Opinion
6:22-CV-01465-TMC-JDA
09-07-2022
Ward Benjamin McClain, Jr., personal representative of the estate of personal representative Ward Benjamin McClain, III Plaintiff, v. Greenville, S.C., City Police Department; City of Greenville, S.C., The; Greenville County, SC Sheriff's Office; Greenville County, S.C.; South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; State of South Carolina, The, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants the Greenville County, SC Sheriff's Office (“the Sheriff's Office”), Greenville County, SC (“the County”), South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”), and the State of South Carolina (“the State”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”). [Doc. 13.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action pro se, asserting various claims arising out of an encounter of Plaintiff's son (“the Deceased”) with law enforcement officers from Defendant the Greenville City Police Department and/or the Sheriff's Office on or about May 9, 2020, that resulted in the Deceased's death. [Doc. 1.] On May 25, 2022, Moving Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and they filed additional attachments to the motion to dismiss the next day. [Docs. 13; 16.] On June 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a response to Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss, and on June 16, 2022, Moving Defendants filed a reply. [Docs. 20; 21.] The motion is now ripe of review.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that in the early hours of May 9, 2020, the Deceased, his father, his sister, and his sister's boyfriend were at the law office of W. Benjamin McClain, Jr., L.L.C. Attorney at Law, having a get-together in honor of the Deceased's sister's college graduation. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff alleges that law enforcement officers came to this law office and began firing their weapons at and through the office. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that the Deceased returned fire to protect himself and those with him and that some of the officers killed the Deceased and “staged a suicide.” [Id. at 2-3.]
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, South Carolina's Wrongful Death Act, SC Code § 15-51-10 et seq., and South Carolina's survival statute, SC Code § 15-5-90 asserting violation of his right to due process under the United States Constitution, as well as state-law claims of outrage, assault and battery, and negligence. [Doc. 1 at 3-9.] As his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages, including punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and court costs. [Id. at 9.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Plaintiff's claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal Standard
The Fourth Circuit has been “unclear on whether a dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).” Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (comparing Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1995), with Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1998), and Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626 (4th Cir. 1998)). Because the trend among courts within the Fourth Circuit is to consider sovereign immunity under Rule 12(b)(1), see Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 899 F.Supp.2d 457, 466 (D.S.C. 2012), the Court considers Moving Defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity argument pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Goss v. Moultrie, No. 2:21-cv-01090-JMC-MGB, 2022 WL 3718602, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. July 27, 2022), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 3718317 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2022).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Typically, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). “However, where a party challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the party is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, the burden of persuasion lies with the party asserting the immunity.” Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 899 F.Supp.2d 457, 466 (D.S.C. 2012). The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against the State, SLED, and the Sheriff's Office must be dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. [Docs. 13 at 2-4; 21 at 2.] The Court agrees.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina, or its officials in their official capacities, by a citizen of South Carolina or a citizen of another state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to arms of the State, including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity generally protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pense v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 926 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 2019). Because SLED is a state agency, it, like the State itself, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. See Blakney v. Brewton, No. 6:20-cv-02915-DCC-KFM, 2020 WL 8366287, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 307489 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2021). And because sheriff's departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments, Owens v. Gibson, No. 9:19-cv-03411-JD-MHC, 2022 WL 2506908, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2022), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 2155321 (D.S.C. June 15, 2022); see also S.C. Code § 23-13-10 (providing that only the Sheriff has the authority to hire or terminate employees of the Sheriff's Department, and that the Sheriff is responsible for neglect of duty or misconduct by a deputy sheriff); Edwards v. Lexington Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 688 S.E.2d 125, 127 n.1 (S.C. 2010) (“[U]nder South Carolina law, the sheriff and sheriff's deputies are State, not county, employees.”); Comer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the sheriff of Greenville County is “an arm of the State”), the Sheriff's Office is also entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. See Wirtz v. Oconee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 8:13-1041- RMG, 2013 WL 5372795, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2013) (“Defendant Oconee County Sheriff's Department has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages under § 1983.”).
As noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. The State of has not consented to suit in a federal court. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, section 15-78-20(e) of the South Carolina Code of Laws, expressly provides that the State does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the state of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort “does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities”), superseded by statute, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 633 S.E.2d 143 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 (“[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.”).
As Plaintiff notes [Doc. 20 at 1], immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to political subdivisions of a state such as counties or municipalities. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claims against the State, SLED, and the Sheriff's Office be dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
In his response opposing Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues at length that Moving Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 20 at 2-4.] However, Moving Defendants have not argued that they are entitled to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. [Docs. 13; 21.] Accordingly, the Court does not address that issue.
Insufficient Allegations Against the County
Moving Defendants next contend that Plaintiff's claims against the County should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. [Doc. 13 at 4-5.] The Court agrees.
As Moving Defendants point out, Plaintiff's only allegation against the County is that the Sheriff's Office “is an institution of” the County. [Id. at 4 (quoting Doc. 1 at 2).] Even to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations concern Sheriff's Office deputies, “a deputy sheriff has been considered, both under South Carolina common and statutory law, as the agent of the sheriff, not as [an] ‘employee' of the county.” Allen v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 515 F.Supp. 1185, 1190 (D.S.C. 1981), aff'd, 694 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1982). And, “[i]n South Carolina, a sheriff's department is an agency of the state, not a department under the control of the county.” Millmine v. County of Lexington (S.C.), No. 3:09-1644-CMC, 2011 WL 182875, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2011). Insofar as the County does not control the deputy sheriffs serving within the county, “it bears no concomitant responsibility” for their actions. Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th Cir. 1999); see Lewallen v. McCarley, No. 8:21-1171-SAL-MHC, 2022 WL 3161855, at *5 (D.S.C. July 7, 2022), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 3161684 (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2022).
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly state a claim against the County and recommends that the County be dismissed from the action.
In their initial memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, Moving Defendants make an argument about an amended complaint and claims of violations of the South Carolina Constitution, and which references the question of whether York County is a proper party. [Doc. 13 at 5-6.] It appears to the Court that these arguments do not apply to this case and were mistakenly included in Moving Defendants' memorandum, and thus the Court does not address them.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss [Doc. 13] be GRANTED and that the County, the Sheriff's Office, SLED, and the State be DISMISSED from the action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.