Opinion
Civil Action 01-0030, Section "T"(5).
April 16, 2002.
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the plaintiff, Nancy Mayer. The parties waived oral argument and the matter was submitted for the Court's consideration on the briefs alone, March 13,2002. The Court, having studied the legal memoranda submitted by both parties, the evidence presented, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
Plaintiff, Nancy Mayer, filed this action asserting claims for sex discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and failure to pay overtime work, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), La.R.S. § 23:967 (West); 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. of the amended Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); and, La. R.S. 23:631,23:632, against the defendant, Southeast Battery, a subsidiary of Advantage Battery (hereinafter, "Southeast Battery").
For purposes of this motion the relevant background facts are as follows, plaintiff worked as an "office coordinator" for the defendant, Southeast Battery, from November 1997 to December 1998. As part of her job, plaintiff submits that she was responsible for opening the offices and warehouse each morning. However, plaintiff admits that a majority of the time, the office and warehouse would already have been open upon her arrival at work by a supervisor. Ms. Mayer contends that she started work each morning at 7:00 a.m., typically would not take a lunch breach, and would leave work between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. As such, she worked a minimum of 45 hours, and sometimes 46-50 hours in a week. She further contends that her supervisors knew that she worked said overtime and promised that she would be paid for the additional work; however, plaintiff was never compensated for her overtime. Plaintiff has filed the present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES:
A. Arguments of the Plaintiff in Support of the Motion:
Plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment rendered in her favor finding that the defendant wilfully violated the FLSA and failed to satisfy the three (3) day payment requirement for discharged employees in violation of La. R.S. 23:631 and 23:632. It is submitted that Ms. Mayer's supervisors saw her arrive to work at 7:00 a.m. each day, work through her lunch break, and leave between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. each evening, as such, defendant knew plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per week. Plaintiff contends that she consistently requested that she be paid for her overtime worked and that her supervisors never denied that said payment was owed but instead promised that she would be paid at a later time, once the business "got on its feet." Therefore, plaintiff contends that these facts evidence a willful violation of the FLSA on defendant's part which further entitles plaintiff to a penalty in an equal amount plus attorney's fees and costs.
Plaintiff estimates that she worked between 260-520 hours of uncompensated overtime and therefore averages it to 390 hours. The plaintiff was paid $7.50/hour from November 10, 1997 to September 1, 1998. From the time period between September 1, 1998 and December 31, 1998, plaintiff was paid $10.11/hour. As such, plaintiff calculates the total overtime amount owed as $4,798.58. Additionally, because the failure to pay was willful, an equal amount is owed bring the total to $9,597.16.
Plaintiff multiplied 38 weeks x 285 hours x $11.25 (which represents $7.50/hour x 1.5), which equaled $3,206.25. Plaintiff then multiplied 14 weeks x 105 hours x $15.17 (which represents $10.11 x 1.5), which totaled $1,592.33. Plaintiff added these two sums for the grand total amount of $4,798.58.
The plaintiff further contends that defendant violated Louisiana's wage payment law by failing to pay Mayer all wages due within three (3) days of her discharge. As such, Southeast Battery is liable for penalties in the amount of ninety (90) days pay and attorney's fees. Plaintiff has calculated said penalty as $5,090.00 plus attorney's fees.
Accordingly, plaintiff argues that there are no material facts in dispute and that she is entitled to partial summary judgment in the amount of $14,686.00 plus attorney's fees.
B. Arguments of the Defendant in Opposition to the Motion:
Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to meet the standard for granting a summary judgment motion, as plaintiff has only submitted to the Court her own affidavit which contains estimates of the time spent working overtime. However, plaintiff's deposition, which is not submitted in support of plaintiff's motion, provides contradictory facts. In her deposition, Mayer testified that she was not given the keys and alarm code until new management took over in late August 1998, some ten (10) months into her employment. She further stated that Mr. Gomez, the manager up until August 1998, always arrived before she did. During his tenure, she stated that she usually worked until "4:00,4:30 sometimes." She further stated that he was the only manager to tell her that she would be paid for her overtime when the business got on its feet, and then only with respect to a paycheck discrepancy of five hours that plaintiff brought to his attention during the first weeks of her employment in 1997.
At a minimum, plaintiff's estimates on the amount of uncompensated overtime worked is sufficient to preclude the granting of the present motion for partial summaryjudgment. Moreover, plaintiff has not averred whether she actually began work at 7:00 a.m. or merely arrived at that time, she has not asserted that she was required to work through lunch or after 4:00 p.m. Additionally, in plaintiff's affidavit she provides that Messrs. Battenfield, Denzin, and Lopez, knew of her overtime work; however there is no reference to the time period before September 1998, leaving almost 10 months of her 14 month tenure with the company uncovered.
With respect to the Louisiana wage claim, defendant submits that jurisprudence has interpreted said law to apply only to ordinary wages and not overtime.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Motion for Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that sumrnaryjudgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P.56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco. Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-5 6 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins. Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323(1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corn., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex. Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. Law on Willful Violations of the Fair Labor Standard Act:
The standard for a willful FLSA violation is satisfied when the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard as to whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). A willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act must be unreasonable and reckless. Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico. 938 F.2d 1510, 1514 (1st Cir. 1991). Willful is synonymous with voluntary, deliberate, and intentional for the purposes of the three year statute of limitations for willful violations of the Equal Pay Act. Salmons v. Dollar General Corp., 989 F. Supp. 730 (D.Md. 1996) affirmed, 133 F.3d 916 (4th Cir. 1998).
C. Louisiana Wage Payment Law:
La. R.S. 23:631(1)(a) provides that upon the discharge of any employee, it shall be the duty of the employer to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the employment is by the hour, day, week, or month, not later than three (3) days following the date of discharge. An employer who refuses or fails to comply with said provision is liable for either ninety (90) days wages at the daily rate of pay or for the full wages from the time the employee's demand is made until tendered whichever is less, together with reasonable attorney's fees. La. R.S. 23:632.
D. The Court's Analysis:
It is the opinion of this Court that there are genuine issues of material fact which exist regarding what amount of hours of overtime may have been worked by Ms. Mayer, during what time periods, and who may have known that Ms. Mayer was working overtime. This Court does not believe, that based upon the evidence provided at this time, it is in a position to find a willful violation of the FLSA and/or violatiorrof Louisiana wage payment law and provide an accurate assessment of any amounts that may be owed plaintiff. These issues are best resolved by the trier of fact after all testimony has been heard and all evidence presented.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed on behalf of the plaintiff, Nancy Mayer, be and the same is hereb DENIED.