Opinion
Case No. 3:02 cv 1100 JLF.
April 26, 2005
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge by District Judge James L. Foreman pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and Local Rule 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the plaintiff, Ronnie L. McAtee, on June 29, 2004 (Doc. 34). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition be DENIED, that this case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and that the court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
The plaintiff, Ronnie L. McAtee, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge the loss of good conduct credit (GCC) at various internal jail disciplinary committee proceedings. At these hearings, which occurred from April 29, 1998 to August 13, 1998, McAtee lost a total of 37 months GCC for various infractions:
1. At the April 29, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 3 months GCC for offenses 202 (damage, or misuse of property) and 402 (health, smoking or safety violation). The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on April 23, 1998.
2. At the May 20, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 2 months GCC for offenses 202 and 403 (disobeying a direct order). The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on May 18, 1998.
3. At the July 7, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 1 month GCC for offenses 304 (insolence) and 310 (abuse of privileges). The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on June 30, 1998.
4. Also at the July 7, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 3 months GCC for offenses 210 (impairment of surveillance), 304, and 403. The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on July 4, 1998.
5. At the July 23, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 6 months GCC for offenses 202, 206 (intimidation or threats), and 304. The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on July 20, 1998.
6. At the July 28, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 6 months GCC for offense 202, 210, 304, and 403. The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on July 23, 1998.
7. Also at the July 28, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 6 months GCC for offense 403. The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on July 24, 1998.
8. Also at the July 28, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 3 months GCC for offense 403. The incident resulting in the hearing also occurred on July 24, 1998.
9. At the August 4, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 1 month of GCC for offense 304. The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on July 28, 1998.
10. At the August 11, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 3 months GCC for offenses 107 (sexual misconduct), 304, and 403. The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on August 7, 1998
11. At the August 13, 1998 hearing, McAtee lost 3 months GCC for offense 203 (drugs drug paraphernalia). The incident resulting in the hearing occurred on August 11, 1998.
On January 20, 1999, the Administrative Review Board (ARB) reviewed the disciplinary reports issued on incident dates April 23, May 18, and June 30, 1998 and hearings held on April 29, May 20, and July 7, 1998, respectively. The ARB stated that "the Panel is reasonably satisfied the inmate committed the infractions and recommends the grievance be denied." On March 5, 1999, the ARB also reviewed the disciplinary reports issued on July 4, July 6, July 23, July 24, and July 29, 1998 and the hearings held on July 7, July 9, July 28, and August 4, 1998, respectively, and came to the same conclusion. On April 14, 1999, the ARB reviewed the remaining disciplinary reports and hearings and again reached the same conclusion.
The petitioner is not complaining about this incident date and respective hearing.
Each of the disciplinary committee reports and other documents referred to in this section are attached to the petitioner's original petition filed on October 25, 2002. The material is not paginated but generally is ordered by date.
On July 21, 2001, McAtee filed a "Complaint for Mandamus" with the Livingston County Circuit Court. The complaint was dismissed summarily on June 22, 2001 for the failure to state a cause of action. The petitioner appealed and the Illinois Appellate Court which, while noting that the trial court had erred in dismissing the petition for failure to state a claim, nonetheless affirmed the dismissal on the ground that McAtee was not entitled to mandamus relief because the "facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint for mandamus cannot be proved true." The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently denied leave to appeal.
McAtee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this court on October 25, 2002 along with a memorandum in support (Docs. 1, 3). The respondent, Eugene McAdory, the Warden at Menard Correctional Center where McAtee is housed, filed an Answer on July 18, 2003 (Doc. 17). On June 29, 2004, McAtee filed an amended petition (Doc. 34) and a hearing on the amended petition was held, by Magistrate Judge Gerald B. Cohn, on September 2, 2004. At the hearing, the parties merely reiterated the arguments made in their respective briefs and added no new arguments or evidence. Magistrate Judge Cohn took the matter under advisement on September 2, 2004. On January 4, 2005, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned judge.
