Opinion
C. A. 3:23-5037-CMC-PJG
02-21-2024
Lakenyata Maxwell, in her individual capacity and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Thomas, Jr., deceased, and Michael Thomas, Jr., in his individual capacity, Plaintiff, v. Leon Lott, in his capacity as Sheriff of the Richland County Sheriffs Department; Timothy Ehrhart, Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Lakenyata Maxwell, a self-represented individual, filed this civil rights action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of herself and as the personal representative of the Estate of Michael Thomas, Jr.. The defendants removed the action to this court. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Maxwell of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if she failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion. (ECF No. 9.) Maxwell filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 13), and the defendants replied (ECF No. 23). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the defendants' motion to dismiss. Maxwell's son was killed in May 2021 when a Richland County Sheriff's Deputy initiated a high-speed pursuit of a suspected drunk driver, causing the suspect to hit her son, who was riding a dirt bike near the roadway. Maxwell claims that the deputy, Defendant Timothy Ehrhart, initiated the chase in violation of Richland County Sheriff's Department policy, failed to take proper precautions during the chase, failed to render aid to her son after the crash, and engaged in a cover-up to conceal his wrongful acts.
On May 5, 2023, Maxwell filed a case in this court against Ehrhart and Richland County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-7810 et seq., seeking damages. C/A No. 3:23-1903-CMC-PJG. In that case, Maxwell raised claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, deprivation of substantive due process, and denial of equal protection against Ehrhart pursuant to § 1983. Maxwell also raised claims of municipal liability and negligence against Defendant “Richland County,” which the court construed as claims against the Richland County Sheriff, as Plaintiff improperly identified the “Richland County Sheriff's Department” as part of the government of Richland County, South Carolina. Regardless, the court summarily dismissed Maxwell's claims against the Richland County Sheriff without prejudice, concluding that the Sheriff was not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983, and the negligence claim could not be brought in federal court in the first instance under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. (ECF No. 27.) The court noted, however, that Maxwell could file suit against the Sheriff in state court, and the Sheriff could remove the case to this court. (Id. at n.3.)
Maxwell did just that, filing this case in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas just days after the court's order. In this case, Maxwell brings constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983 against Ehrhart which are identical to the claims that remain pending against him in the first case filed by Maxwell. Maxwell also again raises a claim of municipal liability pursuant to § 1983 as well as a negligence claim pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, but this time against Richland County Sheriff Leon Lott. Maxwell's allegations are also basically identical to her first case.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Maxwell's § 1983 claims against Ehrhart and Lott are duplicative of the claims she filed against him in the first case. The defendants also argue that Maxwell's negligence claim against Lott is barred by the statute of limitations.
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. The Defendants' Motion
1. Claims Pursuant to § 1983
The defendants argue that Maxwell's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are duplicative of the claims she raised in her first case, and therefore, the claims should be dismissed. The court agrees.
Generally, duplicative litigation within the federal courts is disfavored. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (“Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction. As between federal district courts, however, though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.”) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). One form of duplicative litigation, “claim-splitting,” arises when a plaintiff files two actions “on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000). Claim-splitting is a distinct but related concept to that of claim preclusion. Stone v. Dep't of Aviation, 453 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff's obligation to bring all related claims together in the same action arises under the common law rule of claim preclusion prohibiting the splitting of actions.”) Dismissal based on claim-splitting is appropriate where, “assuming that the first suit were already final, the second suit could be precluded pursuant to claim preclusion.” Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 296 F.3d 982, 987 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)). Thus, unlike with claim preclusion, no final judgment is needed in the first action to dismiss a claim or action based on improper claim-splitting. Katz, 655 F.3d at 1218.
Here, Maxwell's two cases in this court raise identical § 1983 causes of action against the same defendants. While in the first case Maxwell improperly identified Richland County as a defendant, the court construed the claims as being raised against the Richland County Sheriff and found that they were subject to summary dismissal. Thus, Maxwell's § 1983 claims in this case are duplicative of the claims she raised in the first case that have either already been adjudicated or are currently pending. They should therefore be dismissed. Katz, 655 F.3d at 1218; see also Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F.Supp.2d 688, 697 (D.S.C. 2007) (“Generally, a federal suit may be dismissed ‘for reasons of wise judicial administration . . . whenever it is duplicative of a parallel action already pending in another federal court.' ”) (quoting Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993)).
