Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-12130-RWZ
August 5, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Petitioner Glenn A. Mattson was convicted of assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to commit rape, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in Massachusetts Superior Court on February 25, 1977. On January 10, 2001, petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his due process rights to a fair trial were violated when the trial judge improperly gave the following instruction to the jury regarding the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt:
"You must be convinced to a moral certainty of the man's guilt. You can't act upon whim, caprice, or some vague desire to see somebody get off the hook. You must be convinced beyond a moral certainty that this man is guilty as charged. If you don't have that deep, abiding conviction, then, of course, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt and you must find him not guilty of the charges. If there remains no such doubt in your mind, then, of course, he should be found guilty as charged."
Petitioner correctly points out that the Supreme Court has discouraged the use of the phrase "moral certainty" in jury instructions as to reasonable doubt. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 10-16, 22 (1994). However, the Court has also held that use of the phrase "moral certainty," alone, will not render a jury instruction unconstitutional if the instruction, as a whole, impresses upon the jurors the correct standard of proof. Id. See also Watkins v. Murphy, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24119, *11-*14 (D.Mass. June 26, 2001) (reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence about the phrase "moral certainty" and describing current standard). At petitioner's trial, the judge elaborated upon the phrase "moral certainty," defining it as "a deep, abiding conviction" as to the defendant's guilt. The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that this additional language provided sufficient context to the phrase "moral certainty" to convey to the jury the high degree of certainty needed for conviction. This decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED. Judgment may be entered for the Respondent.