In his petition before this Court, McAtee states that he was denied substantive and procedural due process during the disciplinary committee hearings because the hearing committee was not impartial, a reasoned written record was not provided, the findings were contrary to the evidence provided, the committee arbitrarily disregarded evidence, and because no reasoning was provided for the disciplinary action taken. In his answer, McAdory argues that McAtee's claim, that the disciplinary committee only relied on the disciplinary report, is procedurally defaulted because it was not raised with the State Co urt. Next, McAdory argues that McAtee has failed to show how the State Court erred in its determination that his petition should be denied.
Conclusions of Law
As an inmate in state custody, McAtee's habeas petition is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in a State Court proceeding, as is the case here, is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005). This code section provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Section 2254(d)(1) implicates two methods by which a writ can be granted based on an error by the State Court. First, the State Court could reach a legal conclusion that is opposite to a legal conclusion announced by the Supreme Court. Owens v. Frank, 394 F.3d 490, 496-497 (7th Cir. 2005). Second the State Court could identify the correct legal rule but unreasonably apply it to the facts of the case or unreasonably extend a legal principle. Owens, 394 F.3d at 496-497. As the Supreme Court has stated:
We have made clear that the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to "grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts" of petitioner's case. In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a "governing legal principle" to "a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced." In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of our precedent "unreasonable," the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been "objectively unreasonable."
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534-2535 (2003) (citations omitted).See also Owens, 394 F.3d at 496-497. In order to grant a Petition based on this section, the State Court's decision must be both unreasonable and incorrect. Owens, 394 F.3d at 497. The burden is on McAtee to show that he is entitled to relief.Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004).
Section 2254(d)(2) involves the "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." In considering this section, this Court presumes that the State Court correctly determined the factual issues; and, the petitioner has the burden to show that the state court erred by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); See also Benefiel v. Davis, 357 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
Prior to addressing the merit of McAtee's petition, it must be determined whether any of his claims have been procedurally defaulted (thereby, precluding review by this Court). Procedural default occurs when "a petitioner does not adequately present a claim to the state court" and there is no showing of "cause and prejudice for the default or . . . that a failure to grant him relief would work a fundamental miscarriage of justice."Richardson v. Briley, 401 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The purpose of this rule is to require petitioners to "fairly present" their claim before the State Court in order to allow the State the opportunity to correct any Constitutional violations. Sanders v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 581 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Here, McAdory is not arguing that McAtee failed to present his general due process claim before the State Court, but rather that he failed to present a specific argument — that the disciplinary committee's decision was arbitrary because it relied only on the disciplinary report filed by the correctional officers.
In McAtee's brief before the Illinois Appellate Court, he made the following arguments: He first argued the he was denied an impartial hearing. (Ex. B at pp. 28-35) He then argued that the disciplinary committee failed to provide an adequate record of the proceedings. (Ex. B at pp. 36-40) Within this argument, McAtee also claimed that the disciplinary committee failed to provide a written record of the evidence that they relied on, of why they discounted exculpatory evidence, and a reason for the disciplinary action taken. (Ex. B at p. 37-38) He then goes on to argue that the decision was not supported by some evidence. (Ex. B at p. 41-44) In McAtee's petition for leave to appeal, filed with the Illinois Supreme Court, McAtee argued that the Appellate court ignored his Due Process claims, misapplied Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974), and various state laws and regulations. (Ex. C at p. 14-15) He specifically argues that the written record of the disciplinary committee was inadequate, that the record was a mere duplication of the disciplinary reports, that the written record provided no reasoning, and that there was no reasoning as to why exculpatory evidence was ignored. (Ex. C at pp. 15-16) He goes on to argue that there was no reasoning as to why the specific sanctions were imposed, that there was insufficient evidence to find the petitioner guilty of the infractions, and that the disciplinary committee was neither fair nor impartial. (Ex. C at p. 19)
This brief is attached as Exhibit B to Document 18, the relevant record filed by McAdory on July 29, 2003.
This document is attached as Exhibit C to Document 18, the relevant record filed by McAdory on July 29, 2003.
