further argue that there was never any finding by Judge Lloyd that there was no violation of probation. He simply determined that, due to the amount of time the plaintiff had spent in the detention center, his probation should be terminated. As stated by the South Carolina Court of Appeals,
Probation is a matter of grace; revocation is the means to enforce the conditions of probation. State v. McCray, 222 S.C. 391, 396, 73 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1952); State v. White, 218 S.C. 130, 135, 61 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1950). However, the authority of the revoking court should always be predicated upon an evidentiary showing of fact tending to establish a violation of the conditions. White, at 135, 61 S.E.2d at 756; State v. Miller, 122 S.C. 468, 475, 115 S.E. 742, 745 (1923). Thus, before revoking probation, the circuit judge must determine if there is sufficient evidence to establish that the probationer has violated his probation conditions.State v. Hamilton, 511 S.E.2d 94, 97 (S.C.Ct.App. 1999).
As noted by the defendants and admitted by the plaintiff in his complaint, he was represented by counsel, was given notice, and was given an opportunity to appear and address the violation of probation.
The defendants further claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. This court agrees. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation so that an objectively reasonable official in the defendants' position would have known of it. Id.
In addressing qualified immunity, the United States Supreme Court has held that "a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and, if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, the Supreme Court held that "[d]eciding the constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. If the court first determines that no right has been violated, the inquiry ends there "because government officials cannot have known of a right that does not exist." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 1998).
The plaintiff has failed to state a claim regarding violation of his constitutional rights by these defendant probation agents. Furthermore, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.