Opinion
Civ. 1:19-CV-1951
03-27-2024
RALPH MCCLAIN, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
Rambo, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case comes before us for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss filed by several defendants in this matter. (Doc. 154). The plaintiff, Ralph McClain, filed this action in 2019 against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and several individual defendants arising out of events that occurred while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill in 2018. Now, more than five years later, the plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint is the operative pleading in this case. (Doc. 149). The amended complaint names the DOC, the Residential Treatment Unit Psychiatric Review Team (“PRT”), and several individual defendants and asserts claims of medical deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment; a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim; a retaliation claim under the First Amendment; a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and a state law negligence claim. (Id.).
The magistrate judge initially assigned to this matter filed a Report and Recommendation on August 15, 2023, recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted. (Doc. 167). Following a belated request for an extension of time by McClain to respond to the motion (Doc. 172), the Court granted McClain's motion and deemed the Report and Recommendation moot. (Doc. 173). The Court then referred the matter to the undersigned for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss after McClain filed his opposition brief. (Id.).
The fourth amended complaint will be referred to hereinafter as amended complaint.
At the time of the events alleged in the amended complaint, McClain was in custody pursuant to a guilty plea to charges of stalking and harassment, and ultimately received a sentence of up to six years' imprisonment. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 19-20). McClain was transferred to SCI Camp Hill in November of 2018 for intake and classification, at which time he was told he had to be interviewed by a psychiatrist due to his answers to the suicide risk indicator questionnaire. (Id. ¶ 23). He was interviewed by Defendants Plotica and Jones. (Id.). After further review of McClain's psychological testing, he was informed by Defendant Tedesco that he was at risk for suicide and was being moved to the Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”). (Id. ¶¶ 24-27).
McClain alleges that after he spoke with Defendants Imler and Jenkins about his mental health issues, including “his depression over his failed loves with his former college professors,” he was moved from the RTU to general population. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 30-31). He claims that this move was ordered by Defendant Carberry after a vote by his Psychiatric Review Team (“PRT”) (Defendants Imler, Jenkins, Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, Striker, Mushtag, and others), and was approved by Defendants Clements and Kephart. (Id. ¶ 31). McClain alleges that after he was moved to general population, he attempted suicide by hanging himself. (Id. ¶ 32). After his suicide attempt, he was rushed to a hospital to treat his injuries. (Id. ¶ 34). The amended complaint alleges that the reasons he was given for his move to general population were his romantic advances toward female prison staff and his lack of participation in treatment in the RTU. (Id. ¶ 35).
Based on these allegations, McClain asserts several constitutional claims against these defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983-an Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Carberry, Imler, Jenkins, Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, Striker, Clements, and Kephart (Count I); a Fourteenth Amendment denial of Due Process Claim against Defendants Carberry, Imler, Jenkins, Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, and Striker (Count II); and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Carberry, Imler, Jenkins, Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, and Striker (Count III). He also asserts an ADA claim against the DOC and the PRT (Count IV), as well as a state law negligence claim against the DOC and Defendants Carberry, Imler, Jenkins, Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, Striker, Clements, and Kephart. (Count V).
McClain also asserts these claims against Dr. Mushtag, who filed a motion to dismiss separate from the Correctional Defendants. (Doc. 150). A Report and Recommendation was filed as to this motion and is pending before the district court. (Doc. 168).
The Correctional Defendants have now moved to dismiss the claims against them. (Doc. 154). They assert that McClain failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to these claims and that McClain's claims fail as a matter of law. (Id.). This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 155, 174). For the following reasons, we recommend that the defendants' motion be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be Granted.
As we have noted, the defendants first contend that McClain failed to exhaust some of his claims for certain defendants not named in his grievance. They further argue that his claims fail on their merits. As we will discuss below, we conclude that McClain has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claims in this matter. We further conclude that even if McClain had properly exhausted as to these claims and defendants, most of his claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners are required to present their claims through a prison's administrative process prior to bringing claims in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This applies to any claim arising in the prison setting, regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory, provided that administrative remedies are available to the prisoner. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A failure to exhaust available administrative remedies bars an inmate from bringing a suit in federal court. Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2000).
The PLRA “proper exhaustion” of administrative remedies requirement means that the inmate must comply with the procedural requirements of the prison's grievance system. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 90 (2006). In Pennsylvania, DOC inmates must follow the three-tiered grievance process set forth in DC-ADM 804. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). An inmate must begin by filing a grievance with the Facility Grievance Coordinator at the institution where the incident took place. The grievance must contain a statement of facts giving rise to the grievance, identify the individuals involved, state claims the inmate wishes to make regarding any violations of DOC policy or the law, and request the specific relief sought. If the grievance is denied at initial review, the inmate may then appeal to the Facility Manager, i.e., the Superintendent of the facility. If the initial response is upheld, the inmate may file an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”) within 15 working days of the Facility Manager's decision. See DC-ADM 804 (Doc. 155-1).