McAdory characterizes McAtee's claim (that he alleges is procedurally defaulted) as a claim that the disciplinary committee acted arbitrarily by relying on the discipline report as the only evidence. While McAtee may not have artfully stated his claim, he did assert, in his petition for leave to appeal, that the disciplinary committee relied only on the discipline report in making its findings. He also had, at least tangentially, made this argument before the Illinois Court of Appeals. In addition, this Court does not read McAtee's claim as narrowly as McAdory does: McAtee generally is alleging a due process violation with respect to the disciplinary committee's reports and procedures. As part of that claim, he asserts that the disciplinary committee arbitrarily gave credence to the disciplinary report and not to his own evidence. Therefore, McAtee did adequately and fairly present this claim to the state courts.
McAdory's next argument is that McAtee does not specifically assign error to the state court's reasoning in denying his complaint for an order of mandamus. McAdory is correct in his representation. In neither his petition, which he filed pro se, nor his amended petition, which was filed by his appointed attorney, does McAtee specifically state how the State Courts erred in denying his request for mandamus relief. Rather, he reiterates the arguments that he made before the State Courts: that he was denied substantive and procedural due process. While the failure to specifically present arguments may be fatal to McAtee's claim, he has at least asserted enough from which an inference can be made as to what his claim for review is. For the purposes of this petition, then, this Court infers that McAtee is arguing that the State Court unreasonably applied the relevant legal standard to the facts of this case. Therefore, in order to succeed in his petition, McAtee must show that the State Court's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of the law as announced by the United States Supreme Court.
In Illinois, the correct method of challenging the loss of GCC is a complaint for an order of mandamus pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/14-101. McAtee v. Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 507 (7th Cir. 2001).
There has been no showing that the State Court's failed to identify the correct legal standard. Rather, McAtee has argued throughout his petitions that the facts surrounding the disciplinary committee hearings showed a lack of regard for his substantive and procedural due process rights.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974), the Supreme Court analyzed the applicability of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to internal prison disciplinary hearings. The Supreme Court first held that the "full panoply of rights due a defendant" as part of a criminal prosecution are not applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings. 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975. In addition, an inmate does not have the right to the type of due process "designed for free citizens in an open society" or even parolees or probationers. 418 U.S. at 560-561, 94 S.Ct. at 2977. However, the Due Process Clause does minimally protect against the arbitrary abrogation of a state-created right to good conduct credit. 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975. As part of this minimal Due Process right, there must be
There is no dispute here that Illinois has created such a right to GCC, that it applies to McAtee, and that Wolff necessarily would apply to hearings revoking his right to GCC.
1. "[A]dvance written notice of the claimed violation" at least 24 hours prior to the hearing; and
2. "[A] written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken" necessary for review; and
3. The ability of the inmate "to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals."
418 U.S. at 563-567, 94 S.Ct. 2978-2980 (citations omitted).See also Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773 (1985). In addition to these three specific rights, the inmate also has the right to an impartial hearing — a committee that does not run the "hazard of arbitrary decisionmaking that [would be] violative of due process of law." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571, 94 S.Ct. 2982. Finally, the Supreme Court stated that an inmate does not have the right to confront the witnesses against him or the general right to representation. 418 U.S. at 567-568, 570-571, 94 S.Ct. 2980-2982.
Throughout his petition, McAtee asserts that the hearings were conducted in violation of state laws and regulations. Federal habeas review is limited to violations of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Federal habeas review is not available to analyze and rule on the alleged erroneous application of Illinois law. Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, to the extent that McAtee is asserting that State law was violated, his petition must be denied. The only argument before this Court is that the State procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated by the Supreme Court in Wolff.
Based on McAtee's filings, his argument is that the disciplinary committee failed to provide an adequate written record and that the decision was not based on the minimal "some evidence." Both of these arguments are interrelated. The disciplinary committee must provide a written record of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision taken. Contrary to McAtee's assertions, the disciplinary committee is not required to assert why it discounted any evidence presented on his behalf. Rather, the disciplinary committee is only required to base its decision on "some evidence in the record."Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 454-455, 105 S.Ct. 2773-2774. Due Process only requires "a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credit [that] will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interest or imposing undue administrative burdens." Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. "Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board."Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 455-456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774.
