Opinion
5:23-CV-00228-BO-RN
05-23-2023
Sara Nicole McCall, Plaintiff, v. Cape Fear Valley Medical Center & Allied Universal, Defendants.
ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
Robert T. Numbers, II United States Magistrate Judge
Sara Nicole McCall wants to sue Cape Fear Valley Medical Center and Allied Universal under North Carolina law for allegedly providing her deficient medical treatment, preventing her from speaking with an attorney, and denying her due process. She also asks to do so without paying the standard civil filing fee. The court will not force McCall to pay the filing fee because she lacks the requisite resources, but her complaint should be dismissed-McCall fails to state a federal claim for relief, and the court should not involve itself in her state-law medical malpractice claim.
I. Background
McCall travelled to CFVMC by ambulance in July 2022 after attempting suicide. Proposed Compl. at 2, D.E. 1. While there, she received treatment from CFVMC staff as well as Allied employees, who are contract workers at the Medical Center. Id. But McCall contends that the care she received was inadequate-CFVMC and Allied employees allegedly violated her rights by involuntarily committing her to inpatient treatment, administering unnecessary medications, preventing her from speaking to an attorney, and barring her from filing grievances. Id. at 2-4. She also maintains that hospital staff's antagonistic demeanor caused her to suffer anxiety and panic attacks. Id. at 7. She seeks $150,000 in damages. Id. at 3.
Although McCall's proposed complaint contains numbered paragraphs, the numeration sometimes restarts or is altogether absent. Thus, citations to her complaint will point to pages rather than paragraphs.
II. IFP Motion
McCall asks the court to allow her to proceed with this action without paying the required filing fee and other costs associated with litigation (colloquially known as proceeding in forma pauperis or IFP). IFP Mot., D.E. 2. The court may grant her request if she submits an affidavit describing her assets and the court finds that she cannot pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In assessing a request to proceed IFP, the court should consider whether the plaintiff can pay the costs associated with litigation “and still be able to provide himself and his dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotations omitted).
The court has reviewed McCall's application and finds that she lacks the resources to pay the costs associated with this litigation. Thus, the court grants her motion (D.E. 2) and allows her to proceed IFP.
III. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Along with determining whether McCall is entitled to IFP status, the court must also analyze the viability of the claims contained in her complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court reviews a complaint to eliminate claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice. The court must dismiss any portion of the complaint it determines is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous because of either legal or factual shortcomings. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Legally frivolous claims are based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory' and include ‘claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.'” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A complaint is factually frivolous when its factual allegations are “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
McCall's pro se status relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that her complaint contain facially plausible claims. The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, but it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011).
McCall claims that her rights were violated because hospital staff involuntarily committed her to inpatient treatment, gave her unnecessary medications, prevented her from speaking to an attorney, and stopped her from filing grievances. Proposed Compl. at 4. Construing her complaint liberally, the undersigned concludes that she wishes to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants for barring her from speaking to an attorney or filing grievances. She also seeks to bring a claim under the Restatement Mental Health Bill of Rights for the treatment she received. See Civil Cover Sheet, D.E. 1-1. Finally, she wants to bring a state-law medical malpractice claim. The court should dismiss her federal claims for failure to state a claim, and it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her medical malpractice claim.
A. Federal Claims
McCall first contends that Defendants' employees prevented her from speaking with an attorney and stopped her from filing grievances to complain about the care she received. These claims arise out of 42 U.S.C. §1983, which creates civil liability for any person acting under the color of state law who deprives a plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Therefore, to state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
But McCall does not claim that CFVMC or Allied employees were acting under color of state law when they allegedly prevented her from speaking with a lawyer or filing grievances. And private hospitals are generally not state actors. See, e.g., Modaber v. Culpepper Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Although health care is certainly an essential public service, it does not involve the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that a court-appointed physician who examined a plaintiff during involuntary commitment was not a state actor). Thus, the district court should dismiss her § 1983 claims.
McCall next alleges that Defendants violated various rights patients are entitled to while receiving treatment. She refers to the “rights set forth by the Mental Health American [sic] Board of Directors[,]” “the Patient Bill of Rights for mental health treatment[,]” and other general rights she has as a patient. Proposed Compl. at 2. Also, the Civil Cover Sheet she filed with her lawsuit refers to “42 U.S. Code Ch. 114.” See Civil Cover Sheet at 1. That portion of the United States Code contains the Restatement Mental Health Bill of Rights. 42 U.S.C. § 10841(1)(A)(i).
As best the court can tell, any rights set out by the “Mental Health American Board of Directors” or in the “Patient Bill of Rights for Mental Health Treatment” are not creations of federal law. A private entity called Mental Health America has published a set of Mental Health Rights. And the American Psychiatric Association has published a Bill of Rights for patients receiving mental health treatment. But these statements do not create rights under federal law. See Vaughn v. Ryan Health Care Ctr., No. 22-CV-1637 (LTS), 2022 WL 673607, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (finding that a plaintiff's vague reference to a “Patient's Bill of Rights” did not create a federal cause of action); Leonard v. Ahlin, No. 1:09-cv-00339-OWW-GSA PC, 2010 WL 4323047, at *3 (“A violation of the hospital's Patient Bill of rights is not sufficient to support a claim under [§] 1983[.]”). Nor is there any indication that her general invocation of patient's rights has a basis in federal law. See Vaughn, 2022 WL 673607, at *4 (“Outside of the prisoner context, there is no general constitutional right to adequate medical care[.]”). Thus, McCall cannot support a claim under §1983, and any claims based on this language should be dismissed.
See Mental Health Rights, Mental Health America, https://mhanational.org/issues/mental-health-rights (last visited May 18, 2023).
See Endorsement of Principles for the Provision of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment Services: A Bill of Rights, American Psychiatric Association (2007), https://www.psychiatry.org/getattachment/d735fd73-6a06-4342-9c78-0f67db1f0184/Position-2007-Bill-of-Rights.pdf
And while Congress has enacted a Mental Health Bill of Rights, McCall cannot rely on that statute to bring a § 1983 claim. Courts have repeatedly held that the Mental Health Bill of Rights does not confer a private right of action. See, e.g., Brooks v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 685 F.Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1989); Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 995 (1st Cir. 1992); Briand v. Lavigne, 223 F.Supp.2d 241, 246-47 (D. Me. 2002). Thus an individual may not bring a civil suit alleging that her medical provider's standard of care fell below the statute's command. Thus, the district court should dismiss McCall's claim under the Mental Health Bill of Rights as well.
B. State Malpractice Claim
Finally, McCall contends that Defendants committed medical malpractice and violated North Carolina law by keeping her at the hospital against her will, medicating her unnecessarily, and treating her with disrespect. The court should not involve itself in this dispute.
These claims arise under North Carolina state law. See N.C. G.S. § 90-21.11(2) (defining medical malpractice action); § 90-21.12 (laying out the standard of care in medical malpractice actions); § 90-21.13 (establishing the scope of informed consent in medical malpractice actions). Federal courts have limited jurisdiction to hear state-law claims. But so long as a district court has original jurisdiction over a dispute, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law tort claims that are “part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a case once it has dispensed with all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
The undersigned has recommended that the district court dismiss all the claims that created this court's original jurisdiction. After considering the interests of judicial economy, fairness, federalism, and comity, the undersigned recommends that the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over McCall's tort claims. Thus, these claims should be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the court grants McCall's motion to proceed IFP (D.E. 2), but the court should dismiss her proposed complaint (D.E. 1).
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared here. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.