Opinion
No. 1-17-0798WC
02-23-2018
MATTESON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 159, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., (Mary Anne Higgins, Appellee and Cross-Appellant).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 17 L 50435 Honorable Carl Anthony Walker, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hudson, Harris, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that the claimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment with Matteson Elementary School District No. 159 and awarding her temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and permanent partial disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2010)) is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. That portion of the circuit court's judgment finding that the claimant is not entitled to an award of penalties pursuant to sections 19(k) and 19(l) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(k), 19(l) (West 2010)) or an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16 (West 2010)) is vacated. The circuit court's judgment confirming the Commission's decision is affirmed in all other respects. The cause is remanded to the Commission with directions to address the claimant's request for an award of penalties and attorney fees. ¶ 2 The Matteson Elementary School District No. 159 (District) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which confirmed a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) awarding the claimant, Mary Anne Higgins, temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and permanent partial disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2010)) for injuries sustained to her low back and left knee on February 16, 2011. The claimant has cross-appealed from that portion of the circuit court's judgment finding that she is not entitled to an award of penalties pursuant to sections 19(k) and 19 (l) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(k), 19(l) (West 2010)) or an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16 (West 2010)). For the reasons which follow, we: affirm that portion of the circuit court's judgment which confirmed the Commission's decision; vacate that portion of the circuit court's judgment which found that the claimant is not entitled to an award of penalties pursuant to sections 19(k) and 19(l) of the Act or an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 16 of the Act; and remand this matter back to the Commission with directions to address the claimant's request for an award of penalties and attorney fees. ¶ 3 The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing held on January 29, 2015. ¶ 4 Prior to the events at issue, the claimant had a medical history that is relevant to this appeal. Medical records entered into evidence show that she presented to WellGroup Health Partners for treatment in connection with bilateral knee pain in June 2004, neck and back pain in December 2004, and low back pain and left leg sciatica in September 2006. X-rays taken in July 2007 revealed "spondylitic changes at multiple levels of the cervical spine," and an MRI performed in August 2007 revealed mild degenerative disc disease. Dr. Thomas Hurley, a neurological surgeon, testified in his deposition that, from October 2007 to December 2009, he treated the claimant's cervical spine, and, during that period, she never reported low back pain. ¶ 5 The claimant testified that, on February 16, 2011, she was employed by the District as a special education resource teacher. On that date, she slipped on ice in the District's parking lot, injuring her left knee, and, when she tried to stand, slipped again and struck her tailbone on the ground. An ambulance took her to the hospital, where X-rays revealed "[d]egenerative changes in the patellofemoral compartment" of her left knee and "[m]ultilevel degenerative changes, most severe from L4 through S1" in her lumbar spine, but no acute fractures or subluxation in either location. She was discharged from the hospital and, subsequently, returned to work. ¶ 6 On February 21 and March 1, 2011, the claimant treated with Dr. Guarang Zala for non-radiating low back and left knee pain. Dr. Zala noted tenderness around both the L4-L5 vertebrae and the patella and medial joint line of the left knee. ¶ 7 On March 23, 2011, the claimant presented to Dr. David Mehl, an orthopedic surgeon, who observed that her left knee exhibited "significant tenderness over the medial joint line," restricted motion, and moderate crepitus. He diagnosed "preexisting" mild left knee degenerative joint disease and a "[w]ork-related injury with probable medial meniscus tear." He provided the claimant with a knee brace and recommended that she undergo an MRI, but, due to her insurance plan, she first attempted physical therapy. ¶ 8 On April 21, 2011, the claimant treated for low back pain with Dr. Hurley. On April 22, 2011, she underwent an MRI that revealed "degenerative disc [disease] at L4-5 and L5-S1" and "grade 1 spondylolisthesis with neuroforaminal stenosis[ ] *** at the L4-5 region." ¶ 9 On April 29, 2011, the claimant returned to Dr. Mehl, who noted that physical therapy had not improved her left knee pain. An MRI of her left knee, conducted on May 5, 2011, revealed "[h]igh-grade chondromalacia of the patellofemoral