Opinion
24A-JC-302
07-31-2024
In the Matter of: D.M., H.M., A.M., and S.C. (Minor Children), and v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner M.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Frances Barrow Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court The Honorable Robert E. Hunley II, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-2308-JC-43, 77C01-2308-JC-44, 77C01-2308-JC-45, 77C01-2308-JC-46
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Frances Barrow
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge.
[¶1] M.B. ("Mother") appeals the adjudication of her children, D.M., H.M., A.M., and S.C. (collectively, "Children") as Children in Need of Services ("CHINS"). Mother argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusions that Children's mental or physical conditions are seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's lack of cooperation with the Department of Child Services ("DCS") and mental health problems, and that Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that Mother is unwilling to provide without the intervention of the trial court. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Mother has five children, four of whom are the subject of this CHINS adjudication - D.M., who was born September 21, 2008; H.M., who was born May 22, 2011; A.M., who was born February 12, 2014; and S.C., who was born October 25, 2017. Mother's oldest child, J.B., is an adult and does not live with Mother. The father of D.M., H.M., and A.M. is Da.M. ("Father M.").S.C.'s father is A.C. ("Father C.").
Father M. admitted D.M., H.M., and A.M. were CHINS. He does not participate in this appeal.
Father C. admitted S.C. was a CHINS. He does not participate in this appeal.
[¶3] On August 6, 2023, DCS received a report that A.M. was a victim of neglect. At the time of the report, Children were living with their adult sibling, J.B. On August 8, 2023, Family Case Manager Chloie Boatright ("FCM Boatright") conducted an investigation for DCS. A.M. told FCM Boatright that Mother "thought [A.M.] had pinworms" and Mother "dumped medication" out of some of the pills in her home and "filled them with a white dirt[.]" (App. Vol. II at 14.) Mother's adult daughter J.B. told FCM Boatright that the substance was Diatomaceous Earth, which Mother "used . . . for years and would throw it around the house" and it had made J.B. sick in the past. (Id.) Mother told A.M. to swallow the pills to treat the pinworms. A.M. told FCM Boatright the substance in the pills "made her stomach hurt." (Id.) D.M. also told FCM Boatright that Mother had a history of mental problems.
There is a separate CHINS case number for each child. The trial court consolidated the proceedings involving children of Father M. and Mother into one proceeding and the proceeding regarding S.C. remained separate. The relevant information in the documents - such as DCS's CHINS petition and the orders adjudicating the children as CHINS - are virtually identical with regard to Mother. Unless indicated otherwise, we cite the documents in the record concerning the children of Father M. and Mother.
D.M. called the substance "Damascus Earth" (App. Vol. II at 14), but it was later clarified during the hearing that she meant "Diatomaceous Earth," which is "used to put in your yard and things to kill bugs." (Tr. Vol. II at 6.)
[¶4] Also on August 8, 2023, FCM Boatright went to Mother's house to speak with Mother. Mother denied knowing what Diatomaceous Earth was. Mother "had difficulty focusing on one topic and could not confirm whether [A.M.] had pin worms[.]" (Id.) Mother told FCM Boatright that she wanted Children to stay with J.B. and that she "would talk to [J.B.] about guardianship." (Id.) Mother would not let FCM Boatright see Mother's home, would not take a drug test, and refused to provide a current phone number or sign a safety plan.
[¶5] On the same day, FCM Boatright also interviewed Father M., who told her he "has sole legal custody of [D.M., H.M., and A.M.]." (Id. at 20.) Father M. stated he lived "with his father in the middle of no where[.]" (Id.) He told FCM Boatright that he did not want D.M., H.M., and A.M. to stay with Mother unsupervised and he would "sign over legal custody" to J.B. (Id.) From August 9, 2023, to August 10, 2023, Father M. took D.M., H.M., and A.M. "to where he was staying . . . in a camper." (Id. at 14.)
[¶6] On August 11, 2023, J.B. took A.M. to the doctor, and the doctor administered a drug test. On August 18, 2023, DCS received the results of the test, which indicated A.M. tested positive for methamphetamine. FCM Boatright went to J.B.'s home. Father M. was also there. FCM Boatright told Father M. he needed to complete an instant drug test "because [A.M.] had tested positive for Meth at the doctor the day after she was with him." (Id. at 20.) Father M. was argumentative but eventually agreed to a drug screen, which came back positive for methamphetamine. When he was told D.M., H.M., and A.M. would be removed from his care based on his substance use, he "was calm and stated that he was going to sign [D.M., H.M., and A.M.] over to [J.B.] until he could get on his feet." (Id. at 21.)
