Burkybile, 411 F.3d at 313 (quoting Ryan v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 500 (N.Y. 1984)). Our decision in Mazur v. New York City Department of Education, 621 F. App'x 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order), is instructive on this point. There, the DOE brought similar charges against a teacher in a section 3020-a proceeding.

Mazur v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. , 53 F. Supp. 3d 618, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Plaintiff's claims of age and disability discrimination were necessarily decided in the 3020–a hearing in order to support a final judgment because they were her central defenses."), aff'd , 621 Fed.Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2015). Here, the claims at issue in the instant action are disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

All of the evidence in the record indicates that Stinson's termination was the consequence of continued mistakes in her work and a communication style that her managers deemed insubordinate. See Mazur v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 621 Fed.Appx. 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (affirming dismissal of NYCHRL retaliation claim due to “a lack of the requisite causal link between [plaintiff's] complaints and any alleged retaliatory action,” and where “the record contains numerous non-retaliatory reasons for any action taken against [plaintiff]”). For these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment to Morningstar on Stinson's NYCHRL and NYSHRL retaliation claims.

Nor has Plaintiff established a causal connection between her alleged protected activity and Defendants' conduct. See id.; see, e.g., Livingston, 563 F.Supp.3d at 250-51 (granting summary judgment to the employer because the plaintiff was “unable to demonstrate any ‘causal link'” for his Title VII, NYCHRL, and NYSHRL retaliation claims); Mazur v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 621 Fed.Appx. 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment for the defendants because the plaintiff failed to establish “the requisite causal link between [her] complaints and any alleged retaliatory action,” and the record also contained “non-retaliatory reasons for any action taken”).

Although the Court shall not consider some of the statements in Goldberg's declaration because they are conclusory and unsupported by factual data, see Goldberg Decl. ¶¶ 6-9; cf. Mazur v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 53 F.Supp.3d 618, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd, 621 Fed.Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2015), it finds that the specific allegations APP sets forth are sufficient to create a material issue of fact with respect to Feel Films' performance under the contract. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to APP, APP has shown that Feel Films withheld consent for $40,000 of COVID-19 testing costs. The parties dispute whether such costs were reasonable and whether APP paid these costs out-of-pocket, see Hirschkorn Reply Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17, ECF No. 55; Goldberg Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, which creates questions of fact for a jury to decide.

. See alsoMazur v. N.Y.C. Dep’ of Educ. , 621 F.App'x 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Absent evidence sufficient to support a reasonable finding of discriminatory motivation [which the court found was lacking] we must accept the hearing officer's determination that Mazur was guilty of the charged conduct and disciplined for these legitimate reasons"). Although on the surface the parties in the instant case appear to dispute this issue, they are actually largely in agreement.

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiff's NYCHRL claim as well. SeeMazur v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. , 621 F. App'x 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (affirming dismissal of NYCHRL retaliation claim due to "a lack of the requisite causal link between [plaintiff's] complaints and any alleged retaliatory action," and where "the record contains numerous non-retaliatory reasons for any action taken against [plaintiff]"); see alsoKellman v. Metro. Transp. Auth. , 8 F. Supp. 3d 351, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Even after taking into account the NYCHRL's ‘uniquely broad and remedial purposes,’ no jury could find, based on the submitted evidence, that the issuance of the [critical letters of instruction], the investigation into the missing [activity report] and related Notice of Intent to Discipline, and the denial of training were caused even partly by retaliatory motives." (citation omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff's allegations with respect to retaliation for filing her Second EEOC Complaint — i.e., that she was asked about her retirement date and received offers to assist with the retirement process — are closer to "stray remarks" than to daily disparaging comments. See Boonmalert, 721 F. App'x at 34 (holding that "[d]iscussions of retirement and a one-time preparation of retirement paper d[i]d not suffice" to survive a motion to dismiss); Almontaser, 2014 WL 3110019, at *1, 8 (finding that plaintiff's allegation that defendants made "frequent" remarks that he was "too old" and asked when he was going to retire was "simply too vague" to support a hostile work environment claim); Mazur v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 3d 618, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[C]omments or questions about retirement, without more, do not create a hostile work environment."), aff'd, 621 F. App'x 88 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order).

Ferraro, 404 F. Supp. 708, aff'd, 752 F. App'x 70 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Mazur v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 3d 618, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[p]laintiff's claims of age and disability discrimination were necessarily decided in the 3020-a hearing in order to support a final judgment because they were her central defenses."), aff'd, 621 Fed.Appx. 88 (2d Cir. 2015).) Here, the remaining claims at issue in the instant action are disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

Plaintiff does not allege that the Hearing Officer imposed the suspension based on any discriminatory animus. See Mazur v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 53 F. Supp. 3d 618, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting plaintiff's ADEA claim following a Section 3020-a hearing because she had "not shown that the hearing officers were biased or that certain evidence was unavailable or overlooked, thus undermining the inference that her suspension was connected to her protected status"), aff'd, 621 F. App'x 88 (2d Cir. 2015). Nor does Plaintiff maintain that Defendants influenced the Hearing Officer's decision based on their own discriminatory intent.