joint" and "[m]ild to moderate arthritic changes," but "[n]o evidence of a meniscal tear." After reviewing the MRI, Dr. Mehl concluded that: (1) the claimant might have an "occult" meniscal tear; and (2) her "chondromalacia is posttraumatic in nature and due to the work injury." Based on the foregoing, he recommended surgery. ¶ 10 On May 25, 2011, at the District's request, the claimant underwent an independent medical evaluation (IME) by Dr. Theodore Suchy, an orthopedic surgeon, who memorialized his opinions from the appointment in a letter dated May 27, 2011. Dr. Suchy examined the claimant's left knee, lumbar spine, and MRI results and concluded that, due to the work injury, she sustained a left knee contusion and a lumbar strain that temporarily exacerbated the degenerative conditions in both her left knee and low back. According to Dr. Suchy, the claimant's spondylolisthesis was preexisting and, absent a severe accident such as "a fall from a 20-foot ladder," could not have resulted from trauma. Dr. Suchy opined that, due to the work injury, the claimant required left knee surgery and would reach maximum medical improvement (MMI) after three to four months. Regarding the claimant's low back injury, he stated that surgery was unnecessary and that she would reach MMI after six to eight weeks of physical therapy. The claimant, however, testified that Dr. Suchy did not examine her low back during the IME. ¶ 11 On August 12, 2011, the claimant underwent a left knee arthroscopy, partial medial meniscectomy, and diffuse chondroplasty, which was performed by Dr. Mehl. The claimant's postoperative diagnosis was persistent left knee chondromalacia with pain and a medial meniscus tear. Following the surgery, both Drs. Mehl and Hurley removed the claimant from work. ¶ 12 On August 26, 2011, the claimant underwent a CT scan of her lumbar spine, which revealed, inter alia, (1) grade 1 L4-L5 spondylolisthesis secondary to severe facet degeneration, and (2) L5-S1 neural foraminal stenosis secondary to facet arthropathy and degenerative disc disease. The CT scan did not reveal acute spinal changes. ¶ 13 In a letter dated November 5, 2011, Dr. Suchy stated that he reviewed the CT scan and found degenerative conditions but no acute abnormalities. Based on treatment notes from Drs. Hurley and Mehl, and progress notes from physical therapy, Dr. Suchy concluded that the claimant's low back condition had reached MMI and that any further treatment would relate to her preexisting lumbar arthropathy and degenerative disc disease, but not her work injury. He did not offer an opinion as to her left knee. ¶ 14 The claimant continued treating with Dr. Mehl, who administered a cortisone injection to her left knee in November 2011. On December 12, 2011, he determined that her left knee reached MMI, with full range of motion, "moderate crepitus," and "[s]trength *** at 80%." He released her to work "with respect to her knee" but had "no opinion" regarding her low back. On January 30, 2012, Dr. Mehl administered a Synvisc injection after the claimant presented with moderate swelling and crepitus in her left knee. When she returned on March 28, 2012, Dr. Mehl observed "significant popping and crepitus in the patellofemoral joint" and "significant grade III and grade IV chondromalacia in the patellofemoral joint[,] a significant amount of which was post-traumatic in nature." ¶ 15 In June 2012, Dr. Hurley noted that the pain in the claimant's low back, left buttock, and both legs continued despite two epidural steroid injections and therapy. He concluded that conservative treatment had failed and recommended surgery. On October 11, 2012, he performed an L4-L5 posterior lumbar interbody fusion with instrumentation and grafts, a bilateral L4-L5 pedicle screw fixation, and an L4-L5 bone arthrodesis. In the following months, the claimant presented with worsening pain in her low back and both legs. ¶ 16 On December 31, 2012, and July 17, 2013, Dr. Mehl provided the claimant with Synvisc injections and noted "[s]evere patellofemoral crepitus" with swelling in her left knee. ¶ 17 The claimant testified that she returned to work on August 18, 2013. Dr. Hurley, in treatment notes from October 9, 2013, opined that the claimant should not work because "she keeps getting worse." Dr. Hurley took the claimant off work the following month, and, per the claimant's testimony, her last day of work was November 15, 2013. An MRI, conducted on December 5, 2013, revealed new "right L3/4 lateral recess stenosis" and worsening "left L5/S1 NF stenosis ***." On December 30, 2013, Dr. Hurley noted that the claimant might have "failed back surgery syndrome" and that further back surgery was not certain to improve her condition. ¶ 18 Soon afterwards, the claimant began treating for back pain with Dr. Intesar Hussain, a pain specialist. On January 27, 2014, Dr. Hussain diagnosed her with chronic low back pain and bilateral radicular pain secondary to lumbosacral radiculities, and prescribed pain medications. ¶ 19 On February 26, 2014, Dr. Mehl examined the claimant and found "further degeneration" of her left-knee cartilage "as a result of" the work injury. She appeared bowlegged, which Dr. Mehl attributed to her degenerated cartilage. X-rays taken that day revealed degenerative changes and joint space narrowing. Dr. Mehl