Opinion
No. C3-97-633.
Filed October 14, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, Crow Wing County, File No. C996626.
Stephen D. Gabrielson, Robert W. Holmen, (for appellant).
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, P. Kenneth Kohnstamm, Assistant Attorney General, (for respondent).
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Cheryl Maxwell was an employee of Brainerd Public School District (the school district). She worked in Building 4 of the Brainerd Regional Health Service Center, a state agency (the state). The state leased Building 4 to the school district. As a part of the lease, the state assigned two janitors to maintain the building. Their duties included snow and ice removal. On the morning of January 14, 1991, Maxwell slipped and twisted her knee as she went up the steps to the building entrance. Maxwell believed that she slipped because her left foot hit a chunk of ice that was hidden by snow on the steps. The janitors had not shoveled or sanded the sidewalk or the steps to the building when Maxwell arrived. There had been freezing rain and light snow during the night of January 13-14, 1991. Maxwell stated that it was still snowing when she arrived at work. Maxwell filed a formal report of the accident on April 18, 1995.
The district court granted summary judgment for the state on two grounds: (1) the "mere slipperiness" rule barred the claim against the state; and (2) no duty on the state existed at the time of the injury. Appellant challenges summary judgment, arguing that a private landlord has a duty to remove accumulations of ice and snow, that the state should be held to the same duty as a private landlord, that common law immunity does not apply to cases against the state based on maintenance of steps abutting a state building, and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the condition of the steps constituted a "rough and slippery" surface. The state argues that the district court properly granted summary judgment, but that it erred in denying the state's motion to dismiss because it was prejudiced by appellant's four-year delay in bringing suit.
DECISION
On appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law.
State by Cooper v. French , 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990); See Admiral Merchants v. O'Connor Hannan , 494 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Minn. 1992). The reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo , 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).
Appellant contends that the state breached its duty to maintain the steps leading up to Building 4 when the state's janitors failed to remove or make safe icy conditions present on the steps at the time appellant slipped and twisted her knee. We disagree.
Assuming a scenario most favorable to appellant in this case, i.e., that the state had the same duty as a private property owner to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of its steps, that duty was as follows:
Absent extraordinary circumstances, * * * it is the general rule that a business establishment or other inviter may, without violating its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of business guests or invitees, await the end of the freezing rain or sleetstorm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from its outside entrance walks, platform, or steps. * * * Reasonable care only requires a landowner or possessor to remove ice and snow, or take other appropriate corrective action, within a reasonable time after the storm has abated.
Mattson v. St. Luke's Hosp. of St. Paul , 252 Minn. 230, 233, 89 N.W.2d 743, 745 (1958); Hedglin v. Church of St. Paul of Sauk Centre , 280 Minn. 119, 158 N.W.2d 269 (1968). The only evidence concerning the weather was appellant's own statement that there was a "[v]ery, very light snow" at the time of her accident. As the snow storm was still in progress at the time of the accident, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the state.
It is not necessary, and we choose not to determine whether the "mere slipperiness" rule applies or whether the state was prejudiced by appellant's failure to file notice of her claim as required by statute.