Opinion
MMXCV156013040S
10-27-2017
Arlene J. Maye v. Mika R. Maye
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Matthew E. Frechette, J.
On December 29, 2008, the plaintiff, Arlene J. Maye, signed a quitclaim deed transferring ownership of her house to the defendant, Mika R. Maye. The house is located at 220 Essex Road in Old Saybrook, Connecticut, and the defendant is one of the plaintiff's four children. Def.'s Ex. C. The plaintiff retained a life use of said property, and the deed was acknowledged as her free act and deed before Attorney Christina P. Burnham (Burnham). As stipulated to by the parties, the remaining counts of the amended complaint seeking to set aside this conveyance sound in undue influence (Count Four), fraud (Count Five) and unjust enrichment (Count Seven).
As of the date of the amended complaint, the plaintiff is alleged to be " suffering from severe dementia, and is unable to transact business for herself." Am. Compl., ¶ 4. The plaintiff has further alleged that " prior to the onset of her disability, " the plaintiff expressed her wishes to bring this lawsuit through her attorney-in-fact, her daughter, Cindy L. Wallace (Wallace). Am. Compl., ¶ 5. This appointment by the plaintiff of her daughter as her attorney-in-fact on October 4, 2011; Def.'s Ex. D.; necessarily implies that the plaintiff was of sound mind as of that date. The plaintiff alleges in paragraph nine of her amended complaint that " she did not understand that the Deed she was signing conveyed [the] real estate to Mika R. Maye alone but instead conveyed the property to all four of her children in equal shares." Paragraph thirty-eight of Count Four of the amended complaint (undue influence) alleges that " [t]he defendant unjustly and unduly influenced the plaintiff to convey the . . . real property to him." Paragraph forty of Count Five of the complaint (fraud) alleges that " [t]he defendant wrongfully induced the plaintiff to sign the Deed conveying [the] real property to him by means of false representations . . ." Paragraph forty-five of Count Seven (unjust enrichment) alleges that " [b]y receiving a benefit from the plaintiff for no consideration, and under circumstances which were not consistent with the plaintiff's understanding or intent, the defendant has been unjustly enriched."
From the evidence produced at trial, in reaching its conclusions, the court has fairly and impartially considered all the evidence presented, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, assessed the weight, if any, to be given to specific evidence, measured the probative force of conflicting evidence, applied relevant statutory criteria and relevant case law, and has drawn such inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems reasonable and logical. Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not sustained her burden of proving any of the remaining counts.
Count Four (Undue Influence)
As stated by the Court in Reynolds v. Molitor, 184 Conn. 526, 528-29, 440 A.2d 192 (1981): " In order to execute a valid deed of real property, a grantor must intend to execute the deed . . . A grantor who has been unduly influenced does not have the requisite intent . . . Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought into question, to destroy [her] free agency and constrain [her] to do what [she] would not have done if such control had not been exercised . . . Relevant circumstances include the grantor's health and its effect upon [her] mental and physical functions, [her] dependence upon the person alleged to have influenced [her], and the opportunity to exert influence available to that person." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) " 'Undue influence' in the execution of a deed is defined as overpersuasion, coercion, force, or deception that deprives an individual of his or her free agency. The undue influence must be of sufficient force to destroy the free agency of the grantor and to constrain the grantor to do, against his or her [free] will, that which the grantor would otherwise have refused to do . . . Undue influence constitutes an equitable ground for the cancellation of a deed . . . For a finding of undue influence with respect to a deed transfer, four elements are required: (1) a person who is subject to influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; (3) a disposition to exert undue influence; and (4) a result indicating undue influence . . . [A] mere suspicion that the execution of a deed was obtained through improper means is not sufficient to establish undue influence. The fact that the grantor, in executing a conveyance, was actuated by the motives of affection, esteem, and gratitude for favors shown does not make out a case [for] undue influence. The question of undue influence is one of fact." (Footnotes omitted.) 23 Am.Jur.2d, Deeds § 177 (2013). See also Tyler v. Tyler, 151 Conn.App. 98, 105-06, 93 A.3d 1179 (2014).
Count Five (Fraud)
" Under the common law . . . it is well settled that the essential elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his. injury." Ferris v. Faford, 93 Conn.App. 679, 692, 890 A.2d 602 (2006). " All of these ingredients must be found to exist . . . Additionally, [t]he party asserting such a cause of action must prove the existence of the first three of [the] elements by a standard higher than the usual fair preponderance of the evidence, which . . . we have described as clear and satisfactory or clear, precise and unequivocal." Harlod Cohn & Co. v. Harco International, LLC, 72 Conn.App. 43, 51, 804 A.2d 218 (2002). The plaintiff claims in paragraph forty of her fraud count that the defendant made the following false representations: " (a) that the Deed would convey the property to all four of the plaintiff's children in equal shares; (b) that he had discussed the planned conveyance with his siblings and obtained their approval; and (c) that he was acting as trustee for his siblings."
Count Seven (Unjust Enrichment)
" A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another . . . Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were [benefitted], (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment . . . [T]he determinations of whether a particular failure to pay was unjust and whether the defendant was [benefitted] are essentially factual findings for the trial court that are subject only to a limited scope of review on appeal." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford Whalers Hockey Club v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Conn. 276, 282-83, 649 A.2d 518 (1994).
Findings of Fact
The plaintiff has presented no credible evidence in support of her claims of undue influence, fraud, or unjust enrichment. The evidence submitted to the court was clear that the plaintiff, at the time of the transfer, intended for the defendant to own the property and for herself to retain a life estate.