Here, it is undisputed that McClain failed to name Defendants Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, Striker, Clements, or Kephart in his grievance regarding his medical care. (See Doc. 155-2). While the PLRA does not impose a “name all defendants” requirement, the grievance must “alert prison officials to a problem.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217, 219 (2007) see also Preziosi v. Morris, 2022 WL 3586667, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2022) (inmate failed to exhaust against defendants about whom his grievance “failed to provide enough information indicating they were involved in the events about which he was complaining.”). Here, a review of McClain's grievance regarding his medical care cannot be fairly said to have alerted prison officials that any of these defendants were involved in McClain's move from the RTU. Nor can it be said to have encompassed any claim of due process, retaliation, or disability discrimination. Rather, the grievance specifically identifies only Carberry, Imler, and Jenkins and seeks to hold them responsible for his move out of the RTU, which he characterizes as a denial of mental health treatment. Accordingly, we conclude that McClain has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the remaining Correctional Defendants, as well as his ADA, due process, and retaliation claims.
“[W]here a defendant moves to dismiss based on a failure-to-exhaust defense and ‘the exhaustion issue turns on [] indisputably authentic documents related to [the inmate's] grievances,' we may consider those documents ‘without converting [a motion to dismiss] to a motion for summary judgment[.]'” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 261 n.1 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 223).
While McClain claims that he was not aware of the other defendants' involvement at the time of the incident, we cannot conclude that his failure to identify them should excuse his procedural default. An inmate's failure to name individuals involved in the incident can be excused if the DOC “identif[ies] the unidentified persons and acknowledg[es] that they were fairly within the compass of the prisoner's grievance.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234. Here, a review of McClain's grievance cannot be said to have acknowledged that Defendants Searer, Plotica, Jones, Tedesco, Striker, Clements, or Kephart were fairly within the compass of McClain's grievance regarding his medical care. Accordingly, as to these defendants, McClain has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and any claims against them should be dismissed.
Similarly, as to McClain's argument that he was unaware of the bases for his ADA, due process, and retaliation claims until after the filing of this lawsuit, we cannot conclude that McClain's procedural default of these claims can be excused. McClain relies on Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016), for the proposition that as to these claims, administrative remedies were unavailable to him. However, in Ross, the Supreme Court discussed the unavailability of administrative remedies, noting three relevant circumstances that may render an administrative process unavailable. Id. at 642-43. These three circumstances, which the Court noted “will not often arise,” id. at 643, involve (1) officers refusing to provide relief to aggrieved inmates; (2) situations in which the administrative scheme is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use[]”; and (3) “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 643-44. The Court further warned that “[c]ourts may not engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances' exception onto the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 648.
Here, McClain does not allege that he was refused relief, that the administrative system was incapable of use, or that he was thwarted in some way from taking advantage of the grievance process. Rather, McClain clearly had access to the grievance process and used it to grieve his denial of medical care issue. However, McClain's grievance did not alert prison officials to any disability discrimination, due process, or retaliation claims. Therefore, these claims are unexhausted. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that McClain's procedural default as to his ADA, due process, and retaliation claims should be excused.
Further, as to his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Carberry, Imler, and Jenkins, we also conclude that McClain has not properly exhausted this claim. While is it undisputed that McClain identified these individuals in his grievance, it is also undisputed that McClain failed to request any relief in his initial grievance. DC-ADM 804 specifically mandates that an inmate seeking monetary compensation “must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.” (Doc. 155-1 at 5) (emphasis added). Given this requirement, the Third Circuit has found that a district court's dismissal of a claim on exhaustion grounds is proper where the inmate failed to request monetary relief in his initial grievance. Wright v. Sauers, 729 Fed.Appx. 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2018) (non-precedential). The Wright court reasoned that “the Prison's policy required [the inmate] to specifically request monetary relief in his initial grievance. Because [he] failed to do so, he defaulted his claim for money damages.” Id.
Following Wright, district courts within this circuit have similarly held that an inmate procedurally defaults any claim for money damages if he does not specifically request monetary relief in his initial grievance. See e.g., Brockington v. Garcia, 2022 WL 3142612, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2022) (“As Brockington failed to request any specific relief in his initial grievance, let alone monetary damages, he may not pursue the claims alleged in his complaint in federal court.”); Hobson v. Tiller, 2021 WL 2191282, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2021) (“Failure to request monetary compensation in an initial grievance means that a court must dismiss a legal claim in federal court seeking money damages[.]”) (collecting cases); Tillery v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 480485, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2019). Accordingly, because it is undisputed that McClain did not request monetary relief in his initial grievance regarding his Eighth Amendment claim, he has failed to properly exhaust this claim.