administered another Synvisc injection. ¶ 20 Dr. Hurley's notes show that the claimant's back and leg pain intensified through April 2014. Due to a "clear worsening" of her condition resulting from "adjacent level degeneration from her L4/5 fusion," Dr. Hurley recommended additional surgery. On May 12, 2014, he performed an L3-L4 posterior lumbar interbody fusion with instrumentation and autograft, an L5-S1 laminectomy, a left L5-S complete facetectomy and foraminotomy, a bilateral L3-S1 pedicle screw fixation, and a bilateral L3-L4 and L5-S1 posterolateral transverse process bone arthrodesis with autograft. ¶ 21 On June 27, 2014, Dr. Hurley noted that the claimant's right leg and low back pain had improved but her left leg pain persisted. On September 25, 2015, when she last presented to Dr. Hurley, she exhibited little progress from physical therapy, reported ongoing pain in her left leg and low back, and stated that her ability to perform activities of daily living was limited. ¶ 22 On August 29, 2014, Dr. Mehl administered another Synvisc injection and concluded that the claimant would need left-knee replacement surgery. ¶ 23 In their depositions, Drs. Mehl and Hurley testified that a causal relationship existed between the claimant's work accident and current condition of ill-being as to her left knee and low back. Dr. Mehl opined that, due to the work accident, the claimant tore her medial meniscus and sustained trauma to the articular cartilage of her left knee. These injuries exacerbated her preexisting degenerative knee problems and caused her ongoing condition of ill-being as to her left knee. Dr. Hurley stated that the claimant's fall "aggravated" her spondylolisthesis and produced her current condition of ill-being as to her low back. According to both Drs. Mehl and Hurley, the claimant's treatment and surgeries subsequent to February 16, 2011, were necessary and directly related to her work injury. ¶ 24 Drs. Mehl and Hurley also disagreed with some of Dr. Suchy's opinions. Dr. Mehl disputed that the claimant's work injury merely resulted in a contusion to her left knee. Dr. Hurley denied that the slip-and-fall was insufficient to aggravate her spondylolisthesis, and posited that her back condition resulted from a "structural issue to her spine," rather than a temporary muscle strain. ¶ 25 Dr. Suchy responded to Drs. Mehl's and Hurley's depositions in a letter dated May 5, 2014. Therein, he stated that the claimant's lumbar spine treatment after November 5, 2011, including her October 11, 2012 surgery, was medically necessary but solely attributable "to the natural progression of her preexisting [low back] problem." According to Dr. Suchy, the claimant's "failed back syndrome" and chronic pain permanently restricted her from work but was unrelated to the work accident. ¶ 26 The claimant testified that, at the time of the hearing, she experienced "excruciating" pain in her low back and left knee, could not bend down or ambulate in a classroom, walked with a cane, and was unable to dance, socialize, or babysit her grandchild. She denied any injuries to her knees or back prior to February 16, 2011, and did not recall seeking treatment for knee or low back pain prior to that date. ¶ 27 Following a hearing held on January 29, 2015, the arbitrator found that the claimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment, but that her current condition of ill-being is not causally related to the work accident because (1) her low back reached MMI on November 5, 2011, and (2) her left knee reached MMI on December 12, 2011. The arbitrator awarded the claimant 17 4/7 weeks of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits under section 8(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 2010)), for the period between August 12, 2011, through December 12, 2011, and reasonable and necessary medical expenses for testing and treatment of her low back (through November 5, 2011) and left knee (through December 12, 2011), plus out-of-pocket expenses. Additionally, the arbitrator awarded the claimant 37.5 weeks of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits under section 8(d)2 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)2 (West 2010)) because her low back injury caused a 7.5% loss of use of the person as a whole, and 53.75 weeks of PPD benefits under section 8(e)12 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(e)12 (West 2010)) because her left knee injury caused a 25% loss of use of her left leg. The arbitrator also stated that, by stipulation of the parties, the District would receive a credit for already-paid TTD benefits and payments made by its group health insurance carrier under section 8(j) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(j) (West 2010)). The arbitrator denied the claimant's petition for attorney fees and penalties under sections 16, 19(k), and 19(l) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k), 19(l) (West 2010)). ¶ 28 The claimant filed a petition for review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. On June 6, 2016, the Commission issued a unanimous decision that reversed the arbitrator's decision and found that the claimant proved that the work accident "caused the conditions of ill being of both her left knee and lumbar spine ***." In so holding, the