Opinion
2:23-cv-02466-SAL-MGB
07-11-2023
Tyrone Deon Mazyck, Petitioner, v. Director, Al Cannon Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Tyrone Deon Mazyck (“Petitioner”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the petition be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was arrested on a charge of “Accessory after the fact to Felony A, B, C or Murder” on May 18, 2021, and is currently being detained at the Al Cannon Detention Center pending trial before the Charleston County Court of General Sessions.(See Indict. No. 2022-GS-10-00456.) Petitioner brings the instant petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on the grounds that he has been “deprived of an immediate preliminary hearing” in violation of Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 3060(b)(1).(Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) Based on the above, Petitioner contends that his detention is “unlawful,” such that he should be “discharged from custody or from the requirement of bail or any other condition of release.”(Id.) Petitioner further suggests that the delay in his underlying criminal proceedings has impacted his right to a speedy trial and therefore “objects” to any further continuances in his state action. (Id.) This is the extent of Petitioner's one-page pleading.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Petitioner's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County) (last visited July 11, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
The undersigned clarifies that Petitioner was indicted on a state criminal charge, meaning his prosecution before the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas is governed by the State of South Carolina's rules of criminal procedure and other relevant statutes concerning state prosecution. Petitioner's references to the aforementioned federal rules are therefore misplaced and ultimately inapplicable to the state proceedings at issue here. To that end, the undersigned assumes, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, that Petitioner is challenging the delay in his preliminary hearing based on the applicable South Carolina law.
Although Petitioner insists that he did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing (see Dkt. No. 1 at 1), the undersigned notes that state court records suggest that he and/or his defense counsel waived the preliminary hearing on November 1, 2021. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County) (last visited July 11, 2023).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Petitioner's pro se petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply any or all of these rules to § 2241 petitions).
The narrow question before the Court is whether it “plainly appears” that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. If so, his petition must be dismissed; if not, Respondent must respond. Id. Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his petition is accorded liberal construction. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Under certain circumstances, a pretrial detainee may bring a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.” See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987)). However, “[i]t is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases[,] the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.” Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918).
To be sure, the United States Supreme Court emphasized this principle in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), finding that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Petitioner is plainly involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Petitioner can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)); see also Sparks v. Mitchell Cty., No. 1:21-cv-50-MR, 2021 WL 781508, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Under the third prong, the scheme for federal habeas review is designed ‘to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.”) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Because Petitioner's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal habeas relief is available only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224-26 .
Petitioner has not shown the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”).
Petitioner is plainly able to raise his claims in his underlying criminal case. Indeed, Petitioner appears to be represented by counsel and various motions have already been filed in his state proceedings. See, e.g., Holmes v. Grant, No. 4:22-cv-3459-MGL-TER, 2022 WL 19331394, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2022) (finding no exceptional circumstances where petitioner and/or his counsel could raise concerns regarding untimely preliminary hearing in state court), adopted, 2023 WL 2717362 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2023); Brown v. Dir. of Florence Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 2:20-cv-2951-JD-MGB, 2021 WL 6139411, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2021) (dismissing pretrial detainee's habeas petition because he could raise his claims regarding state court's purported failure to afford him a bond or preliminary hearing in his underlying criminal case). Because Petitioner can pursue his claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Petitioner is precluded from federal habeas relief at this time.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that Petitioner cannot cure the deficiencies in his petition by amendment and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS the petition without prejudice and without requiring Respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.