The most significant witness to testify was Attorney Burnham. Burnham's testimony was unambiguous, clear, and credible. Burnham testified that the plaintiff initially consulted her concerning a zoning issue, but later consulted her concerning the planning of her estate. Burnham had previously drafted the plaintiff's will in 2005, and was again consulted by the plaintiff in 2008 concerning Title 19 issues and the transfer of the subject property. Burnham met with the plaintiff two or three times and discussed, inter alia, her family situation, the number of her children, the outline of her assets, the Title 19 look-back provisions, and the meaning of the transfer of her property and her retention of a life estate. Burnham described the plaintiff's demeanor as calm and normal, and noticed nothing unusual about her behavior. She was described as being aware and not at all confused. Burnham confirmed with the plaintiff that she wanted to transfer the property to the defendant and that she wanted to retain a life estate. She clearly explained to the plaintiff what a life estate was, and that the plaintiff would no longer own the property. This was done outside of the presence of the defendant and with no one else in the room other than Burnham and the witness to the deed. Burnham testified that she would not allow the plaintiff to sign the deed unless she was convinced she knew what she was doing, and that it was truly her free act and deed. Burnham was and is an experienced attorney and knew the plaintiff as she had represented her in the past. Her testimony concerning the transfer, and the plaintiff's lucid state of mind at the time of the transfer, was entirely credible.
The testimony of the defendant, the plaintiff's son, dovetailed with that of Burnham, and was similarly credible. The defendant testified that in 2004 he, his wife, and his children moved into his mother's home at her invitation. The defendant further testified that between 2004 and 2008 his mother had an excellent relationship with his children. He also testified that he became power of attorney for his mother in 2005, although he never used it. In 2008, the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff remained excellent. The plaintiff in 2008 remained very independent, traveled with her husband, and repeatedly stated that she wanted to transfer the property to the plaintiff. At this time the plaintiff was not reliant on anyone, drove herself (including from Connecticut to New Hampshire), ran errands, and needed no care from anyone. At no time did the defendant ever request that the plaintiff transfer the property. Rather it was the plaintiff who volunteered that it was her desire to do so. Indeed, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the defendant pressured or pursued his mother to transfer the property, nor did he make any kind of threats or attempt to force his mother to transfer the property. While the plaintiff's health was not perfect in 2008, the evidence is clear that she was taking care of herself, and was of sound mind and body. The defendant sat in the waiting room while Burnham spoke with his mother on the day she signed the deed, and it is clear to the court that the transfer was the plaintiff's free act and deed.
The testimony of Susan Wood, the defendant's former wife was also credible and telling. She testified that she too had an excellent relationship with the plaintiff. She confirmed that in 2004, the plaintiff began approaching the defendant about transferring the property to him.
Cindy L. Wallace, the plaintiff's daughter, became power of attorney over the plaintiff in 2011. Def.'s Ex. D. She confirmed that in 2008, the plaintiff knew where she was living, knew who her children were, and drove to visit her in New Hampshire. While the plaintiff did have some memory problems in 2008, Wallace confirmed that after something was explained to her, the plaintiff understood what was being said to her. The fact that the plaintiff expressed some confusion regarding the financial complexity and/or benefits of an annuity involving Ameriprise certainly does not show that the plaintiff was not capable of making informed decisions for herself. At the request of the plaintiff, the court has admitted the medical records offered by the plaintiff. A review of them, even in conjunction with all of the testimony, does not change the fact that the plaintiff was perfectly capable of making her own informed decisions in 2008. Indeed, Wallace admitted that she cannot comment on the condition of the plaintiff's mental health on the date she transferred the property. She has no doubt that it is the plaintiff's signature on the deed, and that it appears to her to be a valid deed. Indeed, both Wallace and Attorney Walter Twachtman confirmed that the plaintiff was of sound mind and able to make decisions for herself in 2011, when Wallace was named by the plaintiff as power of attorney, and in 2012, when Attorney Twachtman began to represent the plaintiff.
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff has failed to prove any of the elements of undue influence. First, the plaintiff was not subject to influence. Indeed, the evidence shows that at the time of the transfer in December 2008, the plaintiff was of sound mind and body, independent, and fully able to make decisions for herself. At the time of the transfer, the plaintiff was represented by competent counsel who unequivocally and credibly testified that the plaintiff was fully lucid at the time of the transfer, and that the transfer was her free act and deed. Additionally, there is no evidence that there was any attempt by the defendant to request, let alone coerce or force, the plaintiff into transferring the property to him such that it " [destroyed the plaintiff's] free agency." Reynolds v. Molitor, supra, 184 Conn. 528. The mere fact that the defendant was the recipient of a gift is not sufficient to show that the defendant exercised undue influence. Moreover, transferring a piece of property to a child is an entirely reasonable and rational act for which there are many legitimate motivations.
As to fraud, the plaintiff has presented no credible testimony that the plaintiff ever made a false statement of fact to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff relied on any false statement by the defendant. The plaintiff had the burden of proof on this issue, and failed to carry it. The plaintiff simply presented no credible evidence in support of her allegations of fraud.
Finally, having failed to prove her allegations of undue influence and fraud, the plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment also fails. As stated above, the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable in nature. There is nothing unjust about the plaintiff doing exactly as she did: transferring her property to her son and retaining a life estate. The credible evidence was that this was her intention in 2008 when she transferred the property and that this is exactly what she did.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment may enter in favor of the defendant on all of the remaining counts: Counts Four, Five and Seven.