Opinion
February 27, 1962
Order, entered June 20, 1961, dismissing petition in proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, in which petitioner sought to have annulled a determination followed by censure by a private professional association that he had been guilty of unethical conduct, unanimously affirmed, without costs, but solely on the ground that the proceeding is moot. Petitioner resigned, and, following the determination by the association concerning which he complains, the resignation was accepted. This renders the present proceeding moot. Consequently, Special Term should not have reached the merits, and this court does not. Special Term, therefore, should have dismissed the petition, but not on the grounds assigned. Regrettable as it may be from petitioner's point of view, the court may not, solely to assuage the hurt to him, personally or professionally, review his former status in the association, once that status has been removed by his voluntary act. In short, petitioner may not convert this proceeding into a nonmonetary equivalent of a remedy for defamation (see Angland v. Doe, 263 F.2d 266; Hanes v. Pace, 203 F.2d 225; Davis v. Cason, 185 Ga. 334).
Concur — Botein, P.J., Breitel, Rabin, Valente and McNally, JJ.