[¶7] Also on August 18, 2023, FCM Boatright went to Mother's house, explained A.M.'s positive drug screen, and asked Mother to complete an instant drug screen. Mother repeatedly refused and would not let FCM Boatright into her home. Mother told FCM Boatright that she wanted Children to live with J.B. and she "did not want to do anything to get them back home with her." (Id.)
[¶8] After speaking with Mother and Father M., FCM Boatright spoke with A.M. A.M. "did not disclose how the drug could have gotten in her body other than through Mother's pill." (Id. at 15.) A.M. told FCM Boatright she had seen "both parents use drugs around her." (Id.) On August 21, 2023, DCS filed petitions to adjudicate Children as CHINS because neither Mother nor Father M. could "explain how [A.M.] would have ingested methamphetamine[.]" (Id.)
[¶9] The trial court held an initial hearing regarding the petitions on August 22, 2023. Mother did not attend. The trial court continued the matter until September 6, 2023. At the hearing on September 6, 2023, Mother denied Children were CHINS. The trial court scheduled a fact-finding hearing for November 29, 2023.
[¶10] At that fact-finding hearing, FCM Boatright testified regarding her interactions with Mother after DCS filed the CHINS petitions. She told the trial court that her conversations with Mother had been "very hard to follow" and Mother was "very erratic, very confrontational[.]" (Tr. Vol. II at 61-2.) She stated that "at one point [Mother] had came [sic] into the [DCS] Office and brought [FCM Boatright] a 16-page packet on how the military is controlling her brain and, [sic] how she doesn't have Schizophrenic Effective Disorder that she has been diagnosed with." (Id. at 61.) FCM Boatright also reported Mother had been "verbally aggressive with several [DCS] staff . . . demanding documents [and] demanding a list of every employee that works for DCS[.]" (Id. at 62.) FCM Boatright testified Mother told her that Mother did not "understand why we have a CHINS case since [Children] are with [J.B.] and the problem has been alleviated[.]" (Id.)
[¶11] FCM Boatright noted she had a previous DCS-related interaction with Mother in the spring of 2023, and Mother was very different - "she was easy to have a conversation with, very compliant . . . I felt as if when I [was] speaking to her she understood what I was saying[.]" (Id. at 63.) FCM Boatright testified that, in the spring of 2023, Mother was on her medication and "was happy to show me her medication[.]" (Id.) FCM Boatright told the trial court that Mother's behavior in the months before the fact-finding hearing was very different from the spring of 2023 and she was concerned about Children's safety in Mother's care based on Mother's mental health and substance abuse issues. (Id. at 64.)
It is unclear what medicine Mother was taking at the time.
[¶12] Sullivan County Sheriff's Department Deputy Cole Boatright also testified at the fact-finding hearing. He recounted two incidents in which he interacted with Mother in criminal matters after DCS filed the CHINS petitions. The first occurred on September 2, 2023, when Deputy Boatright responded to a 911 call of "somebody pointing a firearm[.]" (Id. at 104.) Deputy Boatright testified that when he arrived he saw "a shotgun lying in the grass [and] [Mother] was running around the area of the shotgun[.]" (Id. at 105.) He described Mother's demeanor at the time as "all over the place" and indicated that she was "hard to communicate with[.]" (Id.) After Deputy Boatright told Mother he was going to arrest her, Mother "lifted her shirt up and exposed her bare chest and stated that somebody told her that if she done [sic] that, she wouldn't go to jail." (Id.) Deputy Boatright arrested Mother for indecent exposure and disorderly conduct.
The record does not indicate the relationship, if any, between FCM Boatright and Deputy Boatright.
[¶13] DCS presented evidence that, based on that incident, the State charged Mother with Class C misdemeanor public nudity and Class A misdemeanor pointing a firearm at another person. On September 29, 2023, Mother pled guilty to the firearm charge and the criminal court dismissed the public nudity charge. On October 3, 2023, the criminal court sentenced Mother to 365 days in the county jail, with 335 days suspended and credit for 11 days served.
