Order unanimously modified on the law and facts and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following Memorandum: In this child protective proceeding (Family Ct Act art 10), the evidence was sufficient to support Family Court's finding that respondent had abused the children Timothy and Katherine and that finding was not against the weight of the evidence. There was no evidence, however, to support the finding that respondent had abused the child Daniel. Based on respondent's behavior toward the other children, however, we find that Daniel is a neglected child (see, Department of Social Servs. v Manual S., 148 Misc.2d 988; Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914). We determine that the court properly permitted the validator to render her opinion (see, Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, rearg denied sub nom. Matter of Francis Charles W., 71 N.Y.2d 890). There is no requirement that the validator meet with the child for a certain period of time.

We do not find these considerations to be significant. Although the fact-finding order in a sexual abuse case must state the particular sex offense involved as defined by the Penal Law, a finding of sexual abuse, which is based on less rigid rules of hearsay and corroboration than in a criminal proceeding, does not subject a parent to criminal sanctions (see, Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, supra; see also Matter of Linda K., 132 A.D.2d 149, supra; Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914). While a subsequent criminal proceeding is, of course, a possibility, any such proceeding would be completely independent (see, Matter of Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354). Further, while a finding of repeated abuse may form the basis of a termination of parental rights proceeding under Social Services Law § 384-b (4) (e), in such a proceeding the petitioning agency would have the enhanced burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence (see, Social Services Law § 384-b [g]). Finally, we reject the appellant's argument that the stigma which attaches to a finding of abuse is sufficiently greater than the stigma of a finding of neglect so as to require a higher burden of proof.

In essence, they must "`take steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child from their home'" (Matter of Nathaniel T., 67 N.Y.2d 838, 840, quoting from Matter of Leon RR., supra, at 125). Here, after the appellant was found to have sexually molested her 4 1/2 year old twins, her son Travis was removed from her home (see, Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914). The Family Court directed her to seek mental health counseling if she wanted to reunite herself with her son. The record demonstrates that although the appellant regularly and continuously attended group therapy sessions, and actively participated in the group, due to her lack of acknowledgment of guilt, the cause of abuse was never explored and she was unable to gain any insight to her behavior.

In evaluating the quality of the expert testimony in the instant case, a number of salient factors cannot be overlooked. Firstly, Dr. Tuthill's testimony was predicated on more than five months of weekly therapy sessions with Linda. Secondly, the detail and precision of Linda's description of the sexual acts to which she had been subjected, while unusual for a child of her tender years, is consistent with the behavior of sexually abused children in a clinical setting. Moreover, the fact that Linda was able to give explicit details of her encounters reflects a strong improbability that her statements were mere fabrications (see, Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914, 916). Thirdly, Linda's involvement of her dolls in oral sexual activity during the course of play therapy and her comments that her father had engaged in such conduct with her are significant. In a somewhat similar vein, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that where the evidence shows that a three-year-old child exhibited conduct during play therapy which indicated that she had been exposed to inappropriate sexual conduct with a male, and had used certain names in reference to genitalia, all in a manner characteristic of children who have been sexually abused, charges of child abuse would be sustained (Matter of Cheryl H., 153 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1118-1119, 200 Cal.Rptr. 789, 800-801).

ion 1046 (a) (i), when applied in conjunction with the presumption of continuance (Matter of Cruz, supra, at 903), would support an affirmative answer to this question under certain circumstances. In this court's view, a finding of derivative abuse or neglect would be proper, if: (1) the offensive conduct proven as to one child was not remote in time (Matter of James P., supra, at 464; Matter of Maureen G., 103 Misc.2d 109; compare, Matter of Daniel C., 47 A.D.2d 160); (2) the conduct was serious or involved a course of abusive or neglectful behavior (see, Matter of Jovann B., 153 A.D.2d 858, 859, supra; Matter of Victoria SS., 108 A.D.2d 989, 990-991; see also, Matter of Susan B., 102 A.D.2d 938, 939; Matter of Richard SS., 87 A.D.2d 915; Matter of Shelley Renea K., 79 A.D.2d 1073, 1074); and, (3) the conduct demonstrated a fundamental defect in respondent's understanding of the duties and obligations of parenthood (Matter of Christina Maria C., supra; Matter of Richard SS., supra; Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914). In deciding whether the last element has been satisfied, the court need not exclude common sense and every day experience from its deliberations (Matter of T.G., supra, at 919, and cases cited therein).

There had been an earlier judicial finding to that effect in Georgia, following which respondents moved with T.G. to New York. A derivative finding of neglect of T.G. (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [i]) was made after the article 10 hearing in a decision of this court dated May 21, 1985 (see, Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914). In the resulting October 22, 1985 consent dispositional order placing him in DSS custody for 18 months, respondents agreed, inter alia, to supervised visitation with T.G., and to undergo evaluation and treatment for incest for as long as judicially deemed necessary.

"The two proceedings operate independently of each other, and neither Grand Juries, criminal courts, nor prosecutors are bound or legally influenced by the results of Family Court determinations." (Matter of T.G., 128 Misc.2d 914, 918.) Similarly, since there has been no prior prosecution of this matter in any criminal court, no issue of ultimate fact has previously been determined by a valid and final judgment and there is no collateral estoppel (see, People v Chang, 86 Misc.2d 272).

Petitioner argues that if this court now utilizes the standard established by the new statutory amendment as well as by some earlier and contemporary case law, the corroborative evidence presented in this matter passes muster. Relying in part on this court's earlier decision in Matter of T.G. ( 128 Misc.2d 914), counsel for petitioner asks that great weight now be given to the detail and precision of the child's sordid accounts as indicative of the improbability that they were fabricated tales. She also points to testimony which independently verifies that the men Janet identified as her abusers were in fact present in respondent's home.