In each of the written records of the disciplinary committee hearings, there is a section entitled "Basis for Decision." In each of these sections, the disciplinary committee outlined the evidence that it relied on in determining that McAtee was guilty of the infractions listed. The only hearings that McAtee specifically identifies as failing to adhere to the Constitutional standard are those hearings on July 23, 1998, July 28, 1998, and August 11, 1998. At the July 23, 1998 hearing, the committee stated that it found McAtee guilty:
Based on the observation of the reporting employees that McAtee called staff: punk, bitch, hoe, slut; and then stated that he would slap officer McDonald's bitch ass and threatened to kick Lt. Delong's bitch ass. McAtee then started kicking his door. Past history of 202 . . . [and] 304. . . . Inmate witness Ryder stating that McAtee did call staff names.
(July 23, 1998 Disciplinary Committee Report at p. 2) (All Caps omitted, some grammatical marks inserted)) This conclusion was based on the incident reports filed by Officers McDonald and DeLong and the witness statement of inmate Randy Ryder, who stated that the officers and McAtee got into a verbal confrontation, with each side yelling and swearing, after McAtee's cell became flooded. Based on this evidence, it is clear that there was "some evidence" relied on by the adjustment committee and that the report is an adequate written record of the evidence relied on.
This same conclusion is reached with respect to the July 28, 1998 hearing and the August 11, 1998 hearing. At the July 28, 1998 hearing concerning an incident on July 24, 1998 with Officer Whitecotton, the disciplinary committee found McAtee guilty of disobeying a direct order: "[b]ased on the observation of the reporting employee that inmate McAtee did refuse to cuff up when directed to do so and the inmate's history of committing similar types of offenses. . . ." (July 28, 1998 Disciplinary Committee Report at p. 1 (All Caps omitted)) The evidence presented by McAtee was, again, inmate Ryder's statement that McAtee "did not refuse to cuff up." Attached to the report is the incident report relied on by the committee which stated that McAtee failed to obey an order to "cuff up." Based on this, there was "some evidence" relied on by the committee and the report is an adequate written record of the evidence relied on.
At the August 11, 1998 hearing, the committee stated, as a basis for decision. that: "[b]ased on the observation of the reporting employee that inmate McAtee did call him by his first name after he was ordered not to and then held his penis and told the officer that he would like to `fuck' him, the inmate's history of insolence . . . and inmate's refusal to offer information that would refute the charges. . . ." (August 11, 1998 Disciplinary Committee Report at p. 1 (All Caps omitted)) At the Hearing, McAtee presented the statements of two inmates, Terrell Knight and Eric Coleman, who stated that the complaining officer, McBurney, was not on the gallery at the time that he stated that the incident occurred. Attached to the report is the officer's incident report. Based on this, there was "some evidence" relied on by the committee and the report is an adequate written record of the evidence relied on. This same conclusion can be reached for each of the disciplinary committee hearing reports attached to the petition.
What McAtee appears to be arguing is that it was unfair for the disciplinary committee to discount the evidence that he presented and to rely exclusively on the reporting officer's incident report. Such an argument would necessarily require a credibility analysis of the witnesses and evidence presented before the disciplinary committee. Such an analysis is not required by the Due Process Clause and is specifically rejected inSuperintendent, 472 U.S. at 455-456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774. Based on the evidence provided by McAtee, this Court can only conclude that the written record was adequate and that there was some evidence to support the committee's findings. There has been no showing that evidence, in addition to the incident reports, is necessary under the Due Process Clause. In addition, McAtee's argument that the committee failed to articulate why it was imposing the loss of GCC is unavailing. It is obvious from the reports that the penalty of loss of GCC was imposed because the committee found McAtee guilty of the infractions. McAtee has pointed to no federal law that requires any additional explanation. As such, there has been no showing that the disciplinary committee hearings were arbitrary, that the written record was deficient, or that its decision were not based on some evidence. For these reasons, McAtee's petition must fail.
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the plaintiff, Ronnie L. McAtee, on June 29, 2004 be DENIED(Doc. 34), that this case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and that the court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties shall have ten (10) days after issuance of this Recommendation to file written objections thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2003).