Opinion
Case No. 5:97-CV-236.
Dated: November 23, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR FOR REMITTITUR
Now before the Court is defendant's motion for a new trial, for judgment as a matter of law, or for remittitur, filed September 20, 1999. The Court held trial in this matter before a jury from August 31, 1999, to September 8, 1999. Following deliberations, the jury found defendant liable for intentional discrimination and retaliation, and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages in an amount of $200,000. Accordingly, the Court issued a judgment order in plaintiff's favor for the same sum on September 10, 1999. Defendant's motion followed. For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny defendant's motion in full.
The Court considers a motion for j.n.o.v. as a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
Following a seven-day trial, the jury found former Lansing Postmaster Anita Billingslea intentionally retaliated and discriminated against plaintiff. The jury further found a motivating factor in Billingslea's refusal to select plaintiff for a permanent supervisory position was in retaliation for complaints made by plaintiff to the EEOC and to Billingslea's immediate supervisor, Gregg Chanski. Significantly, Billingslea did not appear in person to testify at trial — an unanticipated absence that was first revealed to the Court and to the jury in defendant's opening statement. Consequently, both parties introduced portions of her deposition taken prior to trial. As part of his litigation strategy, defendant had elected not to ask questions of Billingslea at the time her deposition was taken by plaintiff. Thus, at trial defendant had little choice but to present testimony by Billingslea elicited by plaintiff's questions.
In its verdict, the jury concluded defendant failed to provide plaintiff with other temporary supervisory positions and training both on account of his race and in retaliation for having engaged in protected activities, i.e., plaintiff's aforementioned EEO complaints. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a verdict form that allowed the jury to award damages without specifying the elements of compensation comprising the award. After having found for the plaintiff on some but not all of his allegations, the jury awarded him $200,000.
II
The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law requires that sufficient evidence for submission to the jury will be found "unless, when viewed in the light of those inferences most favorable to the non-movant, there is either a complete absence of proof on the issues or no controverted issue of fact upon which a reasonable person could differ." Monette v. AM-7-7 Baking Co., 929 F.2d 276, 280 (6th Cir. 1991).
An only slightly less strict standard is employed by the Court when ruling upon a motion for a new trial. The Court must compare the opposing proofs, weigh the evidence and set aside the verdict only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. The Court will deny the motion if the verdict could have reasonably been reached, and the verdict should not be considered unreasonable simply because different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or because other results are more reasonable. See J.C. Wyckoff Assocs., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1487 (6th Cir. 1991).
After analyzing the record under each of the above standards, the Court finds defendant's arguments fail to establish either a complete absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict or that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. Thus, the Court will deny defendant both judgment as a matter of law and a new trial.
A.
Defendant moves for a new trial, or alternatively for judgment as a matter of law, based on the jury's findings of (1) retaliation regarding plaintiff's claims of non-promotion; and (2) race discrimination for the failure to grant plaintiff work details and training.
The Court commences its analysis with plaintiff's claim of retaliation. Defendant contends plaintiff presented no evidence to establish a causal connection between plaintiff's complaint and the jury's finding of retaliation. First, defendant maintains Chanski's testimony, in which he denies ever having received a complaint from plaintiff, supports the argument that "no evidence was adduced to support a finding that Mayes was denied training or details because of retaliation or his race." Second, defendant submits no causal nexus existed between plaintiff's complaints and Billingslea's employment decisions. Defendant argues plaintiff failed to present evidence that either plaintiff's complaint to Billinglea's immediate supervisor, Gregg Chanski, or plaintiff's EEOC complaints were made known to Billingslea prior to her employment decisions regarding plaintiff.
Plaintiff responds that whether Chanski is "adamant" that plaintiff made no such complaint to him is immaterial; it was the jury's prerogative to conclude on the basis of plaintiff's testimony that the conversation occurred. Moreover, plaintiff highlights exhibit 36, an EEO report dated August 6, 1997, that summarizes an interview of Billingslea. This EEO report was made after plaintiff's alleged complaint to Chanski and prior to plaintiff's non-selection, and presents Billingslea's stated reasons for terminating plaintiff's temporary supervisory position. Plaintiff contends this interview made Billingslea aware of his complaints concerning her employment decisions. Moreover, plaintiff argues the jury could have inferred from the on-going EEO investigation that plaintiff's complaints were within Billingslea's knowledge at the time of plaintiff's non-selection.
