Opinion
Nos. 117847, 117852.
July 20, 2001.
COA: 213575, Wayne CC: 97-714625-NI
SC: 117852
COA: 211928
Wayne CC: 97-717377-NF On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal from the September 15, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.
Plaintiff was driving a rented U-Haul truck when he became involved in an automobile accident. He suffered serious injuries as a result of the collision and sued defendant truck driver in a civil action. At the time of the accident plaintiff was driving on a suspended license in violation of the law. A review of his driving history reveals that his driving privileges had previously been suspended on at least twenty-eight occasions. Many of these suspensions were the result of safety-related violations ranging from disobeying traffic signs and signals to driving 80 mph in a 25 mph speed zone. The trial court ruled that plaintiff's action was barred by the "wrongful conduct" rule. However, this ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
I would grant leave in this case in order to consider a number of issues relating to this state's "wrongful conduct" rule, which prohibits a plaintiff from maintaining an action "if, in order to establish his action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party." Orzel v. Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich. 550, 558 (1995). These issues are as follows: (a) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and his illegal conduct of driving on a suspended license was too attenuated for application of the "wrongful conduct" rule, or whether it should be presumed foreseeable that an individual, whose license has been suspended for the reasons here, is not only more likely to become involved in an accident injuring another, but is also more likely to become involved in an accident injuring himself; (b) whether, and to what extent, there is a statutory exception to the "wrongful conduct" rule, cf. Orzel, supra at 570-572, with Garwols v Baker's Trust Co, 251 Mich. 420 (1930); (c) whether, if there is a statutory exception, it is properly assessed by the standards of the Restatement, Torts, 2d, or by the traditional standards of statutory interpretation; (d) whether, if there is a statutory exception, it is relevant in the context of the present litigation, which was arguably, but not certainly, brought in the context of MCL 500.3135, a provision of the no-fault act that retains tort liability for plaintiffs suffering certain severe injuries as a result of motor vehicle accidents; and (e) whether there is a "safety statute" exception to the "wrongful conduct" rule, and if so, how such an exception is to be defined.
The "wrongful conduct" rule has its origins deep in the common law. Coke's lst Institute, § 148b ("[N]o man shall take advantage of his owne wrong, nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria."); 1A CJS Actions, § 29 at 386. Ascertaining the parameters of the "wrongful conduct" rule is an exercise essential to the preservation of a fair and equitable civil justice system, and indispensable to the maintenance of public respect for this system. Because I believe the present case squarely implicates each of these considerations, I would grant leave to appeal.
Cavanagh, J., concurs with the statement of Markman, J.