onna Hoisington, is, as a matter of law from her course of conduct, guilty of contributory negligence and that she assumed the risk incident to her transportation as a guest in the car owned by the defendant, Sylvia Kulchin." Petitioners assert that a direct conflict exists between the instant case and the following cases: Cormier v. Williams (1941), 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525; Erlichstein v. Roney (1944), 155 Fla. 333, 20 So.2d 254; Bridges v. Speer (Fla. 1955), 79 So.2d 679; Faircloth v. Hill (Fla. 1956), 85 So.2d 870; Klems' Inc. v. Cline (Fla. 1958), 105 So.2d 881; Farrey v. Bettendorf (Fla. 1957), 96 So.2d 889; Farrey v. Bettendorf (Fla.App. 1960), 123 So.2d 558; Nelson v. McMillan (Fla. 1942), 10 So.2d 565; Cadore v. Karp (Fla. 1957), 91 So.2d 806; Welch v. Moothart (Fla. 1956), 89 So.2d 485; Webster v. Kemp (Fla. 1964), 164 So.2d 814; Carraway v. Revell (Fla. 1959), 116 So.2d 16; Revell v. Carraway (Fla.App. 1960), 124 So.2d 874; Smart v. Masker (Fla.App. 1959), 113 So.2d 414; Mazak v. Rowe (Fla.App. 1959), 112 So.2d 57. Probable jurisdiction having been made to appear on the theory of "direct conflict," the cause was set down for oral argument on the question of jurisdiction and on the merits, and is now before this Court for decision in the light of such argument and the briefs of the parties.

Byers v. Gunn, Fla. 1955, 81 So.2d 723. Herring v. Eiland, Fla. 1955, 81 So.2d 645; see cases cited in notes 1, 2 and 4; Mazak v. Rowe, Fla.App. 1959, 112 So.2d 57. Appellee contends that the stricken defense is insufficient as a matter of law because of a variety of reasons.