Analyzing the verdict in light of the record, the Court cannot conclude that the jury's findings were either unreasonable or against the clear weight of the evidence. Although defendant places great weight upon the testimony of Chanski, the jury was entitled to find plaintiff's testimony to be the more credible.
Moreover, the jury's conclusion that Billingslea was aware of plaintiff's complaints is not unsupported by the record given exhibit 36, the EEO report of the Billingslea interview. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could reasonably have inferred a causal nexus between Billingslea's knowledge of plaintiff's complaints and her allegedly retaliatory action (not selecting plaintiff for the permanent supervisory position).
Indeed, in a portion of the Billingslea deposition introduced by defendant, Billinglea admits to have had a conversation with Chanski concerning plaintiff after plaintiff first pursued his suspicion that he had been wrongfully terminated from his temporary supervisory position. (Billingslea Dep. at 41). Although the jury did not find that plaintiff was wrongfully removed from his temporary position, Billingslea's testimony constitutes direct evidence of Billingslea's knowledge of plaintiff's complaints. When viewed most favorably to plaintiff, this evidence is independently sufficient to create an inference of a causal relationship between plaintiff's complaints and Billingslea's nonselection of plaintiff for the permanent supervisory position for which he applied. Thus, the jury's verdict finds reasonable support in the record, precluding both judgment as a matter of law and a new trial.
B.
The Court next turns to examine whether defendant's failure to provide plaintiff with other supervisory positions and training opportunities was in part motivated by racial animus.
Defendant contends the only inference of racial discrimination that plaintiff adduced (other than the fact that plaintiff and Billingslea belong to different races), arose from exhibit 25, a letter to local television station WILX-TV written by Billingslea. Defendant further contends Billingslea made no decisions regarding plaintiff during the time period in question. To the contrary, defendant maintains plaintiff's participation in an associate training program that began on February 23, 1998, establishes that plaintiff received the very training he claims to have been denied.
In addition to exhibit 25, plaintiff relies upon his testimony that he had not been given training or further temporary assignments until February of 1998. Plaintiff further argues that exhibit 7, a request for consideration for temporary details allegedly ignored by Billingslea, proves the animus he alleges. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff's testimony and Billingslea's failure to respond to plaintiff's request for consideration creates an inference of discrimination. Standing alone, Billingslea's letter detailing her belief that certain postal union employees were racist and discriminated against her may be insufficient to create an inference that defendant discriminated against plaintiff. (Plf. Ex. 25). However, between August 13, 1997, and February 23, 1998, plaintiff was not provided with temporary supervisory positions or training opportunities, positions that he had frequently held since 1992. Thus, plaintiff submits the failure to place plaintiff in temporary supervisory positions — the very absence of action that defendant claims exonerates Billingslea — constituted discrimination. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the failure to grant plaintiff training, coupled with both Billingslea's failure to respond to plaintiff's requests for temporary positions and Billingslea's letter in exhibit 25, raised an inference of racial animus. In the absence of Billingslea's live testimony, the jury was not presented with specific refutation of the inference of discrimination raised by plaintiff. Hence, defendant cannot adduce sufficient evidence to surmount the high thresholds of proof necessary for either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
III
Arguing in the alternative, defendant moves the Court to remit the jury's award as clearly excessive. When evaluating a motion for remittitur, the Court employs a similar standard to that for granting a new trial:
A trial court is within its discretion in reducing a verdict only when, after reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the awardee, it is convinced that the verdict is clearly excessive, resulted form passion, bias, or prejudice; or is so excessive, or inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court. If there is any credible evidence to support a verdict, it should not be set aside.
Farber v. Massillon Board of Education, 917 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
Defendant does not dispute the award attributable to plaintiff's claim for back pay (approximately $11,000). However, defendant maintains the remaining $190,000 of the jury's award constitutes windfall. According to defendant's reasoning, either the jury awarded some $90,000 in front pay and another $100,000 in compensatory damages, or it awarded $190,000 in compensatory damages alone. Defendant argues front pay is improper as a matter of law, and alternatively submits that if the jury awarded plaintiff $190,000 in compensatory damages, such an award is clearly excessive.
