Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-01206-HMH-JDA
05-22-2023
Marion Mays, Plaintiff, v. C. Dinkins, SIS; Warden Dunbar; Regional Director Sero, Regional Director; Ian Connors, Administrator; D.H.O. Williams, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Marion Mays (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (a “Bivens claim”), against the above-named Defendants. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary, Coleman I, Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida (“USP-1 Coleman”). [Id. at 2.]
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the pleadings filed in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint on the standard form (the “Complaint”). [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff attached to his Complaint approximately 165 pages of additional documents including the following: (1) copies of grievances and appeals from the BOP administrative remedy process [Docs. 1-2; 1-3; 1-4; 1-9]; (2) an incident report [Doc. 1-5]; (3) portions of various BOP Program Statements [Docs. 1-6; 1-7]; and (4) a list of the USP-1 Coleman department heads/supervisors and a copy of the Institution Admission and Orientation Handbook [Doc. 1-8]. The Court has carefully reviewed each of these submissions.
Plaintiff makes the following pertinent allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Although Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at USP-1 Coleman, the events giving rise to his claims appear to have occurred while he was incarcerated at the Williamsburg Federal Correctional Institution in Salters, South Carolina (“FCI Williamsburg”). [Id. at 27.]
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dinkins wrote a disciplinary report on December 12, 2021, after an incident occurred. [Id. at 4.] The disciplinary report alleged that Plaintiff was in possession of a prison-made weapon. [Id.] Plaintiff provides a summary of the facts detailed in the incident report. [ Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff alleges that a disciplinary hearing was held on February 3, 2022. [Id. at 5.] Again, Plaintiff provides a summary of the events from that hearing. [Id. at 5-6.] At that hearing, Plaintiff was convicted of the charge, and he appealed through the prison grievance process. [Id. at 6-13.]
As noted, Plaintiff has attached a copy of the incident report to his Complaint. [Doc. 1-5 at 1-3.]
Plaintiff now challenges the report, hearing, and conviction, claiming Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 15.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has suffered mental anguish, intentional infliction of emotional distress, “punitive damage,” anxiety, depression, stress, manic depression, nightmares, and headaches. [Id. at 25.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $200,000 for mental damages, $250,000 for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and $400,000 for punitive damages. [Id. at 25.] He also seeks to have his record expunged and for his sentence to be reduced. [Id.]
Plaintiff does not appear to seek habeas corpus relief. However, to the extent that his allegations and/or request for relief should be construed as seeking relief under a federal habeas corpus statute, any such action is not proper in this District as the Court would lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff's custodian, and the case would be subject to dismissal on that basis or should be transferred to the appropriate judicial district. It is well established that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). For example, “[a] motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence, such as parole matters, computation of sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, and prison transfers.” Manigault v. Lamanna, No. 8:06-cv-047-JFA-BHH, 2006 WL 1328780, at *1 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006). However, for a habeas petition challenging an inmate's present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies only in the district of confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Kanai v. McHugh, 638 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2011) (“When a petitioner is physically detained, the custodian generally is the warden of the facility where the petitioner is confined. A habeas petitioner who is physically confined must name this ‘immediate custodian' as the habeas respondent, and must file the habeas petition in the ‘district of confinement.' In that circumstance, the ‘district of confinement' necessarily is the location of both the habeas petitioner and the immediate custodian.” (citations omitted)). Here, although Petitioner seeks to have his disciplinary record expunged and asks that his sentence be reduced [Doc. 1 at 25], it does not appear that the disciplinary conviction resulted in the loss of any good conduct time or in any sanction resulting in a direct change in the length or duration of his overall confinement [see Doc. 1-5 at 6 (Petitioner's DHO Report noting that “Good Conduct Time could not be taken due to you serving a life sentence”)]. Nevertheless, if the District Court construes this action as one seeking habeas corpus relief, the action should be transferred to the appropriate district court having jurisdiction over Plaintiff's custodian at his present place of confinement, USP-1 Coleman, which is in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
APPLICABLE LAW
Review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
This action was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” “is frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the action if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the pleading must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the pleading's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”). Thus, although a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under Bivens
In Bivens, the Supreme Court established a direct cause of action under the Constitution of the United States against federal officials for the violation of federal constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 389. A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; federal officials cannot be sued under § 1983, however, because they do not act under color of state law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-20 (1982). Case law involving a § 1983 claim is applicable in a Bivens action and vice versa. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 511 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440, 443-44 (4th Cir. 1988). To establish a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and (2) the defendant did so under color of federal law. See Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 claim under color of state law); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (“In [a previous case], we reserved the question whether violation of [the Constitution] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct. Today we hold that it does.”).
DISCUSSION
The crux of this action is Plaintiff's challenge to the validity of his prison disciplinary conviction and sanctions. However, Bivens provides no avenue of relief for Plaintiff.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, an implied private cause of action for damages against FBI agents alleged to have violated a petitioner's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure when the agents handcuffed the petitioner in his own home without a warrant. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. After Bivens, the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens claim in only two additional contexts: (1) under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for gender discrimination when a Congressman fired his female administrative assistant, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and (2) under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause against prison officials for failing to treat an inmate's asthma, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
However, in the four decades since deciding Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, the Supreme Court “has ‘consistently rebuffed' every request - 12 of them now - to find implied causes of action against federal officials for money damages under the Constitution.” Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th 839, 843 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.Ct. 735, 743 (2020)); see also Egbert v. Boule, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 1803 (2022) (emphasizing that recognizing additional causes of action under Bivens is disfavored). Indeed, although the Supreme Court has not overruled Bivens, recently “it has handed down a trilogy of opinions not only expressing regret over its Bivens cases but also demonstrating hostility to any expansion of them.” Tate, 54 F.4th at 843. Thus, the Supreme Court has imposed a highly restrictive analysis for recognizing a new Bivens remedy by “(1) narrowing the precedential scope of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson and (2) imposing a broad standard of criteria that, if satisfied, require courts to reject any expansion of Bivens remedies.” Id. at 844.
The Supreme Court has framed the inquiry as a two-step process. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135-38 (2017). “First, a court must determine whether a claim falls within the causes of action authorized under the Supreme Court's three Bivens cases or whether it arises in a new context or involves a new category of defendants.” Tate, 54 F.4th at 844 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “If, following the first step, the court finds that a claim arises in a new context and thus is different from the three Bivens cases, it must proceed to the second step and ask whether there are any special factors that counsel hesitation about granting the extension of Bivens.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that, “[w]hile our cases describe two steps, those steps often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Egbert, 142 S.Ct. at 1803.
In applying the standard above, courts have repeatedly refused to recognize a Bivens remedy for a claim for money damages arising from a prison disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., Goree v. Serio, 735 Fed.Appx. 894, 895 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluding that claims premised on due process violations arising from administrative and disciplinary proceedings are not cognizable under Bivens and are properly dismissed at screening); Christy v. Sproul, No. 22-cv-02044-JPG, 2023 WL 2529851, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2023) (“[S]pecial factors counsel hesitation in expansion of a damages remedy into this context-namely, the availability of the BOP's administrative remedies process and habeas actions to address due process violations at prison disciplinary proceedings.”); Davis v. Chambers, No. 1:22-cv-02074, 2023 WL 2719460, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2023) (refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy for a plaintiff's due process claim arising from prison disciplinary conviction and sanctions); Gedeon v. Att'y Gen., No. 22-cv-3595, 2022 WL 7570749, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2022) (recognizing that “special factors did not warrant an extension of Bivens to the context of prison disciplinary proceedings”).
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief as he has failed to state a claim that is cognizable under Bivens. As such, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).