[¶14] Deputy Boatright also testified about an incident that occurred the week prior to the fact-finding hearing. On November 25, 2023, Deputy Boatright responded to multiple 911 calls that reported Mother, in a state of undress, was beating on a neighbor's front door. Upon arriving at the scene, Deputy Boatright spoke with Mother and smelled alcohol on her breath. He observed Mother's "speech was slurred, [he had] a hard time understanding her . . . [and Mother had an] inability to stay balanced." (Id. at 107.) Mother admitted "she bought a . . . bottle of Jack Daniels and drank it all." (Id.) Mother told Deputy Boatright that she remembered taking off her clothing despite the fact it was a cold day and she "was confused about where she was." (Id.) Deputy Boatright arrested Mother for public intoxication. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, he did not know if the State had filed charges against Mother based on that arrest.
[¶15] Additionally, J.B. testified Children had lived with her various times during their lives and Children were living with her at the time of the fact-finding hearing. J.B. explained that she left Mother's house when she was thirteen or fourteen because she was "constantly having arguments with [Mother] over [Mother's] addictions and drug use[.]" (Id. at 90.) J.B. returned to Mother's house around the time S.C. was born but moved out approximately a year later because Mother's "behavior was very erratic and unpredictable." (Id. at 91.)
[¶16] J.B. told the trial court that Mother "had signed the paperwork" so J.B. could take Children to the doctor. (Id. at 89.) J.B. testified she had spoken with DCS regarding guardianship of Children. She indicated she "ha[d] the papers [but she] ha[dn't] done them yet" but would do so when she had money to pay the fees to file for guardianship. (Id. at 98.) Mother later testified she would agree to allow J.B. to be Children's guardian. FCM Boatright testified that if J.B. were to obtain guardianship, DCS would "ensure guardianship was settled before [DCS] would close the case out[.]" (Id. at 66.)
[¶17] On December 11, 2023, the trial court issued orders adjudicating Children as CHINS. On December 20, 2023, the trial court held a dispositional hearing regarding the children of Mother and Father M, and it entered a dispositional order requiring Mother and Father M. to participate in reunification services on January 4, 2024. On January 10, 2024, the trial court held a dispositional hearing regarding S.C., and it entered a dispositional order requiring Mother and Father C. to participate in reunification services on January 29, 2024. The services Mother was required to complete were identical in those orders. They included communicating with the FCM; obeying the law; completing services recommended by the FCM; maintaining suitable housing and a legal source of income; refraining from using illegal substances; submitting to random drug screens; engaging in homebased counseling with Children; completing parenting, substance abuse, and psychological assessments and following all recommendations arising therefrom; and addressing her personal mental and physical health needs.
Discussion and Decision
[¶18] Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). DCS alleged Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which states:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
[¶19] A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child, rather than the culpability of the parent. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 476. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parent but to provide proper services for the benefit of the child. Id. at 475. "[T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention." Id. at 476.
While we acknowledge a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that - a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent. Only when the State moves to terminate a particular parent's rights does an allegation of fault attach. We have previously made it clear that CHINS proceedings are "distinct from" involuntary termination proceedings. The termination of the parent-child relationship is not merely a continuing stage of the CHINS proceeding. In fact, a CHINS intervention in no way challenges the general competency of a parent to continue a relationship with the child.Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied.
[¶20] When a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law in a CHINS decision, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Des. B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014). We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess witness credibility and do not reweigh the evidence; we instead consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id. We defer substantially to findings of fact but not to conclusions of law. Id.
[¶21] Mother argues the trial court erred when it adjudicated Children as CHINS. She does not challenge the trial court's findings, and thus they are accepted as true. See Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) ("We accept unchallenged findings as true."). In its order adjudicating Children as CHINS, the trial court found, in relevant part:
1) This case initiated due to a report that [A.M.] was given an unknown substance while at [Mother's] home.
* * * * *
3) The relevant result of this action was [A.M.] being taken to the doctor a few days later to be checked out, at which time she tested positive for methamphetamine.
* * * * *
8) [After learning that A.M. tested positive for methamphetamine, Mother] refused to screen for DCS and refused entry into her home.
9) Throughout DCS's assessment, [Mother] refused to cooperate with DCS to either screen to show that she was not using illegal substances or to allow DCS to inspect her home to ensure that it was safe.
10) [J.B.] testified that [Mother] had used drugs in the past that she was aware of, and testified that she was mentally unstable.
11) [J.B.] testified that she left home when she was 14, would then return when [S.C.] was born, and then left prior to turning 18, taking some of the [c]hildren with her.
12) [J.B.] testified that she effectively has raised [S.C.] from the time she was born.
13) In support of Mother's instability, there was testimony of two separate involvements with law enforcement during the pendency of the CHINS proceeding, one of which resulted in a conviction.