However, while we have concluded that McClain's claims should be dismissed based on his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, as we will discuss below, we further conclude that most of McClain's claims fail as a matter of law.
We are constrained to note that, if properly exhausted, McClain appears to have pleaded an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the individual defendants. In the medical context, an inmate alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Accordingly, an inmate asserting a claim of deliberate indifference must establish that he had a serious medical need, and that prison officials, by affirmative acts or omissions, were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference in this context can be shown by a failure to provide care, the delay of medical care for non-medical reasons, or denial of reasonable requests for treatment. Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993). In his amended complaint, McClain alleges that the individual defendants were aware of his mental health issues and his risk of suicide, and that despite this knowledge and his discussions with some of the defendants regarding his suicidal thoughts, the defendants collectively made a decision, as McClain's PRT, to move him out of the treatment unit and he later attempted suicide. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 23-34). However, as we have explained, in our view, McClain has failed to properly exhaust this claim against the defendants, and this claim should be dismissed on exhaustion grounds.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
McClain's amended complaint asserts a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, alleging that the defendants moved him from the RTU without notice or a hearing to determine the appropriateness of his housing placement and mental health treatment. However, we conclude that any claim under the Fourteenth Amendment would be barred by the more-specific-provision rule, as McClain's claim and his allegations relate to the alleged denial of his mental health treatment, and this claim is encompassed by the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision ... the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”). Accordingly, any Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the denial of medical care must be dismissed.
3. First Amendment Retaliation
McClain also asserts that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights. To establish a claim for retaliation, McClain must show “(1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discipline him.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). However, even if a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants may put forth evidence of a “same decision defense”; that is, “they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
McClain's claim is fatally flawed. McClain cannot show that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Simply put, the conduct McClain engaged in, which amounted to inappropriate romantic advances toward female staff members, cannot be characterized as protected activity within the confines of the First Amendment. See e.g., McClain v. Hoover, No. 1:21-CV-992, 2023 WL 4662901, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2023) (Carlson, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 4631657 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2023). Accordingly, McClain's First Amendment claim should be dismissed.
4. Americans with Disabilities Act
McClain's amended complaint also purports to bring a claim under the ADA against the DOC, alleging that he was denied programming for mental health treatment because of his disability. Title II of the ADA applies to state prison inmates. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998). Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of services or programs; and (3) that the exclusion or denial was because of his disability. Durham v. Kelly, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023).
While McClain's amended complaint asserts this claim against the “PRT,” we note that the PRT is not an entity but rather a team consisting of the individual defendants who were tasked with overseeing the plaintiff's mental health treatment. Accordingly, because the plaintiff may not bring an ADA claim against the individual defendants, any claim against the PRT must fail. See Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 76 F.Supp.2d 572, 575-75 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
Even assuming that McClain's allegations that he suffers from bipolar and schizoaffective disorder establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability, there are no allegations in the amended complaint that he was denied programming or services because of this disability. Regarding this element of an ADA claim, the ADA “requires but-for causation.” Durham, 82 F.4th at 226 (citing CG v. Pa. Dep't of Education, 734 F.3d 229, 235-36 & n. 11 (3d Cir. 2013)). The amended complaint fails to allege any facts from which we could infer that McClain's removal from the RTU occurred because of his alleged disability. Accordingly, we conclude that McClain has not adequately pleaded a claim against the DOC under the ADA, and this claim should be dismissed.
5. Negligence
Finally, McClain asserts a state law claim of negligence, alleging that the defendants breached a duty of care by removing him from the RTU. At the outset, we note that to the extent McClain attempts to assert a claim for professional negligence, he has failed to file a certificate of merit in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3. Accordingly, any professional negligence claim should be dismissed. See Iwanejko v. Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., 249 Fed.Appx. 938, 943-44 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's professional negligence claim for failure to file a certificate of merit).
Because we have recommended dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claims, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law negligence claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
To the extent McClain's amended complaint asserts a general state law negligence claim against the defendants, he has not sufficiently pleaded facts to establish such a claim. To state a negligence claim, McClain must plead facts to establish: “(1) the defendant[s] owed the plaintiff a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) the defendant[s] breached that duty; (3) a causal connection existed between the defendant[s'] conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages occurred.” Sodders v. Fry, 32 A.3d 882, 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011). A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must show that “such negligence is the ‘proximate' or ‘legal' cause of the injury.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, McClain's amended complaint does nothing more than attempt to recite the elements of a negligence cause of action against the defendants. (Doc. 149 ¶¶45-48). The amended complaint asserts no facts from which we can conclude that the defendants owed plaintiff a duty under the law, that they breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This style of pleading is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]”). Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 154) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 27th day of March 2024.