Opinion
Case No. 98-C-4347
February 3, 1999
Defendants' joint motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint.
ORDER
Plaintiff McCann brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest against Defendants Sgt. Schmitz (Schmitz) and Capt. Hohm (Hohm). Plaintiff also alleges unlawful detention against Defendants City of Chicago, Schmitz and Hohm. In considering a motion to dismiss the Court must assume all the allegations contained in the complaint are true.Sladek v. Bell Sys.Mgt., 880 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1989). The complaint may only be dismissed if Ait is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that should be proven consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). Here, based on the face of the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law.
This cause of action arises from an incident which occurred on the night July 18, 1997 at the home of Joan Kaczmarek. On that date Kaczmarek summoned the police to her home and notified the responding officer that: (a) she and Plaintiff had been cohabitating at her residence; (b) she owned the residence; (c) she wanted Plaintiff to move out of the residence. Kaczmarek signed a complaint for criminal trespass. Kaczmarek's complaint for criminal trespass, which Plaintiff admits was signed by Kaczmarek, and of which the Court takes judicial notice, asserts that Plaintiff "remained [in her residence] after receiving notice from the owner to leave." Schmitz arrested Plaintiff for criminal trespass. He was not in posession of an arrest warrant for Plaintiff.
Defendants offer two arguments in support of their motion to dismiss: (1) that the police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff; and (2) that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Because Defendants' probable cause argument is dispositive, the Court need not reach the issue of qualified immunity. If the officers had probable cause to make the arrest, and the Court finds that they did, then the arrest was lawful and both of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
Police officers have probable cause to make an arrest when, "the facts and circumstances within the police officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that an offense has been committed. "Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1989). In circumstances where police officers have no particular reason to disbelieve a witness, a witness's complaint can establish probable cause as a matter of law.Gramenos v. Jewel Co. Inc., 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986).interpreting, McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1984). See also, Wiggins v. Beavers, 1994 WL 630605 (N.D.Ill. 1994). Furthermore, Awhen an officer has received his information from some person-normally the putative victim or an eyewitness-who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth, he has probable cause. Tangwell v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1998) quoting, Gramenos v. Jewel Co. Inc., 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986).
Where there is no room for a difference of opinion, it is appropriate for the Court to determine that probable cause existed as a matter of law. Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1989). In the instant case there is no room for a difference of opinion. The allegations in Plaintiff's complaint coupled with the statements contained in Kaczmarek's complaint of criminal trespass establish that probable cause existed as a matter of law. In Illinois, the offense of criminal trespass to real property is statutorily defined. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 21-3(a). Under the statute, a person commits criminal trespass to real property, Awhen he enters the property of another knowing that such entry is forbidden, or remains on property after being told to leave, even if the initial entry was lawful. People v. Kraft, 277 Ill. App.3d 221, 225 (1995). Here, the police relied on verbal and writen statements from Kaczmarek, the putative victim, which established all the elements of criminal trespass. The statements came from a witness which police had no reason to disbelieve. The officers were under no duty to further investigate prior to arresting Plaintiff. There was probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest as a matter of law.
Plaintiff contends there was no probable cause because Schmitz Awrongfully induced Joan [Kaczmarek] to sign the complaint . . . by misrepresenting the consequences to Plaintiff. Amended Complaint, 10. However, even if Schmitz misrepresented the negative consequences of signing the criminal complaint, that does not mean that the officers had reason to doubt Kaczmarek's account of the situation. Such an allegation merely means that Kaczmarek did not wish certain negative consequences to befall Plaintiff. It does not undermine the veracity of the assertions Kaczmarek made verbally and in the criminal trespass complaint which established probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest.
Therefore, the Court finds that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff's false arrest and unlawful detention claims must be dismissed. This action is dismissed and the case is terminated.