In response, plaintiff argues the verdict form stipulated to by the parties did not require the jury to distinguish the elements comprising the total sum. Thus, plaintiff asserts any ambiguity is of the defendant's own making. Secondly, plaintiff contends the instruction on "future pecuniary losses" subsumes the concept of "front pay" and is both legally permissible and supported by the record.
A.
The Court finds plaintiff's arguments to be persuasive. Significantly, the parties agreed to a verdict form in which undifferentiated "lump-sum" damages were to be awarded, if at all. Defendant now complains of the result, occasioned by his acquiescence to a verdict form that permitted the jury to simplify its reasoning. The Court is not sympathetic to defendant's present dissatisfaction with the outcome of its chosen trial strategy: having consented ex ante to the form of the damage award, the Court considers defendant's ex post complaints to be little more than sour grapes.
In addition, the Court concludes the jury's award finds support in the record. Initially, the Court must determine whether the instruction given at trial on future pecuniary loss permits an award of "front pay." If so, the Court must then assess whether the jury's award was clearly excessive in light of the record. "Front pay" is defined as those earnings an employee would have received had he or she not suffered unlawful discrimination, subject to the employee's mitigation of his or her damages. See Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1994). Thus plaintiff correctly notes that "front pay", by both its definition and purpose in the law, is a "future pecuniary loss,, because it is a monetary award for the salary that the employee would have received but for the discrimination. Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1997). Prior to deliberations, the Court instructed the jury that it might "award compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience and mental. anguish. . . . Given the holding in Hudson equating "front pay" and "future pecuniary losses" in Title VII jurisprudence, the jury was permitted to award "front pay" as part of its damages award.
B.
The Court next considers whether the jury's award, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, was clearly excessive. The Court finds that although the jury's award was not a mathematical exercise, it finds support in plaintiff's claims of lost pension benefits, lost earnings, and mental anguish. Hence, the Court will decline to order remittitur.
The jury found that between the Spring of 1997 and February 1998 plaintiff was denied temporary details and training opportunities. Plaintiff testified that this denial of experience might reduce the maximum pay level he might attain from 20 to 18 by the time of his anticipated retirement in 2013. Plaintiff further testified that the projection of the roughly 2% annual increases in pay indicated for years 1996-1998 to the year 2013 for pay levels 18 and 20, respectively, would be $62,878 and $69,432. (Pl. Ex. 30). Plaintiff concludes the reduced annual pension benefit, equal to approximately 60% of the difference between these figures, totals some $31,000 when spread over plaintiff's life expectancy.
Coupled with the evidence on pension benefits, plaintiff offered the differential between pay levels in wages. In 1999, the difference in salary between pay level 18 and pay level 20 is some $5,726, representing a 10.4% difference. This difference, taken over a ten year period commencing in 2003, would represent a total loss in future income of $57,620.
Defendant contends no evidence was introduced to demonstrate that plaintiff would not receive future promotions, and ultimately reach the same pay level he might have received had he been selected for the permanent supervisor position. However, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury was entitled to credit plaintiff's testimony and interpretation of exhibit 30 to conclude from his non-selection and denial of training that his advancement within the postal service would be irreparably impaired.
C.
The last issue for the Court's determination is whether any amount of the jury's award attributable to compensatory damages for plaintiff's emotional distress is clearly excessive. Again, because defendant agreed to a verdict form that precludes the Court from discerning how the jury arrived at the total damage figure or what portion of the award was attributable to emotional distress, the Court deeply discounts defendant's present complaint. Nevertheless, the Court turns to address the merits of defendant's position.
In the Sixth Circuit, proof of emotional damages need only be established by "competent evidence." Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996) Both plaintiff and plaintiff's wife testified to the emotional distress plaintiff suffered as a result of his discrimination and defendant's retaliation. Plaintiff testified to sleeplessness, humiliation, and a negative impact upon his personal life. Although defendant questions the real impact of testimony, he presented no evidence at trial to refute plaintiff's proofs. Accordingly, the Court finds the testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, was competent to support the verdict.