Commission awarded the claimant TTD benefits under section 8(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 2010)), for the periods between August 12, 2011, through August 13, 2013, and November 15, 2013, through September 25, 2014, and awarded her "all" medical expenses related to treatment of her left knee and lumbar spine that were submitted into evidence, plus reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, under section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)). Additionally, the Commission awarded the claimant 264.5 weeks of PPD benefits under section 8(d)2 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)2 (West 2010)) because her left knee injury caused a 30% loss of use of her left leg and her low back injury caused a 40% loss of use of the person as a whole, and granted her interest, if any, under section 19(n) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(n) (West 2010)). Finally, the Commission granted the District credit for payments already made due to the work injury, including payments made by its group health insurance carrier under section 8(j) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(j) (West 2010)). The Commission neither addressed the claimant's petition for attorney fees and penalties nor made any reference to the arbitrator's ruling thereon. ¶ 29 The District, but not the claimant, sought a judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County. On March 8, 2017, the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision and found that the claimant was not entitled to an award of attorney fees or penalties under the Act. The District now appeals and the claimant cross-appeals. ¶ 30 On appeal, the District has not contested the Commission's finding that the claimant sustained an accident on February 16, 2011, that arose out of and in the course of her employment. It argues only that the Commission's award of (1) TTD benefits, (2) medical expenses, and (3) PPD benefits is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We consider these contentions in turn. ¶ 31 First, we address the District's challenge to the Commission's TTD award. The District contends that the evidence established that the claimant reached MMI as to her low back injury on November 5, 2011, and as to her left knee injury on December 12, 2011; and as a consequence, any award of TTD benefits for the period following December 12, 2011, is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. ¶ 32 A claimant is temporarily totally incapacitated from the time an injury incapacitates her from work until such time as she is as far recovered or restored as the permanent character of injury will permit. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ill. 2d 107, 118 (1990). The key consideration is whether the claimant's condition has stabilized, "because a claimant is entitled to TTD [benefits] when a disabling condition is temporary and has not reached a permanent condition." F & B Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 325 Ill. App. 3d 527, 531 (2001). To be entitled to TTD benefits, the claimant has the burden to establish that she did not and could not work during the relevant period. Holocker v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2017 IL App (3d) 160363WC, ¶ 34. ¶ 33 The period during which a claimant is temporarily totally disabled is a question of fact for the Commission. Id. ¶ 35. "The Commission's determination of factual issues, including the resolution of conflicting medical evidence, and the credibility and weight of testimony, will not be disturbed unless against the manifest weight of the evidence." McLean Trucking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Ill. 2d 213, 219 (1983). A finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if an opposite conclusion is apparent or "no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the Commission's decision." Fickas v. Industrial Comm'n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1041 (1999). ¶ 34 Preliminarily, we observe that, although the Commission awarded the claimant TTD benefits from August 12, 2011, through August 13, 2013, and November 15, 2013, through September 25, 2014, the evidence at her hearing suggests slightly different dates for the period she returned to work. Specifically, the claimant testified that her first day of work was August 18, 2013, and her last day was November 15, 2013. The District, however, has not raised this issue on appeal and, therefore, it is waived. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). ¶ 35 Turning to the merits of the Commission's decision to award TTD benefits, we find that its determination is well-supported by the evidence adduced at the claimant's hearing. Both Drs. Mehl and Hurley removed the claimant from work following her left knee surgery on August 12, 2011. While Dr. Mehl found that the claimant's left knee reached MMI on December 12, 2011, Dr. Hurley's treatment notes and deposition testimony describe how the claimant's low back condition continued to deteriorate through her last appointment on September 25, 2014. As the District observes, Dr. Suchy opined that the claimant's low back reached MMI on November 5, 2011. The Commission, however, was presented with conflicting evidence, and we must defer to its determination in