14) Mother was arrested and convicted of Pointing a Firearm at Another Person, a Class A Misdemeanor, on October 3, 2023.
15) Subsequently, there was another incident where Mother was intoxicated in public and was taken into custody. As of the date of Fact Finding, no criminal action had been taken. However, Deputy Cole Boatright testified to the incident and the Court has no reason to doubt the validity of his testimony.
16) These incidents, along with the testimony of the FCMs and [J.B.], show there are serious concerns with Mother's mental health and stability, especially in light of one of the Children testing positive for Methamphetamine when it is not clear where she would have come in contact with the drug.
17) Finally, even by Mother's own argument and admission, she would like [Children] to remain in current placement. She just does not believe DCS should be involved. The Court disagrees. The Court finds that the Children's physical and mental health would be endangered if [Mother] were to be able to have unrestricted access to [Children] at this time. Additionally, if Mother had wished for [J.B.] to have [Children], there was ample time prior to this action for Mother to legally have given custody of [Children] to [J.B.].(App. Vol. II at 96-7.)
[¶22] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions that Children's mental or physical health was seriously endangered by Mother's "inability, refusal, or neglect to provide shelter, care and/or supervision at the present time" and the coercive intervention of the trial court is required based on "Mother's lace [sic] of compliance with DCS[.]" (Id. at 97.) Mother asserts DCS failed to present any evidence that Children were seriously endangered by Mother's actions at the time of the fact-finding hearing. However, as the unchallenged findings indicate, Mother had been arrested for public intoxication less than a week before the fact-finding hearing, exhibited erratic behavior multiple times, and continued to refuse to take a drug screen or allow DCS into her home.
[¶23] Mother also argues DCS failed to present evidence that the coercive intervention of the trial court was needed because Children were in J.B.'s care and "Mother had not demonstrated any intent to change the arrangement. In fact, Mother made clear she wished for [Children] to remain in J.B.'s care." (Mother's Br. at 10.) Additionally, Mother asserted coercive intervention of the trial court was not needed because she signed a release to allow J.B. to get Children medical care. In support of her argument, Mother attempts to distinguish the facts in her case from those in In re D.C., 164 N.E.3d 834 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied.
[¶24] In D.C., after DCS filed a CHINS petition, the children were placed with their maternal grandmother because their father was arrested and DCS was unable to locate their mother. Id. at 836. The mother did not attend the CHINS factfinding hearing despite having notice. Id. The FCM indicated communication with the mother had been difficult and she received "little or no response" after emailing and calling the mother. Id. (citing the record). The trial court adjudicated the children as CHINS based on the father's incarceration and mother's unavailability. Id.
[¶25] On appeal the mother argued, in part, that the trial court erred when it adjudicated the children as CHINS because DCS did not prove that the children's needs were unmet and that those needs were unlikely to be addressed without coercive intervention of the court because the children were being cared for by maternal grandmother. Id. at 837. However, we held that, despite the fact that the children were placed with maternal grandmother, she did not have "any legal authority to care for [the children] or act on their behalf." Id. We also noted maternal grandmother's lack of legal authority over the children, such as a guardianship or a power of attorney, meant the mother could take the children at any time. Id. Therefore, we concluded the trial court did not err when it adjudicated the children as CHINS because without the court's intervention, maternal grandmother had no legal authority to ensure the children's needs were met. Id.
[¶26] Despite Mother's attempt to distinguish the facts in D.C. from those here, the matter before us is actually very similar to D.C. Here, while Mother signed the appropriate paperwork for J.B. to seek medical attention for Children, J.B. did not have guardianship of Children, and thus had no legal authority to do anything outside the terms of the medical paperwork, such as school enrollment, which was virtually the same situation described in D.C. Also similar to the facts in D.C., without the intervention of the trial court, Mother could decide she no longer wanted Children to live with J.B., which may put them in a situation that would endanger their mental or physical welfare. Based thereon, we hold the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Children's mental or physical conditions were seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's action or inaction and that Children needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that Mother was unable to provide without the intervention of the trial court. See id. (despite the children's placement with maternal grandmother, the coercive intervention of the court was warranted because maternal grandmother did not have the legal authority to take the children to the doctor and the mother could decide to remove the children from maternal grandmother's care at any time).
Conclusion
[¶27] The trial court's findings support its conclusions that Children's mental or physical conditions were seriously impaired or endangered by Mother's action or inaction and that Children needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that Mother was unable to provide without the intervention of the trial court. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's adjudication of Children as CHINS.
[¶28] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.