IV
In conclusion, the Court finds the record not only provides sufficient evidence for a finding in plaintiff's favor, but also that the verdict was reasonably supported by the testimony and exhibits offered by plaintiff. Although there was testimony offered by defendant that directly conflicted with that presented in plaintiff's case-in-chief, the jury was entitled to believe plaintiff's proofs. Hence, defendant cannot surmount the high threshold necessary for judgment as a matter of law. Similarly, defendant has not demonstrated that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, and is thus not entitled to a new trial. Lastly, having agreed to verdict form that permitted a lump-sum damage award, defendant is poorly position to argue the composition of the award is contrary to law. Moreover, even were defendant's argument to be well taken, the Court finds that competent evidence — both testimony and exhibits — supports the jury's award. Now, for the reasons set for forth above; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for new trial, for judgment as a matter of law or for remittitur is DENIED IN FULL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S FEES
Now before the Court is plaintiff's motion for allowance of costs and attorney's fees filed September 22, 1999. Defendant failed to file with the Court any response to the instant motion.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs.
I
Plaintiff prevailed at a trial held before a jury in this matter from August 31, 1999, through September 8, 1999. While the jury did not find defendant liable on all counts of discrimination alleged by plaintiff, the jury did find defendant liable both for intentional retaliation and discrimination, and awarded plaintiff $200,000 in compensatory damages. The Court subsequently denied defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial, judgment as a matter of law or for remittitur.
II
In Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth Circuit set forth the analysis governing the award of attorney's fees. Rejecting the contention that a prevailing party should not receive a fee award for issues on which it did not prevail, in Northcross the Sixth Circuit adopted a two step procedure for district courts to evaluate the award of fees. First, this Court determines which party has prevailed by examining the claims on which each party was successful or unsuccessful. Second, if after taking into account the extent to which a party failed, that party can still be characterized as the prevailing party, the prevailing party's attorney should receive a fee for all the time reasonably spent on the entire case. Id. at 636; see also Vaughn v. Trotter, 516 F. Supp. 902, 904 (M.D.Tenn. 1981); Brady v. Washington County, 509 F. Supp. 538, 542-43 (E.D.Tenn. 1979). Although plaintiff did not prevail on his claim of age discrimination or on all aspects of his claim of racial discrimination, the jury did hold defendant liable for both retaliation and race discrimination. Moreover, the jury found the harm to plaintiff to be significant, and awarded him $200,000 in damages. Taking plaintiff's failure on his age discrimination claim and his partial failure on his race discrimination claim into account, he nevertheless qualifies as the prevailing party. Hence, the Court finds the award of fees to be appropriate.
Plaintiff's counsel submits he worked 487.5 hours on this matter, and requests the Court employ the "lodestar" method to calculate the fee award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). Under the lodestar method, the Court multiplies the number of hours worked by a reasonable attorney's fee to arrive at the total fee award. Plaintiff's counsel further submits $160 represents the reasonable hourly wage for his services. In support, plaintiff offers an affidavit of a local attorney who attests that he has routinely charged between $150 and $175 per hour in similar matters. The Court agrees that $160 per hour represents a reasonable hourly wage for plaintiff's services. Under the lodestar method, plaintiff's counsel is entitled to an award of $78,000.
After having made the initial valuation, the Court proceeds to evaluate the award in light of twelve factors set forth in Hamlin v. Charter Tp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 237 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). While the panel did not expressly adopt the Johnson factors for the Sixth Circuit, it identified them as useful criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of a fee award. Accordingly, the Court employs the following factors as a guide to its analysis:
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the `undesirability' of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 437 (citation omitted). Hamlin also makes clear that these factors are not all-inclusive or exclusive, as the initial valuation analysis often subsumes some or all of the factors. Id. Reviewing the record in light of Johnson factors, the Court concludes the fee award of $78,000 is reasonable. Plaintiff's counsel is an experienced attorney who possesses the highest accreditation conferred by Martindale-Hubbell. He represents by affidavit that $160 is his standard hourly fee, which he believes to be at the low end of the range charged by attorneys in the greater Lansing, Michigan area with similar experience. Although the case did not raise novel issues, it took six days to try before the jury, and involved considerable representation in administrative proceedings. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff's counsel's fees are reasonable in light of the Johnson factors.
III
Lastly, plaintiff's counsel submits $7,496.41 in itemized costs. Having found these costs to be reasonable, they are included along with the award of attorney's fees. Now, therefore, for the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for allowance of costs and attorney's fees is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's counsel is awarded $85,496.41 in costs and fees.