accepting Dr. Hurley's opinion, which was supported by his personal observations of the claimant's condition during several years of treatment. See McLean Trucking Co., 96 Ill. 2d at 219; Compass Group v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2014 IL App (2d) 121283WC, ¶ 18 (the reviewing court owes "substantial deference to the Commission's findings regarding medical issues, as its expertise in this area is well recognized."). The Commission, therefore, could properly determine that the claimant's condition of low back ill-being did not stabilize until September 25, 2014. See F & B Manufacturing Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 531. Based on the foregoing, the Commission's award of TTD benefits is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 36 Next, we consider the District's claim of error as to the Commission's decision to award the claimant "all" medical expenses related to treatment of her left knee and lumbar spine. The record shows that these expenses include (1) $275,694.05 that was paid by its group health insurance carrier, (2) $334.80 due to Allied Anesthesia, and (3) $4,687.61 in out-of-pocket expenses. ¶ 37 Under section 8(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)), the claimant is entitled to recover reasonable medical expenses that are causally related to the accident and that are determined to be required to diagnose, relieve, or cure the effects of her injury. See University of Illinois v. Industrial Comm'n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 154, 164 (1992). The claimant has the burden to prove that the medical services were necessary and the expenses were reasonable. See Gallentine v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 880, 888 (1990). What is reasonable and necessary is a question of fact for the Commission, and its determination will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Cole v. Byrd, 167 Ill. 2d 128, 136-37 (1995); University of Illinois, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 164. ¶ 38 In support of its argument that the Commission's award of medical expenses is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the District again relies on Dr. Suchy's opinion that the claimant could expect to reach MMI as to her left knee three to four months after surgery, reached MMI as to her low back on November 5, 2011, and that any further treatment related to her preexisting degenerative conditions and not her work accident. In their depositions, however, both Drs. Mehl and Hurley testified that a causal relationship exists between the claimant's work accident and current condition of ill-being as to her left knee and low back, and that her treatment and surgeries subsequent to February 16, 2011, were necessary and directly related to her work injury. ¶ 39 It was the function of the Commission to judge the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight to be accorded their testimony, and to resolve conflicting medical evidence. O'Dette v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 249, 253 (1980). And we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission when ample evidence exists to supported its decision. The Commission relied upon the opinions of Drs. Mehl and Hurley and rejected Dr. Suchy's differing opinion. See Absolute Cleaning/SVMBL v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 409 Ill. App. 3d 463, 471 (2011). We are unable to find that the Commission's decision in this regard is against the manifest weight of the evidence and, therefore, find no error in the Commission's award of medical expenses. ¶ 40 Finally, we consider the District's argument that the Commission erred in awarding the claimant PPD benefits based upon a 30% loss of use of her left leg and a 40% loss of use of the person as a whole for the injury to her low back. First, the District argues that the Commission mistakenly believed that Dr. Suchy did not examine the claimant's low back. The Commission's decision, however, expressly references Dr. Suchy's May 27, 2011, report that details his examination of the claimant's back. Second, the District alleges that the Commission's decision contains four references to the claimant's right leg pain, which was not at issue in this case. While this is true, our review of the Commission's 12-page decision reveals that it correctly referred to the claimant's left leg through the remainder of the decision. We believe, therefore, that the reference to the claimant's right leg is a scrivener's error. ¶ 41 As to the extent of the claimant's permanent partial disability, we again note that, although Dr. Suchy opined that the claimant's current condition of low back and left leg ill being is related to her preexisting degenerative conditions and not her work accident, both Drs. Mehl and Hurley testified that a causal relationship exists between the claimant's work accident and current condition of ill-being as to her left knee and low back. We also reject the District's contention that the Commission ignored evidence of the claimant's earlier treatment for back and neck problems, as the Commission expressly noted that she "did have pre-existing conditions of ill being of both her left knee and lumbar spine." ¶ 42 "[B]ecause of the Commission's expertise in the area of worker's [sic] compensation, its findings on the question of the nature and extent of permanent disability should be given substantial deference" and "will not be set aside on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 Ill. App. 3d 616, 624 (1999). In awarding the claimant PPD benefits, the Commission relied upon the opinions of Drs. Mehl and Hurley, and we are unable to find that its determination in this regard is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Dr. Mehl testified that the claimant sustained cartilage damage in her left knee due to her work injury, appeared bowlegged as a result, and would need left knee replacement surgery. Dr. Hurley testified that, as of her last appointment, the claimant exhibited little progress from physical therapy, reported ongoing pain in her left leg and low back, and stated that her ability to perform activities of daily living was limited. The claimant, for her part, testified that, at the time of the hearing, she experienced "excruciating" pain in her low back and left knee, could not bend down or ambulate in a classroom, walked with a cane, and was unable to dance, socialize, or babysit her grandchild. ¶ 43 Based upon the record before us, we find no error in the Commission's PPD award based upon its determination that the claimant suffered a 30% loss of use of her left leg and a 40% loss of use of the person as a whole as the result of the injury to her low back. ¶ 44 Turning to the claimant's cross-appeal, her sole contention is that the denial of penalties and fees under sections 16, 19(k), and 19(l) of the (Act 820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k), 19(l) (West 2010)) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She argues that the District (1) unreasonably relied on Dr. Suchy's opinion in failing to pay TTD benefits and certain medical bills after December 12, 2011, (2) began paying TTD benefits on August 19, 2011, rather than the date of her left knee surgery, August 12, 2011, and (3) paid less TTD than she was owed. ¶ 45 Preliminarily, the District argues that "no jurisdiction" exists to consider the issue of penalties because the claimant failed to file an "appeal or cross-appeal" raising the issue in the circuit court. This argument lacks merit, as a summons filed with the circuit court brings the entire record of the Commission before the circuit court, and an adverse party need not file a separate summons or cross-appeal to challenge parts of the Commission's decision. See Hurt v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738 (1989) (although the employer did not seek judicial review, the claimant's request for review "brought before the circuit court the employer's objections to the Commission's award"); Continental Drilling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 155 Ill App. 3d 1031, 1038 (1987) (finding that the circuit court, on review from the Commission, may "review a question presented by the record and argued by a party" although that party "did not seek review under some procedure comparable to filing a cross-appeal."). This court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over the cause following the District's timely appeal from the order of the circuit court. ¶ 46 Although we reject the District's jurisdictional challenge, we are unable to address the issue of penalties and attorney fees on the merits at this juncture. When, as in the present case, an appeal is taken following entry of judgment by the circuit court on review from a decision of the Commission, this court reviews the ruling of the Commission, not the judgment of the circuit court. Dodaro v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 403 Ill. App. 3d 538, 543 (2010). In this case, although the record shows that the claimant argued the issue of the attorney fees and penalties before both the Commission and the circuit court, the Commission's decision neither addressed the claimant's petition for attorney fees and penalties, nor made any reference to the arbitrator's ruling thereon, and nothing in the record establishes that the Commission ruled on the issue. We, therefore, vacate the circuit court's finding that the claimant was not entitled to an award of attorney fees or penalties under the Act and remand the issue of penalties and attorney fees back to the Commission for consideration. See May v. Industrial Comm'n, 195 Ill. App. 3d 468, 491 (1990) (remanding to the Commission where its decision "did not mention the claimant's motion for penalties and attorney fees" and "there is no indication in the record that the Commission even considered" the motion). ¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we: vacate that portion of the circuit court's order court's finding that the claimant was not entitled to an award of attorney fees or penalties under the Act; affirm the circuit court's judgment in all other respects; and remand the issue of penalties and attorney fees back to the Commission for consideration. ¶ 48 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
The arbitrator's decision was internally inconsistent regarding causation because, as we explain, the arbitrator found that the claimant's work accident did not cause her current condition of ill-being, but, nonetheless, awarded her permanent partial disability benefits. --------