Opinion
August 22, 1984
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Slavin, J.).
Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, motion to dismiss denied, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Petitioners instituted the within proceeding pursuant to article 16 of the Election Law seeking to validate their candidacies for election as members of the County Committee for the Democratic Party of Kings County from various election districts in the 44th Assembly District. The petition served herein is verified by petitioners' attorney pursuant to CPLR 3020 (subd [d], par 3). Special Term, relying upon the Appellate Division, Fourth Department's decision in Matter of Sedita v Smolinski ( 89 A.D.2d 1052), determined, inter alia, that verification by an attorney rather than a party to the proceedings does not comply with section 16-116 Elec. of the Election Law and accordingly dismissed the proceeding. We disagree.
Section 16-116 Elec. of the Election Law provides, inter alia, that a proceeding brought pursuant to that article "shall be heard upon a verified petition and such oral or written proof as may be offered". Nothing in this section requires a holding that verification of a petition may not be based upon an attorney's verification pursuant to CPLR 3020 (subd. [d], par 3). In fact, the equities in an election proceeding weigh heavily in favor of allowing such a verification because these proceedings are subject to severe time constraints and require immediate action. Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached in Matter of Sedita v Smolinski ( supra) and hold that a petition commencing a proceeding pursuant to article 16 of the Election Law may be verified by an attorney pursuant to the requirements set forth in the CPLR.
We also disagree with Special Term's determination that the attorney's verification herein does not comply with CPLR 3021. In this case, verification by petitioners' attorney is permitted as he had an office in a county other than the one in which the petitioners reside (CPLR 3020, subd. [d], par 3). In his verification, the attorney attested to this fact and stated that all of the contents of the petition "are true to my own knowledge" except as to matters alleged on information and belief. As to those matters which dealt solely with respondents-respondents' actions in filing objections with the Board of Elections, petitioners' attorney stated that he "believe[d] them to be true". Such a verification. complies with CPLR 3021.
Parenthetically, we note that petitioners' attorney was present on the return date of the order to show cause, and, when informed of respondents-respondents' objection to his verification, offered his testimony to the court in order to clarify the basis of his verification, which offer was refused. Rather than dismiss the proceeding on the basis of a purportedly defective verification, Special Term should have received counsel's oral testimony at that time in order to supplement the verification.
For the above-stated reasons, the dismissal of the proceeding was erroneous. Accordingly, this matter is remitted to Special Term for a trial on the issues raised by respondents-respondents' objections to petitioners' candidacies. Bracken, J.P., O'Connor, Brown, Boyers and Eiber, JJ., concur.