2. Claims Pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
The defendants argue that Maxwell's negligence claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The court agrees.
The defendants argue that Maxwell's negligence claim against Lott should also be dismissed as duplicative. However, in the first case, the court did not have jurisdiction over Maxwell's negligence claim because the State of South Carolina has not consented to be sued in federal court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e); Pennhurst State Sch., 465 U.S. at n.9 (1984) (recognizing that a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court); Gaskins v. South Carolina, C/A No. 8:15-4456-JMC-JDA, 2016 WL 8677201, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2016) (observing that a claim sought to be filed initially in federal court under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act “is not permitted in this federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment”), adopted by 2016 WL 3207855 (D.S.C. June 10, 2016). In the instant case, as Lott has waived that immunity by removing this case, seeLapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002) (holding that a State that voluntarily invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court by removing a case waives immunity for claims in which it has consented to suit in its own courts), Maxwell's negligence claim against Lott is now properly before the court and it is not duplicative of any claim over which the court has jurisdiction in the first case.
Generally, any claim brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act “is forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110. The incident giving rise to this case occurred on May 7, 2021, but Maxwell filed this case on October 6, 2023, more than two years after the incident.
The court is cognizant of the fact that Maxwell filed this case pro se, and that she filed her first case in this court on May 5, 2023, within the applicable limitations period. However, filing a case pro se or in the wrong court is not a disability that entitles a plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (providing that the statute is tolled for minors and “insane” persons). Maxwell argues that the minor disability applies to her because her son was a minor at the time he died. However, the minor disability applies only to “a person entitled to bring an action” under the Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40. Here, Maxwell is the person entitled to bring the action on behalf of her son's estate. Therefore, the fact that her son was a minor does not toll the statute of limitations for Maxwell.
Maxwell also argues she is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. In a supplement to Maxwell's response to the defendants' motion that was untimely filed, Maxwell asserts that she was previously represented by multiple attorneys who did not properly prosecute this case, which delayed her filing of this case. Maxwell also argues that Richland County Sheriff's Deputies harassed her at her home to discourage her from filing a case. (Suppl. Resp., ECF No. 27 at 6-8.) Maxwell's allegations are sparse on detail and fail to explain precisely how she was prevented from filing the lawsuit. See generally Hooper v. Ebenezer Sr. Servs. & Rehab. Ctr., 687 S.E.2d 29, 32 (S.C. 2009) (“The party claiming the statute of limitations should be tolled bears the burden of establishing sufficient facts to justify its use.”). After all, she did in fact timely file a lawsuit, but in the wrong court to raise a negligence claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. And, procedural mistakes, even if made by a pro se litigant, do not justify the tolling of the statute of limitations under South Carolina law. See, e.g., Pelzer v. State, 662 S.E.2d 618, 621 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (finding the statute of limitations should not be tolled for a pro se prisoner who timely mailed his post-conviction relief application but to the wrong court, despite the instructions written on the application explaining which court to file the case in). Therefore, Maxwell has not met her burden of showing an extraordinary circumstance that would justify the equitable tolling of the limitations period. See Hooper, 687 S.E.2d at 32-33; see also Hughes on behalf of Est. of Hughes v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, No. 2021-001339, __ S.E.2d __, 2024 WL 174339, at *10 (S.C. Jan. 17, 2024).
Maxwell's supplemental response was not timely filed, nor did she receive permission to file additional briefing. See generally F.D.I.C. v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to strike a sur-reply because the district's local rules made no provision for sur-replies, the reply brief did not raise a new legal theory or new evidence, and the court's decision was not inequitable). Regardless, even considering Maxwell's supplemental response, the court concludes that Maxwell is not entitled to equitable tolling.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.
Maxwell filed a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, (ECF No. 17), which the defendants argue should be denied as futile because the proposed amended complaint is virtually identical to the original complaint and raises the same claims against the same parties based on nearly identical facts. Therefore, the defendants argue, the amended complaint would not change the outcome of the court's ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court agrees. The proposed amended complaint would not change the court's recommendation that the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted. Therefore, Maxwell's motion to amend the complaint is denied as futile. See U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should freely give leave when justice so requires. Although such motions should be granted liberally, a district court may deny leave if amending the complaint would be futile-that is, if the proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).