Opinion
No. 409, 1998.
Decided: December 4, 1998.
Superior CrA IN95-03-0342R1.
Affirmed.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
ROND McBRIDE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 409, 1998. In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: November 18, 1998. Decided: December 4, 1998.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices.
ORDER
This 4th day of December 1998, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the State of Delaware's motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Rond McBride ("McBride"), has filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying McBride's motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). The State of Delaware ("State") has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of McBride's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). We agree and affirm.
(2) In April 1995, McBride was indicted by a grand jury on charges of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Second Degree, Assault Third Degree, and Terroristic Threatening. In January 1996, McBride entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(c). Under the agreement, McBride entered a Robinson plea to one count of Unlawful Sexual Penetration Second Degree. See Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 291 A.2d 279 (1972) (permitting Superior Court to accept guilty plea where guilt of offense charged is not admitted). In return for McBride's plea, the State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the charges of Assault Third Degree and Terroristic Threatening. On March 1, 1996, the Superior Court sentenced McBride to five years at Level V imprisonment, suspended for five months at a Level IV halfway house, followed by four and a half years at Level III probation. McBride did not appeal his conviction and sentence.
(3) In April 1996, McBride was adjudged guilty of violating the terms of the suspended sentence and probation imposed on March 1, 1996. McBride was resentenced to four years and eight months at Level V imprisonment, suspended after completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program, to four years at Level III probation, suspended after one year, to three years at Level II. McBride v. State, Del. Supr., No. 204, 1996, Hartnett, J., 1996 WL 742783 (Dec. 16, 1996) (ORDER). In June 1997, McBride was again adjudged guilty of violating probation and was resentenced to four years at Level V imprisonment, suspended after completion of the Key or New Hope program, to three years at Level IV work release, suspended after three months, to three years at Level III probation.
(4) In February 1998, McBride filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 61. McBride alleged that he was "denied effective assistance of counsel which resulted in a coerced and involuntary guilty plea." By order dated August 20, 1998, the Superior Court denied the motion for postconviction relief on the basis that McBride had failed to establish any breach of performance by his trial counsel. This appeal followed.
(5) In the context of a guilty plea, a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is one that demonstrates that: (i) "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) counsel's actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Somerville v. State, Del. Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997) (citations omitted). A review of counsel's representation is subject to a strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable. Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
(6) In his opening brief on appeal, McBride alleges, as he did in his motion for postconviction relief, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and subpoena defense alibi witnesses and for misleading McBride as to whether those witnesses were interviewed and available to testify at trial. McBride also alleges that his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty.
(7) We agree with the Superior Court that McBride's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are conclusory and warranted summary dismissal of his motion for postconviction relief. McBride has provided no evidence to establish that his counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and his conclusory allegations are contradicted and/or denied by his counsel's sworn Rule 61(g)(2) affidavit. Furthermore, on both the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and at his plea colloquy, McBride represented to the Superior Court under oath that he voluntarily entered his plea and was satisfied with his counsel's representation. On the guilty plea form, McBride specifically denied that anyone had threatened or forced him to plead guilty or had promised him anything to induce his guilty plea. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, McBride is bound by his answers on the guilty plea form and by his sworn testimony prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea. Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632. McBride has failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating that the assistance of his counsel was ineffective.
(8) It is manifest on the face of McBride's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. The issues raised are clearly controlled by settled Delaware law, and to the extent the issues on appeal implicate the exercise of judicial discretion, there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.