The requirement that a plea of guilty must be intelligently and voluntarily given to be valid has long been recognized by this court. ( Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 192 P.2d 147; McCall v. State, 196 Kan. 411, 411 P.2d 647; Young v. State, 206 Kan. 318, 478 P.2d 194; McCarther v. State, 211 Kan. 152, 505 P.2d 773.) In prior cases, this court has consistently examined the record to ascertain whether pleas were involuntary. ( Jones v. Amrine, 154 Kan. 630, 121 P.2d 263; White v. Crouse, 193 Kan. 674, 396 P.2d 333, cert. den. 381 P.S. 954, 14 L.Ed.2d 727, 85 S.Ct. 1814; Stewart v. State, 206 Kan. 147, 476 P.2d 652; Weathers v. State, 208 Kan. 653, 493 P.2d 270; Rhone v. State, 211 Kan. 206, 505 P.2d 673; Ames v. State, 212 Kan. 409, 511 P.2d 219; Mayberry v. State, 213 Kan. 199, 515 P.2d 819.) A plea of guilty is not rendered involuntary by reason that it was induced by a promise not to invoke the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act. ( Stiles v. State, 201 Kan. 387, 440 P.2d 592; Weigel v. State, 207 Kan. 614, 485 P.2d 1347; State v. Williams, 208 Kan. 480, 493 P.2d 258; Rice v. State, 213 Kan. 591, 518 P.2d 400.) The record conclusively shows the petitioner's plea of guilty was a voluntary and intelligent choice from the alternative courses of action open to him.
We have no jurisdiction on that part of this appeal pertaining to the conviction on the nolo contendere plea. (See Mayberry v. State, 213 Kan. 199, 515 P.2d 819.) Accordingly, that part of the appeal is dismissed.