Opinion
15-P-1601
03-20-2017
Sima MAZZU v. James Michael MAZZU & others.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court following the allowance of the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). She also claims the judge abused her discretion in denying a motion to amend the complaint. We affirm.
Background . We summarize the allegations in the amended complaint, relevant public records, and items appearing in the record of the case. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co ., 451 Mass. 623, 631 n.14 (2008). James Mazzu (Mazzu), the plaintiff's former husband, is alleged to have used marital assets to develop a computer program to assist stock traders. Almost eight months after his New Hampshire divorce from the plaintiff was final, Mazzu and other inventors applied for a patent on the computer program, known as Securities Trading and Knowledge Systems. According to the plaintiff, this "technical know-how" constituted marital property which Mazzu fraudulently failed to disclose in the course of their divorce. Six years after the divorce, the plaintiff sought to enjoin Mazzu, Aminda, LLC, the company Mazzu allegedly formed to capitalize the intellectual property, and FMR, LLC, Mazzu's employer, from alienating, encumbering, or transferring the intellectual property rights in the computer program pending the reopening of the New Hampshire divorce proceeding. The plaintiff also asked that the intellectual property be held in constructive trust for her benefit until the property rights could be litigated.
The plaintiff amended her complaint as a matter of right pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 14(a), as amended, 385 Mass. 1216 (1982), before any answer was filed.
Discussion . 1. Judgment on the pleadings . A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Welch v. Sudbury Youth Soccer Assn., Inc ., 453 Mass. 352, 353 (2009). Here, the judge concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert a claim because she had no legal interest in the computer program or patent. See Boston Water & Sewer Commn . v. Commonwealth , 64 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 614-616 (2005). We review the decision de novo, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Polay v. McMahon , 468 Mass. 379, 382 (2014). As previously noted, we also consider matters of public record and items appearing in the record of the case. Iannacchino , supra .
To have standing in any capacity, a party must show they have an "interest affecting their liberty, rights or property." HSBC Bank USA, N.A . v. Matt , 464 Mass. 193, 199 (2013), quoting from Razin v. Razin , 332 Mass. 754, 754 (1955). Here, public records establish the following: the parties were divorced on February 26, 2007; the patent application was filed more than eight months later on November 6, 2007; and the patent was not issued until November 1, 2011, more than four years after the divorce was final. Because "[p]atent rights are created only upon the formal issuance of the patent," GAF Bldg. Materials Corp . v. Ek Corp ., 90 F.3d 479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the plaintiff had no valid claim to the intellectual property established by the patent four years after the divorce. Accordingly, she lacked standing to seek injunctive relief and a constructive trust related to that intellectual property. We discern no error in the dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing.
The plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that she had a legal claim to her former husband's "technical know-how" before the patent was awarded.
In light of our conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a claim for the intellectual property at issue, we need not address the independent reasons for dismissal set forth in the judge's memorandum of decision.
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2. Motion to amend . We review the denial of a motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc ., 409 Mass. 842, 864 (1991). While leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires," Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(a), 365 Mass. 761 (1974), such leave may be denied where there is undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility in the amendment. Mathis v. Massachusetts Elec. Co ., 409 Mass. 256, 264 (1991). At the time of the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings the case had been pending for two years. There is no indication in the record that, during that time, the plaintiff reopened the New Hampshire divorce proceeding as she claimed in the complaint. Moreover, further amendment would have been futile in light of the plaintiff's lack of standing. In these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to amend the complaint.
3. Attorney's fees . Finally, we address the requests of Mazzu and Aminda for attorney's fees and double costs pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 25, as appearing in 376 Mass. 949 (1979), and G. L. c. 211A, § 15. While we find the plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive, we do not think sanctions are warranted as we cannot say the appeal was frivolous or initiated in bad faith. See Avery v. Steele , 414 Mass. 450, 455 (1993). Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to award attorney's fees and double costs. See Masterpiece Kitchen & Bath, Inc . v. Gordon , 425 Mass. 325, 330 (1997).
Judgment affirmed .